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 This thesis considers the prospects for including respect for patient autonomy as a value in 
veterinary medical ethics. Chapter One considers why philosophers have traditionally denied autonomy 
to animals and why this is problematic; I also present contemporary accounts of animal ethics that 
e og ize a i als  apa it  fo  a d e e ise of auto o  o  so ethi g si ila , su h as age  as 
morally important. In Chapter Two, I review veterinary medical ethics today, finding that respect for 
patient autonomy is undiscussed or rejected outright as irrelevant. Extrapolating mainstream medical 
ethi s  account of autonomy to veterinary medicine upholds this conclusion, as it would count all 
patients as e e -competent  and consider determining their autonomous choices impossible; thus 
welfare alone would be relevant. Chapter Three begins, in Part I, by describing the ways we routinely 
override patient autonomy in veterinary practice, both in terms of which interventions are selected and 
how care is delivered. I also show that some trends in the field suggest a nascent, implicit respect for 
patient autonomy. Part II of Chapter Three presents feminist criticisms of the mainstream approach to 
patient autonomy. I argue that the relational approach to autonomy advocated by such critics can be 
meaningfully applied in the veterinary realm. I advance an approach that conceives respect for patient 
autonomy in diachronic and dialogic terms, taking the patient as the foremost locus of respect. In 
Chapter Four, I turn to issues of practical implementation, such as interpreting what constitutes an 
a i al s alues a d o e s, and assessing the effect of positive reinforcement training on autonomy. 
The Conclusion offers areas for future research while refuting the objection that a simpler, expanded 
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 In this thesis, I examine the principle of respect for patient autonomy, an important value in 
human-centered biomedical ethics, and its relevance and usefulness in veterinary medicine. My interest 
in this topic first arose when, as veterinary director, I was helping to establish a new chimpanzee 
sa tua . The hi pa zees e e ei g eti ed  f o  biomedical research after such use of the species 
was banned in the United States. As a sanctuary, we were committed to putting the chimpanzees and 
their needs and interests first and foremost. P io  to thei  t a sfe  to the sa tua , the hi pa zees  
fates and most aspects of their day-to-day lives had been determined chiefly by human interests and 
concerns. In recognition of this fact, our team was committed to providing the chimpanzees with many 
opportunities for personal choice and directing their own lives; in other words, we would strive to 
maximize their ability to exercise autonomy.  
 These concerns were to inform all aspects of care-giving and facility planning, and the veterinary 
department was to be no exception. But, given that veterinary care, however beneficial, was unlikely to 
be something chimpanzees would choose on their own, how could we respect their autonomy while 
also meeting or exceeding the highest professional standards, as we aspired? I soon found that I was 
entering largely uncharted territory in the fields of both veterinary medicine and animal1 ethics. 
 In this thesis, I argue that the principle of respect for autonomy can and should be incorporated 
as a value in veterinary medicine, and that a relational conception of autonomy is needed for the 
principle to be usefully and meaningfully applied. Over the course of four chapters, I will gradually 
narrow my discussion from the broader context of autonomy as a general philosophical and ethical topic 
to the specific case of veterinary patients and the real-world application of respect for patient 
autonomy, relationally conceived.  
                                                          
1
 “olel  fo  the sake of e it , this thesis ill ge e all  use the te  a i al  to efe  to a i als othe  tha  
humans. Human beings are of course acknowledged to be a variety of animal. 
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 I review in Chapter One some general arguments for denying autonomy to animals and 
challenges to these arguments. I present the accounts of several animal ethicists who argue for including 
respect for autonomy – or something like it – among values important in determining our ethical 
obligations to animals. In Chapter Two, I survey the existing literature on veterinary ethics to establish 
what role, if any, might currently be acknowledged for respect for patient autonomy. Concluding that 
this fails to be an articulated value in veterinary medical ethics, I go on to export to the veterinary case 
the ai st ea  a ou t of espe t fo  auto omy used in human-centered biomedical ethics. I show 
that, because of the limited cognitive and linguistic abilities of veterinary patients, such an extrapolation 
esults i  the o lusio  that espe ti g patie t auto o  is ot a o g the ete i a ia s  oral duties. 
 In Chapter Three, I describe ways in which patient autonomy is routinely overridden in the 
practice of veterinary medicine, both in terms of which veterinary interventions are selected and how 
the resulting necessary care is delivered. I then point to recent trends in veterinary medicine that seem 
to suggest a nascent but unarticulated move toward respecting the autonomy of veterinary patients. I 
describe criticisms leveled at the mainstream account of respect for patient autonomy and introduce an 
alternative conception, namely, a relational approach to patient autonomy, that accounts for these 
criticisms. I show that conceiving of autonomy relationally points the way to meaningfully incorporating 
respect for patient autonomy as a value in veterinary medicine. Finally, in Chapter Four, I discuss 
practical applications of this theoretical work, including associated challenges. These challenges include 
the potential difficulty in interpreting the values or concerns of animals and the effect on animal 
autonomy of the practice of training animals to voluntarily participate in veterinary procedures. 
 
Why Focus on Autonomy? 
 Despite my own interest in the subject of respect for patient autonomy in veterinary medicine, 
one would be right to question whether this is too esoteric an issue to be relevant to ongoing 
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discussions in animal ethics and veterinary medical ethics. For most of the history of philosophy, animals 
e e o side ed to o iousl  la k auto o , a otion so entrenched that many theories explicitly 
di ide hu a  eha io  i to the o t asti g atego ies of auto o ous a tio  a d a i al eha io . 2 
Until quite recently, respecting autonomy was not a subject of much concern to animal ethicists, most of 
whom have placed their emphasis elsewhere, for example, attending to animal suffering. Veterinary 
medical ethics is quite rudimentary as a discipline and thus offers many areas ripe for philosophical 
elaboration. So why focus on respect for autonomy as a potential value in veterinary medical ethics? 
 Exploring this issue is worthwhile for a number of reasons. Recently, several animal ethicists 
have made compelling cases for considering autonomy or something similar to it – exercising personal 
choice, exerting some kind of agency – an important capacity of many animals, one which must be given 
proper consideration and respect in any adequate moral framework. If this is correct, then we should be 
able apply respect for animal autonomy as a value in the specific case of veterinary medical ethics; after 
all, respect for patient autonomy is considered central to most accounts in the analogous field of 
(human) medical ethics. Conversely, if it turns out to be absurd or impossible to respect patient 
autonomy in veterinary medicine, then this counts against the more general case for counting respect 
for animal autonomy as ethically important. Thus, veterinary medicine may serve as an important test 
case for the coherence of more general arguments regarding animal autonomy and the respect it merits. 
 Competing conceptions of autonomy, including relational conceptions which broaden the notion 
of what it means to respect autonomy, have been found useful in some (human) medical contexts and in 
addressing (human) social problems, but are only starting to be explored in animal ethics. As some have 
pointed out, the ethi al di e sio s of sanctuaries are undertheorized, 3 and relational conceptions of 
autonomy are among potentially useful but neglected tools for this work. To my knowledge, veterinary 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Beauchamp, T.L., & Childress, J.F. (2013). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7
th
 ed.). New York, NY: 
Oxford UP. (pp. 102-103). 
3
 Emmerman, K.S. (2014). Sanctuary, Not Remedy: The Problem of Captivity and the Need for Moral Repair. In L. 
Gruen (Ed.), The Ethics of Captivity. New York, NY: Oxford UP. (p. 219). 
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medicinal ethics has not explicitly considered relational conceptions of autonomy at all. If, as I suggest, a 
relational approach to autonomy is applicable to both animals and human beings and suggests concrete 
and feasible ways in which patient autonomy might be respected by veterinary practitioners, this 
supports the continued use of a relational approach to autonomy in areas of ethics outside of animal 
ethics and veterinary medical ethics. In addition, both the theoretical understanding and the practical 
recommendations that spring from such a conception may also be useful in some human cases, when 
the model of autonomy used by mainstream medical ethics fails to be adequate. Finally, if it turns out 
that respect for patient autonomy is among the values we ought to incorporate in the day-to-day 
practice of veterinary medicine, this opens the door to including this value in questions about what 
practices or institutions veterinary medicine as a profession should support or oppose.  
 
The Relationship between Welfare and Autonomy 
 Before embarking on this thesis, it is worth briefly touching on the relationship between welfare 
and autonomy. Given the historical lack of attention to animal autonomy, this issue has been grappled 
with primarily with regard to humans. Some theories of human welfare consider autonomy to be among 
capabilities whose development and exercise enhances human welfare. Others, however, distinguish 
et ee  a  i di idual s welfare and her4 autonomy. In human medicine, for example, these are 
assumed to be separate considerations, as the ph si ia s dut  of e efi e e, which entails 
o t i uti g to he  patie t s elfa e, is distinct from her duty to respect he  patie t s autonomy. The 
two obligations may conflict, as when an intervention is likel  to i p o e a patie t s health o  lo ge it  
but does not align with her values or preferences.  
 The term animal welfare  has traditionally mirrored the narrower, autonomy-excluding 
conception of human welfare, focusing on measures such as providing for physical needs, like food, 
                                                          
4
 In the interest of balancing out the historical androcentrism in philosophy, I will, in this thesis, use feminine 
pronouns (she, her, or hers) when generic gendered pronouns are called for. 
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water, health care, and an appropriate environment, and minimizing aversive states such as fear, pain, 
and stress.5 However, in certain contexts, exercise of autonomy  is mentioned as a component of 
animal welfare, at least for some species. In 1985, the Animal Welfare Act was amended to require 
consideratio  of the ps hologi al elfa e of p i ates,  with the ensuing requirement that captive 
p i ates i  esea h fa ilities e p o isio ed ith e i o e tal e i h e t,  i.e., o je ts, fu ishi gs, 
food puzzles, and other items that can be manipulated by individuals and permit variation in their daily 
activity. While the rationale for providing environmental enrichment was the alleviation of unpleasant 
mental states, such as boredom, Hal Markowitz, the biologist and animal behaviorist considered the 
father of e i o e tal e i h e t, 6 thought a chief function of environmental enrichment to be 
providing animals with opportunities to exercise autonomy.  He defined autonomy as control over 
o e s e i o e t a d o e s o  life.7 Empirical animal welfare research has examined the value to 
animals of exerting control over aspects of their lives, documenting, for example, that chimpanzees 
prefer to use enrichment items that can be controlled or manipulated over those that cannot. 8 Today, 
many accept that psychological welfare is affected by the degree to which an animal can exercise choice 
and control over her environment. 9   
 This might suggest that autonomy should simply be incorporated as one more animal welfare 
consideration, alongside nutrition, hydration, etc. However, I believe this may be too simplistic. While 
Ma ko itz as su el  ahead of his ti e to i lude auto o  i  the dis ussio  at all, e el  p o idi g 
animals with opportunities to control minor aspects of their lives reflects, in my view, an impoverished 
understanding of what it means to respect autonomy. It seems to suggest that, as long as we provide 
                                                          
5
 AVMA Animal Welfare Principles. (n.d.) Retrieved from https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Pages/AVMA-Animal-
Welfare-Principles.aspx . Accessed on June 28, 2017. 
6
 Maple, T. L., & Perdue, B.M. (2013). Zoo Animal Welfare. New York, NY: Springer. (p. 83). 
7
 Wildlife Conservation Society (2007) Enrichment Workbook. ( p. 7); Maple T.L. & Perdue, B.M. (pp. 81-82). 
8
 Videan , E.N., Fritz, J., Schwandt , M.L., Smith, H.F., & Howell S. (2005). Controllability in Environmental 
Enrichment for Captive Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 8 (2), 117-130. 
9
 Wildlife Conservation Society. (pp. 2-4). 
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some manipulable o je ts, e a  he k off the e e ise of auto o  o  o  ou  a i al elfa e 
checklist. But, as typically understood, respecting autonomy is a much deeper, broader concept, one 
that i plies espe ti g so eo e s f eedo  to ake hoi es a oss dispa ate aspe ts of thei  li es. 
Understood in this way, we can easily imagine conflicts between animal welfare and animal autonomy. 
 As will be clear by the end of this thesis, I believe that neither animal ethics nor veterinary 
medical ethics should be limited to conventional welfare considerations, with no role for consideration 
of autonomy, as doing so would paint an incomplete picture of our ethical obligations to animals. 
However, I do not take a position as to whether the exercise of autonomy should ultimately be 
considered a component of welfare or a separate consideration, regardless of whether the subject of 
discussion is humans or animals. If we utilize a conception of autonomy that is applicable across species 
lines, then conclusions about the conceptual relationship between autonomy and welfare ought to be 
similar between humans and animals, so we might expect veterinary medicine to follow human 
medicine in keeping considerations of welfare separate from those of autonomy. However, the 
idesp ead use of the te  a i al elfa e  as ep ese ti g an amalgam of all the interests an animal 










 As authors on the subject frequently observe, the te  auto o  is used i  a  diffe e t 
ways across the literature.10 The te  itself a  e defi ed as self- ule,  as opposed to heteronomy, or 
rule by other, external forces.11 As an adjective, auto o ous  a  des i e a hoi e so eo e akes, 
or may describe the agent whose makes choices or takes actions, e.g., a  auto o ous pe so .  I  the 
latter case, it may indicate either that the individual has a capacity for making autonomous decisions or 
that her actions or choices are frequently substantially autonomous.12 As we shall see, what makes a 
decision or action autonomous is also contentious, with necessary conditions ranging from very 
stringent to very permissive. Historically, animals were assumed to lack the capacity to make 
autonomous decisions, making them (and any actions they might take) non-autonomous. This remains 
the predominant view today.  
 While an in-depth discussion of arguments for and against animal autonomy and the moral 
consideration it deserves is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will use this chapter to briefly outline some 
of the reasons animals have historically been considered nonautonomous and describe challenges to 
these conceptions. I will then review some newer accounts that conceive animals as being able to make 




                                                          
10
 Fo  e a ple, Natalie Tho as des i es eight diffe e t ki ds  of auto o . Thomas, N. (2016). Animal Ethics 
and the Autonomous Animal Self. London: Springer Nature. (p. 72). 
11
 Wardrope, A. (2015). Liberal Individualism, Relational Autonomy, and the Social Dimension of Respect. 
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 8 (1), 39. 
12
 Friedman, M. (2003). Autonomy, Gender, Politics. New York, NY: Oxford UP. (p. 4). 
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Animals and Ka t’s Co ceptio  of Auto o y  
 One classic argument that denies all animals autonomy while attributing it to (many) humans 
originates with Immanuel Kant. For Kant, autonomy is a property of the will of a rational being.13 In his 
understanding of the term, rationality involves being aware of the grounds for a potential action or end, 
evaluating these grounds, and then deciding to act or pursue an end only if they are adequate.14 
Another central feature of atio al ei gs, i  Ka t s view, is the ability to understand and act in 
accordance with principles, o  u i e sal a d e essa  la s. 15 That is, in deliberating about what 
action to undertake, a rational being can articulate the rule, or maxim, that would underlie the decision 
to act in that way, and consider whether it could be universalized, or made to apply across all situations, 
without generating a contradiction or inconsistency.16 For Kant, morality emerges through rationality, 
for one can determine the moral status of a potential action through rational reflection, by examining 
the pote tial a tio s underlying maxim, and whether it could be universalized into a principle followed 
by all without contradiction. Rational agents must have the ability to judge things as good, right, or 
justified, and must have the capacity to be guided by such normative judgments.17 
 It s ot diffi ult to see h  Ka t holds animals do not qualify as rational and therefore fail to 
even be candidates for autonomy. Ka t see s to elie e that a i als  a tio s a e guided  atu e, 
rather than deliberation about the grounds for acting. Kant assumes animals lack the capacity for 
abstraction necessary for appreciating and acting in accordance with principles. Without language, it is 
difficult to see how a being could hold or consider concepts like universality, or applying in all times and 
places, and necessity, or the impossibility of things being otherwise. Or, if non-linguistic beings could 
                                                          
13
 Hill, T.E. (1984). Autonomy and Benevolent Lies. Journal of Value Inquiry. 18, 255. 
14
 Ko sgaa d, C.M.  A Ka tia  Case fo  A i al ‘ights.  I  M. Mi hel, D. Küh e, & J. Hänni (Eds.) Animal Law 
– Developments and Perspectives in the 21st Century.  Zürich: Dike. (pp. 7-8). 
15
 Rollin, B.E. (1976). There is Only One Categorical Imperative. Kant-Studien, 67 (1), 63. 
16
 Ibid., 63-64. 
17
 Sayre-McCord, G. (2015 – draft). Rational Agency and the Nature of Normative Concepts. (p. 1). 
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somehow consider such concepts, it seems difficult to see how we would know this is the case, for they 
would be unable to articulate their understanding to us. 
 Autonomy, for Kant, involves being committed to principles in such a way that one can set and 
pursue ends in accord with the , ega dless of o e s desi es o  othe  fa to s su h as t aditio , i sti t, 
or fear of punishment.18 That is, one is free to act, rather than being determined by some outside force, 
and can choose to act in accordance with o e s normative judgments.19 Autonomous beings can 
respond to reasons, where a reason is understood narrowly as a statement invoking universal and 
necessary principles.20 For Kant, autonomy and morality are inextricably linked, because the principles 
with which an agent, as an autonomous being, acts in accordance turn out to be principles of morality.21  
 The e ui e e t to espe t othe  atio al ei gs  auto o  is a di e t esult of the o e tio  
between universal principles and morality. The rational nature of another individual is fundamentally 
the same as mine, the argument goes, and my own rational nature and functioning is of value to me, so 
failure to respect a othe s atio al atu e by subjugating her to my will would result in a 
contradiction.22 As rational beings ourselves, we are required to respect the autonomous choices of 
other rational beings, both in allowing them to decide their own actions and in regarding their ends as 
worthwhile.23 This means that, if we disagree with someone regarding her choice of action or end, we 
may use reason to try to sway her, but we cannot force or trick her into adopting our ends instead. To 
undermine the choice someone has adopted for themselves would be to treat them as a means to our 
own ends. 
 Gi e  Ka t s a ou t of auto o  a d the oots of espe t fo  auto o , e a  see additio al 
reasons why animals do not qualify for either. Animals cannot give abstract, universal principles as their 
                                                          
18
 Thomas (p. 139); Hill 255. 
19
 Sayre-McCord 2. 
20
 Thomas (p. 73). 
21
 Hill 255. 
22
 Rollin (1976) 68. Hill 255. 
23
 Korsgaard (p. 6). 
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reasons for acting; rather, animals seem to act to achieve ends because they desire them, because they 
are driven by emotions, or because they are causally determined via biological mechanisms.24 And if 
they lack the type of rational nature that Kant has in mind, then there is no contradiction in failing to 
respect their chosen ends or actions, as these have not arisen from the same rational nature that 
underlies our own ends and action. On the contrary, animals are properly considered merely means to 
an end o  Ka t s a ou t, meaning we can use them in order to further the projects, desires, and efforts 
that we, as rational autonomous beings, have.25  
 
Challenges to and Re-interpretations of Ka t’s Accou t 
 Despite its o ti ued ele a e, Ka t s a ou t of autonomy has been criticized from multiple 
different angles. In this section, I will first review Ch isti e Ko sgaa d s a gu e t that Kant misidentified 
one of the presuppositions of rational choice. Correctly conceived, she argues, this presupposition leads 
to the conclusion that animals, even if not rational by Ka t s definition, are ends in themselves. Her 
a gu e t, I suggest, a  e e te ded to sho  that a i als  de isio s a d a tio s prima facie merit our 
respect.  I then use Geoffrey Sayre-M Co d s a al sis of Ka tian atio al agency  to examine how 
Kant s u de esti atio  of the mental abilities of animals leads him to postulate, of human and animal 
decision-making, a difference in kind where there is really only one of degree. Recognizing this lack of an 
unbridgeable gulf challenges Ka t s conclusions that humans but not animals are capable of autonomy.26 
Finally, I note the difference between Kantian autonomy and the type of autonomy that (human) 
medical ethicists are concerned to protect. 
                                                          
24
 Hill 255. 
25
 Thomas (p. 130). 
26
 I  his aste s thesis,  fello  g aduate student, Eric Easley, makes a related argument. He defends the claim 
that our current state of knowledge about animal cognition suggests that many animals possess sufficient degrees 
of reason, autonomy, and self-consciousness, the cognitive capacities unde l i g dig it  a d the a ilit  to 
ea i gfull  set e ds,  to a a t e te di g di e t o al o side a ilit  to the . Easle , W.E. . Of Mi e 
and Kant: Re-examining Moral Considerability to Non-Hu a  A i als o  Ka t s Cog iti e G ou ds. 
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 Korsgaard begins by describing a common interpretation of Kant, one which she argues deeply 
misunderstands his philosophy.27 Under this interpretation, Kant identifies rationality or autonomy as 
properties which confer a kind of intrinsic value on their bearers, one which entitles them to be 
respected. Since humans, but not animals, have these properties, they alone are entitled to this respect, 
namely, being treated always as an end and never as merely a means. Importantly, this is a type of 
metaphysical claim: property x bestows intrinsic value on being who have it.28 
 This i te p etatio  is fla ed, Ko sgaa d a gues, e ause o e of Ka t s ajo  lai s is that e, as 
humans, do t ha e a ess to su h etaph si al k o ledge  a d should t p ete d that e do. 
Instead,  
 Ka t thi ks that lai s that go eyond the realm of empirical or scientific knowledge 
must be established as necessary presuppositions of rational activity – that is, as 
presuppositions of thinking in general, or of constructing a theoretical understanding of 
the world, or of making rational choices. His philosophical strategy is to identify the 
presuppositions of rational activity and then to try to validate those presuppositions 
th ough hat he alled << iti ue>>. 29  
In this way, Kant thought e ould o st u t a  o je ti e o al s ste  ithout having metaphysical 
knowledge that is out of the grasp of human beings.30 If we remember this, Korsgaard argues, then we 
will see that Kant is proposing that people, in making rational choices, necessarily presuppose their own 
value – that is, our value as beings worthy of respect is established by the necessity of presupposing it, 
not by our possession of a given property.31  What sets us apart as rational beings is our capacity to be 
guided by what we judge as good;32 since much of what we choose is good for us, we must presuppose 
that we ourselves are ends. Mo e ge e all , Ka t thought the e  efe e ed he e meant rational 
beings; thus the lai  that atio al ei gs are ends in themselves  is a presupposition of rational 
                                                          
27
 Korsgaard (p. 6-7). 
28
 Korsgaard (p. 6). 
29
 Korsgaard (p. 7). 
30
 Korsgaard (p. 6). 
31
 Korsgaard (p. 7). 
32
 Sayre-McCord 1-2. 
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choice.33 He suggests that i  aki g atio al hoi es e p esuppose ou  alue o l  i sofa  as e a e 
ei gs ho a e apa le of illi g ou  p i iples as la s. 34  
 However, Korsgaard believes this is a flawed conclusion. While rational choice does involve 
presupposing we are ends in ourselves, this differs from presupposing that rational beings are ends in 
themselves, for we are not merely rational beings. 35 In other words, Kant mistakenly identified to 
ho  the te  e  refers. I  aki g a atio al hoi e, e o l  p esuppose ou  alue as ei gs for 
whom thi gs a  e good o  ad. 36 But the class of beings for which things can be good or bad is 
sentient animals, not rational beings. Since it is by virtue of our sentience that things can be good or bad 
for us, the correct presupposition of rational choice is that sentient animals are ends in themselves.37 
 Korsgaard s focus is showing that,  Ka t s o  lights a d o e ti g fo  his e o  i  ide tif i g 
a presupposition of rational choice, animals are ends in themselves because they have a certain kind of 
subjective experience, specifically one that can be good or bad. She does not address the question of 
animal autonomy, though, and since she does seem to find the type of rational agency found among 
humans to be unique, she probably would not argue that her reinterpretation of Kant suppo ts espe t 
fo  a i al auto o .  Ho e e , if hu a s  status as e ds is part of the source of our obligation to 
respect their pursuit of their chosen ends, then considering an animal as an end would also logically 
entail respecting her choice of what to pursue as an end.  
 The objection could be made, however, that while rational agency is not necessary for being 
considered an end, it is essential to the concept of autonomy. That is, autonomy, as the freedom to 
dete i e o e s a tio s, has ea i g o l  fo  those ho a  guide their behavior via normative 
judgments (i.e., rational agents), for otherwise their behavior is alread  ei g dete i ed  o -self  
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 Korsgaard (pp. 8-11). 
34
 Korsgaard (p. 11). 
35
 Korsgaard (p. 1). 
36
 Korsgaard (p. 11). 
37
 Korsgaard (pp. 13-14). 
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forces. Without having an ability to decide what is right and wrong, good and bad, justified or 
u justified, di e ti g o e s o  a tio s fails to e a  e e ise of autonomy.  
 Sayre-McCord tries to bring out exactly what Kant finds unique about rational agents by 
presenting a series of su essi e app o i atio s  of atio al age  that sho  just ho  sophisti ated 
a  age t ight e ithout ei g a atio al age t i  the se se that Ka t spe ifies. 38 While he purposely 
avoids dis ussi g Ka t s a ou t of auto o  per se, I will argue that his account suggests that the 
f eedo  to dete i e o e s a tio s ight e alua le e e  fo  those ho do ot ualif  as atio al 
agents. Although Sayre-McCord seems to agree with Kant that the a ilit  to guide o e s eha io  by 
o e s normative judgments is a uniquely human capacity,39 I question whether this conclusion is at odds 
with observations of some types of animal behavior and argue  that it exaggerates the difference 
between the everyday decision-making of ordinary humans and that of (some) other species.  
 Sayre-McCord identifies the ability to act on the basis of representations as a core capacity of 
rational agents – a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for Kantian rational agency. Within the class 
of beings that has this capacity, he identifies four increasingly sophisticated types of agents:40  
 Stimulus-response agents respond directly to their representations without looking ahead to the 
future or representing other possible responses, and their representations need not be 
conscious; robots, plants, and amoebas would likely be relegated to this category, but humans 
probably also behave as stimulus-response agents at times, such as when we reflexively pull our 
hand away from a hot stove. 
 Planning agents can represent both their current world and how the world might be different as 
the result of their own intervention; they can represent and choose among different possible 
courses of action, selecting the ost att a ti e o  least epelle t ou se. Ma  si ple  a i als 
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seem to fall into this category, as they continually make choices about how to satisfy their basic 
needs for food, shelter, mates, etc. Planning agents, Sayre-McCord notes, satisf  the p i iples 
of standard decision theory,  so would be considered rational by some non-Kantian accounts. 
 The strategic agent is distinguished by her ability to represent how others will likely respond to 
their own representations of her actions, the actions of others, and their own prospective 
options. Sayre-M Co d ide tifies this le el of sophisti atio  ith l i g o  de eptio , si e l i g 
involves trying to get others to represent things as being a way in which one thinks they are not, 
and this requires seeing others as representing the world and (presumably) responding to those 
ep ese tatio s.  This class of agent seems to include at least apes, who effectively alter the 
behaviors of other individuals by deception; they hide or suppress certain behaviors and 
communicatory signals (e.g., erections, mating vocalizations, food barks) and feign reactions to 
redirect another's attention (e.g., sta i g i te tl  o  ala  a king  at nonexistent stimuli).41  
 The Kantian rational agent is one who represents in normative terms, i.e., an agent who, when 
judging representations, uses normative concepts such as being good/bad, right/wrong, or 
justified/unjustified and who has the capacity to be guided by such normative judgments. This 
capacity is what differentiates acting in a certain way because one believes it is right or good 
from acting that way for other reasons, like blind acceptance of norms or fear of punishment. 
Sayre-McCord notes that normative concepts can be moral or nonmoral. 
I suspect that Kant, presented with this classification scheme and unacquainted with modern-day 
advances in cognitive sciences, ethology, and other disciplines, would likely classify animals as stimulus-
espo se age ts. He see s to elie e that all a i als  a tio s a e guided  i sti t, thei  e iste e 
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esti g o  atu e  athe  tha  o  thei  ills.42 Were this true, postulating autonomy as an exclusively 
human capacity would make sense, for choosing cannot be valuable for an agent who does not choose. 
 However, toda  the alidit  a d useful ess of the o ept of i sti t  is i easi gl  
questioned, as it seems to block inquiry which might lead to a deeper understanding of the causes of 
behavior. Explanations that stop with a reference to the vague concept of instinct tend to have less 
robust explanatory and predictive power than those that incorporate learning, cultural transmission of 
knowledge and skills,43 information the animal has gleaned from highly-attuned sensory modalities, 
individual preferences and idiosyncrasies, and means-end rationality. Though he seems to want to retain 
Kantian rational agent status as uniquely human, Sayre-McCord suggests that animals exhibit very 
sophisticated rational abilities and are far from automatons following each new impulse mindlessly. If 
animals are planning agents and strategic agents, then we need to reevaluate the idea that their ability 
to direct their own lives is unworthy of being considered autonomy or of meriting respect.  
 Besides this, although he seems convinced that humans alone are rational agents, Sayre-
McCord s account of what constitutes a normative concept suggests to me that some animals should 
also be considered rational agents because they have the capacity to guide their behavior by (at least) 
nonmoral normative judgments. To show why this is true, I will examine the specific criteria Sayre-
McCord puts forth for determining whether a concept is a normative concept and look for examples 
from the animal world. However, first a brief discussion of the concept of abstraction is needed.  
 The ability to abstract is necessary for considering actions, norms, etc. under normative 
concepts, because making normative judgments involves manipulating a specific representation in the 
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abstract.44 To use a classic example, if you are considering falsely telling your teacher that your dog ate 
your homework so she will not count your assignment as late, one of the first steps in normatively 
evaluating this possible action (i.e., deciding if it is right or wrong, justified or unjustified) is abstracting 
it. For example, you can think about telli g a lie to get out of t ou le  and see how that squares with 
your normative concepts. Kant believed that all substantive ethical prescriptions could be deduced via a 
process of abstraction and checking for universalizability, but we need not go this far to agree that some 
degree of abstraction is necessary for employing normative concepts. 
 Humans are very skilled at abstracting, so it is not surprising that Kant assumed the ability to 
abstract was uniquely human. However, it turns out that many animals have at least some capacity for 
abstraction. Experimental investigation has shown that a variety of bird and primate species can form 
abstract concepts and identify novel instantiations of a concept.45 For example, pigeons who have been 
taught to identify which paintings in a set are by Picasso and which are by Monet go on to correctly 
identify novel paintings by these artists, and even generalize these categories to correctly identify 
painting by other artists as cubist or impressionist.46 To the extent that human language requires and 
permits abstraction, apes who communicate in sign language and with lexigrams have the ability to 
abstract. A more everyday example might be salient to parents with both dogs and young children: once 
the child or the dog has abstracted from her toys to de elop the o ept of to ,  the difficult – but 
achievable, I am told – challenge is to further specify the o epts of dog to  a d hild to .  
  In any case, we cannot point to universal lack of ability to abstract as a reason to conclude that 
no animal can employ normative concepts. Sayre-McCord holds that we have grounds for thinking 
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so eo e uses a o ept he  e ha e easo  to elie e that thei  ep ese tatio s are appropriately 
sensitive to the evidence they have that the concept in uestio  is satisfied. 47 He describes several 
criteria for determining that a given concept is a normative concept. These are: (1) the standards for 
applying the concept (representing something is right or good) are always open to evaluation;48 (2) 
when such a standard is met, the agent automatically has a reason for doing (or not doing) something;49 
and (3) he  the o ept is i  pla e, the disti tio  et ee  a ette  theo  of X  a d a theo  of a 
ette  X  e o es lu ed o  disappea s.50 
 Based on his account, it seems possible to make the case that animals have at least some 
normative concepts, for example, good/bad and right/wrong. Watching an eagle meticulously arrange 
sticks into a large nest51 suggests she has i  i d a ight  a  fo  the est to be built. A chimpanzee 
at hi g a ou ge  fa il  e e  atte pt to te ite fish ith the o g  tool ill so eti es 
e o e it f o  he  ha d a d epla e it ith the ight  ki d of tool.52 Noting that nest building is a 
behavior that improves with practice,53 and observing a chimpanzee seemingly modify her concept of 
hat ualifies as good tool  fo  ut-cracking,54 suggests that a i als  eha io -guiding concepts are 
open to modification. Their concepts provide them with reasons for acting one way and not another.  
And better theory of termite-fishing tools seems to be a theory of better termite-fishing tools. The 
ability to critically reflect on o e s actions is not where we will find a decisive difference between (most) 
humans and all nonhumans. 
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 If we are intent to find, between humans and other animals, a difference in kind rather than in 
degree, Sayre-McCord s a ou t does suggest two possible candidates: (1) the capacity to make and be 
guided by moral normative judgments, and/or (2) the capacity to reason about normative judgements 
linguistically. Even these I am not sure are on completely secure footing. For one thing, at least some 
apes in human-language studies have employed terms like good  a d ad. 55  
 While these seem to have been used in a nonmoral context, the assumption that animals do not 
and cannot make moral normative judgments is increasingly questioned.56 This is especially true when 
we compare animal behavior and its apparent motivations with the moral psychology of ordinary 
humans, rather than idealized versions of moral reasoning su h as Ka t s. In practice, the type of critical 
reflection humans use in moral decision-making seems to be less about normative concepts and more 
about empathy, considering potential harmfulness to ourselves or others, and the background norms 
the constitute the context of our decisions – all a ilities e pe ted of a  e patheti  st ategi  age t.  
Fu the o e, hile Ka t s a ou t lai s that a pe fe t atio al age t ould guide her behavior 
exclusively by reason and not emotion, we now know that humans require emotional input for making 
decisions; destruction of brain centers associated with emotional processing results in an inability to 
make decisions, moral or otherwise, even when brain centers associated with reasoning are left intact.57 
Thus, usi g easo  alo e to dete i e o e s a tio s tu s out to e i possi le.  
 Ca ol Gilliga s esea ch on moral psychology shows that reliance on abstraction and 
universality is more common i  e s app oa h to ethi al issues, hile o e  atte d o e to 
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contextual detail, seeking to resolve issues by looking to the particular details of an ethical conflict.58 
Equating morality with abstraction-derived prescriptions may thus reflect male bias and the exclusion of 
women from philosophy, rather than universal truth. When we do identify abstract ideals to which 
people from diverse cultures seek to conform their behavior, we find norms like reciprocity, community 
cohesion, and fairness,59 which are also recognized as behavior- and emotion-guiding in other primate 
species.60,61   
 In any case, my purpose here is not to attempt to lo ate a u i uel  hu a  apa it , ut 
rather to point out that even if we accept that the ability to be guided by normative judgments is what is 
essential to autonomy, attributing autonomy to some animals is still justified. More importantly, even if 
we grant that humans alone can ha e a spe ial Ka tia  auto o  a isi g f o  the capacity of rational 
agency, it appears that this is not the sort of autonomy that (human) bioethicists are concerned with 
protecting. The autonomy of bioethics, as we will see in the next chapter, does not revolve around 
whether an agent invokes normative concepts in arriving at her decisions. It may be an interesting 
question to what degree she acts as a Kantian rational agent, but whether this is her predominant mode 
of decision-making or whether she relies more on emotions, desires, or societal norms does not factor 
into whether she qualifies as an autonomous patient. Bioethicists are intent to protect a much broader 
t pe of auto o , asi all  a patie t s a ilit  to have control over, and adequate understanding of, their 
health care. Using this kind of conception of autonomy, rather tha  a highl  de a di g o e like Ka t s, 
means that ordinary patients are entitled to respect for autonomy and that physicians are not in the 
usi ess of assessi g hethe  o  ot a patie t s de isio -making involved appeal to normative concepts. 
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Thus, animals  p ospe ts fo  auto o  o  a Ka tia  a ou t do ot ea  o  hethe  espe t fo  patie t 
autonomy ought to be a value in veterinary ethics.   
 
Split-Level Accounts of Autonomy 
 Suffice it to say that, while Ka t s view has influenced our current understanding of autonomy, 
his account is not one that most today would ascribe to, as it circumscribes too narrowly what counts as 
autonomy and as rationality. Another, more widely accepted account of autonomy is described in the 
following way by David Richards:  
Auto o  … is a o ple  assu ptio  a out the apa ities, de eloped o  u de eloped, 
of persons, which enable them to develop, want to act on, and act on higher-order plans 
of action which take as their self-critical o je t o e s life a d the a  it is li ed…. 62 
Such an account is sometimes referred to as a split-le el  o  hie a hi al theory, as it involves two 
levels of desires: first-order or basic desires, which are simple desires to do or avoid something, and 
second-order or higher level desires, which take first order desires as their object. Under such an 
account, there is autonomy in an act only if the first-order volition motivating it is endorsed by a second-
order desire.63 We ule ou sel es  to a lesse  degree when our actions or decisions run counter to how 
we would like to direct them, or when we follow impulses without reflecting on whether we really want 
to do so. Animals are typically presumed to lack the cognitive capacities necessary to take an evaluative 
stance on their desires, cultivate or otherwise change their desires, or form a conception of the good life 
that is e essa  fo  assessi g o e s fi st-order desires.64 Thus, it is argued, they have only first-order 
desires and therefore fail to qualify as autonomous. In fact, a hu a s auto o ous a tio s a e often 
contrasted with her a i al eha io ,  or actions rooted in non-endorsed first-order desires.65 
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 However, is this truly a distinction in kind between humans and other animals? It is easy to 
make assumptions when superficially observing animal behavior or engaging in armchair reflection. Yet, 
when cognitive scientists, ethologists, and behaviorists observe animals carefully, they often witness 
animals making seemingly rational choices between competing desires. Many animals appear to be able 
to suppress even a strong desire when it conflicts with a more important desire. Consider, for example, 
a othe  a i al s sa ifi e of he  o  desi e fo  food o  est he  it o fli ts ith p ote tio  o  are 
for her young. The actions she undertakes to protect her young are often quite complex, rather than 
ei g p og a ed  o  efle -like. Primatologists studying apes have identified fairly long range goals, 
such as accession to power or expanding territory, which seem to underlie a  of a  i di idual s 
choices.66 Two chimpanzees living in the same social group and environment will often choose very 
different lives for themselves, with one individual relentlessly pursuing a leadership position in a group 
while another apparently takes on the role of peacemaker.67 The same individual may also make 
opposite choices in the same situation because of the social context, like suppressing the desire to mate 
when a higher-ranking competitor is nearby.68 Despite these examples, some critics reply that, at best, 
they show that animals select between competing first-order desires, rather than suppressing a first-
order desire due to a conflicting second-order desire; that is, a i als a t decide that their desires 
a e t as the  a t the  to e a d the  ai  to ha ge the .69 
 This question may be open to empirical investigation. It is a type of metacognition, and cognitive 
scientists have performed studies on other types of metacognition; for example, studies suggest that 
some animals evaluate their beliefs with regard to their level of certainty.70 While cognitive monitoring 
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is not identical to cognitive control, this type of evaluation would seem to involve the same type of 
hierarchal structure of the mind and self-awareness presumably necessary for hierarchal autonomy. 
 Regardless of whether hierarchal autonomy is a feature of some animals, this conception of 
autonomy has also been challenged as too demanding as a minimal requirement for autonomy in 
bioethics. For one, such a conception seems to deny autonomy to actions we typically consider 
autonomous but which we take despite being aware that they conflict with our highe  le el desi es  – 
o e autho  offe s the e a ple of heati g o  a spouse, despite ha i g a deepe  desi e to ho o  o e s 
monogamous commitments71 – as well as actions that are undertaken by intuition or passion, without 
rational reflection. 72 In addition, very strong first-order desires can sometimes generate second-order 
desires (consider cases of addiction), in which case identifying with the second-order desire fails to be a 
way of distinguishing autonomous from nonautonomous behavior.73  
 Marilyn Friedman puts forth a feminist version of a hierarchal theory of autonomy which is less 
rigid with regard to the type of evaluation an individual must undertake for decisions or action to be 
considered autonomous. She lists four requirements for a choice or action to be autonomous: (1) it must 
be partly caused by self-reflection, or the a to s efle ti e o side atio  of a ts a d alues  that are 
sustained even in the face of some minimal opposition, (2) it ust i o  these desi es o  alues,  
the desires and values must matter to the actor, and (4) her actions and choices must be relatively 
unobstructed by deception, coercion, and the like.74 
 F ied a s use of the te  hu a  a d la k of dis ussio  of a i als suggests she is not 
counting animals as candidates for autonomy.75 However, examined through an animal ethics lens, her 
account appears to allow the possibility that at least some behaviors by some animals could count as 
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autonomous. It is not difficult to see how the latter three requirements might be satisfied by animals. 
Their actions and choices clearly reflect their desires and what they value, with the connection between 
the two often being more direct and straightforward than in the human case. A  a i al s desi e fo  a 
favorite food or activity certainly matters to them, as evidenced by their often enthusiastic emotional 
expressions in anticipation of and upon securing the desired thing; Friedman makes it a point to note 
that o e tio s a o g e otio al espo ses a e e ough to a ifest a atio al patte  of a i g a out 
or valuing something. It is not necessary … [to] consciously articulate judg e ts… a out the alue o  
i po ta e to he  of hat she a es a out. 76 Finally, we can easily find some examples in which an 
animal is deceived into acting in a certain way and others in which she is not.  
 Showing that animals are capable of self-reflection in the requisite sense may be more 
challenging. However, a careful reading of Friedman suggests that her understanding of self-reflection is 
within the grasp of some animals. The necessary type of reflection, she writes, need not be conscious, 
extensive, or cognitive in the narrow sense – it a  also e affe ti e o  olitio al a d og iti e i  a 
oad se se. 77 I  fa t, F ied a s des iptio  suggests that a  a i al ho epeatedl  pursues or 
avoids certain things, especially in the face of barriers or other types of opposition, is autonomously 
choosing these things:   
What matters … is that e otio s a d desi es … a  o stitute a ki d of efle tio  o  o  
attention to objects or values of concern. They can involve evaluations of those objects. 
In so doi g, the  a  the e  o t i ute to the auto o  of a pe so s hoi es. 
Reflection is consideration that can involve an attitude of some valenced sort, either 
positi e o  egati e. Whe  so eo e s o side atio , of whatever mental sort, involves 
reaffirming what she wants or values as something important to her, and the reaffirmed 
o it e t oti ates he  eha io , the … she ealizes so e deg ee of auto o . 78 
 I  e og itio  of the ole of so ial fa to s i  dete i i g oth o e s desi es a d o it e ts, 
and o e s ability to exercise autonomy, Friedman requires only that the self partly determine what one 
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does and chooses;79 it is not possible for choices or actions to be completely self-originating because we 
all develop in a social setting of some kind which in part shapes what we desire and care about. To 
satisfy the criterion of being minimally self-reflective, it is sufficient that o e s a tio s efle t a d issue 
from the deeper, stable, overarching concerns that constitute who she is. 80 And animals do exhibit 
stable and guiding preferences and patterns in what they value – dog lovers might imagine thei  dog s 
joyous expression when they return home, and her deep, contented sigh when she curls up to sleep 
beside them – so their actions in pursuit of these preferences and values would qualify as autonomous. 
 As we have seen from the above discussion, the la ket de ial of a i als  apa it  fo  
autonomy is at least uestio a le. A ou ts of auto o  like Ka t s a d split-level theories that restrict 
autonomy to only humans (only some humans, to be more exact) seem to make false assumptions 
about the cognitive abilities of animals. They also seem to exclude from the realm of the autonomous 
many human actions and decisions that we typically consider and respect as autonomous. As we will 
see, mainstream medical ethics tends to set a fairly low bar for counting decisions as rational and 
auto o ous: a patie t s de isio  is t pi all  o side ed auto o ous a d o th  of espe t as lo g as it 
is intentional, reasonably well-informed, and not coerced, regardless of whether the deliberation that 
went into it involved abstraction, the consideration of universal and necessary principles, consideration 
of o e s highe  o de  p efe e es, o  self- efle tio  a out o e s desires and values. Using a less 
st i ge t defi itio  of auto o , su h as go e i g o e s hoi es a d eha io s ased o  desi es, 
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Accounts of Respect for Animal Autonomy (or Something like It) 
 Before narrowing in on the issue of autonomy in veterinary medical ethics and (human) 
bioethics, I will review three recent theories in animal ethics that identify autonomy, or something 
similar to it, as a capacity that animals can and do exercise, one worthy of ethical consideration. First is 
Natalie Tho as s argument that a basic level of self-awareness coupled with agency is sufficient to 
establish a minimal level of autonomy, one which most animals have and which entitles them to moral 
considerability. The second and third accounts are Josephi e Do o a s fe i ist animal care ethic 
perspective and “ue Do aldso  a d Will K li ka s itize ship theo , respectively. These latter two 
accounts do not refer to espe t fo  animal auto o  per se, but they point to something along the 
same lines, that is, respecting animal choice and what matters to individual animals, such that animal 
ethics is not limited to traditional considerations such as decreasing suffering and increasing 
opportunities for enjoyment. While I believe that each of these accounts offers important insights, the 
case for incorporating respect for patient autonomy as a value in veterinary medicine does not rest on 
accepting any one of these views in particular. 
 Thomas argues that many animals are self-aware agents who can direct their actions 
toward certain goals. They are self-aware in the sense that they have phenomenal awareness, in 
at least a minimal sense, of both what happens to their bodies and their own beliefs, desires, 
interests, and preferences – evaluative factors that in turn ground their choices.81 They are 
agents in that they are selves who are able to make choices, often in ways that are rational, or 
based on reasons – perhaps minimally complex reasons, but reasons nonetheless.82 These 
easo s a  e o pass a  i di idual s beliefs, desires, and preferences. Like self-awareness, 
rationality can vary along a continuum; reasons can be more or less complex and can affect 
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actions to a greater or lesser degree.83 Any being that can control her own actions and pursue 
her own ends, for her own reasons, values the freedom to self-govern, and this basic self-
governance is what Thomas means by a minimal level of autonomy. 84 
 Thomas accepts that autonomy exists on a continuum and concedes that (many) humans, by 
virtue of their complex mental capacities, a  e apa le of a i he  se se of auto o , one which at 
times involves deep reflection on first-order desires, questioning what has caused them and whether to 
try and change them. She does not deny that endeavoring to achieve such a he oi  type of autonomy 
is worthy.85 However, under her conception, a minimal level of autonomy is present even among first-
order desires, and beings possessing even a minimal degree of autonomy are entitled to respect for that 
autonomy. She argues that the type of autonomy we humans value for ourselves is the freedom and 
ability to make our own choices for our own reasons, and this leads us to espe t auto o  he e a d 
he  e fi d it.  86 If we accept that human autonomy is worthy of respect, there is no good reason, in 
her view, not to respect the autonomy of animals as well. 
 I  Tho as s a ou t, espe t fo  auto o  is ot just o e additional ethical consideration to 
add to an account of animal welfare; on the contrary, she believes characteristics of self-awareness and 
agency, and the autonomy that they make possible, are hat akes a i als o all  alua le  i  the 
first place.87 Thomas proposes expanding more traditional accounts of animal welfare to recognize this. 
Doing so, she proposes, would shift the focus – hat atte s  ethi all  – from the animal s interests to 
the i di idual who experiences the thwarting or fulfilment of those i te ests. 88 One consequence is 
that not all animals of the same species would warrant the same treatment, as desires, preferences, and 
choices vary from one individual to another. Rather, we would be obliged to expend the time and effort 
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necessary to understand what an individual may want for herself.89 In addition, at least in the case of 
domestic animals, respecting autonomy also requires finding ways to allow animals to fulfill their desires 
while protecting them from likely and severe harm. Thomas provides the example of taking her dogs to 
a park where they can safely run free rather than attempting to respect their autonomous desire to run 
outside by opening the door to let them dash out onto the highway.90 
 The second account derives from a newer formulation of feminist animal care theory. 
Originating in the 1980s, care ethics holds that ethical frameworks centered on principles, rights, 
and justice are inadequate for fully appreciating the ethical dimensions of many situations. Such 
frameworks, care ethicists argue, esult f o  the histo i al e lusio  of o e , so iet s 
principle caregivers, from philosophical discussions. Care ethicists emphasize the importance of 
caring, empathy, relationships, and context in ethical decision-making. They maintain that to 
full  u de sta d a situatio s ethi al di e sio s, e ust pa  atte tio  to pa ties  elatio ships 
and responsibilities to one another.91 Feminist animal care theory extends these conclusions to 
animal ethics, arguing that compassion and emotional responses to animals and the 
particularities of a given situation are important in determining what is morally acceptable.92 
 Josephine Donovan emphasizes that feminist animal care theory must involve a 
dialogi al ethod.  That is, ethical reasoning must proceed as a dialogue with animals, rather 
tha  a o ologi  p o ess i  hi h e e el  thi k a out  the . 93 B  dialogi al ethod,  
what she calls for is paying attentio  to a i als  o u i atio s a d espo di g to the  i  a  
evolving conversation of sorts, athe  tha  i posi g o  the  a atio alisti , al ulati e g id of 
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hu a s  o  o ologi al o st u tio . 94 I ludi g a i als  o u i atio s i  ou  
deliberations, she writes: 
is ot so u h … a atte  of a i g fo  a i als as othe s hu a  a d o hu a  
care for their infants as it is one of listening to animals, paying emotional attention, 
taking seriously – caring about – hat the  a e telli g us. 95 
 While Donovan does not articulate her view in terms of autonomy per se, her emphasis on 
dete i i g a d alui g a  a i al s o  p efe e es a d feeli gs a e uite lose to hat I a d othe  
authors like Thomas) have in mind as far as respecting animals  autonomy.  Her point is that our ethical 
assess e t of the situatio s ofte  a ot e holl  dete i ed f o  the outside,   a  assess e t 
of, for example, a list of objective welfare standards. We must also include the i di idual a i al s 
perspective about how she wants her own life to go.  
 Donovan points out that caring about animals motivates us to understand their desires and 
feeli gs, as the  a e o u i ated  eha io , o alizatio s, a d all o u i ati e sig s dete ta le 
 the hu a  ai . 96 Even if we cannot know exactly hat the a i al s desi es a e, we can often 
understand enough about her experience to formulate an adequate ethical response.97 For example, she 
presents the fleeing of a deer from a hunter as a communication that he or she does not want to be 
injured or killed.98 I te a ti g o e  ti e ith a pa ti ula  i di idual a  i ease o e s u de sta di g of 
hat that i di idual s postu es, eha io s, a d othe  e p essio s sig if , espe iall  i  the ase of 
idiosyncratic exchanges specific to the relationship.99  
  A final recent approach to animal ethics is that of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. They 
propose an ethical theory based on extending citizenship theory to nonhuman animals, thereby 
recognizing them as significant members of human-animal society who ought to have a role in shaping 
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the norms of that society.100 They criticize several other approaches to animal ethics as denying that 
animals have vital interests in autonomy and self-determination.101 Domesticated animals, they write, 
are similar to other disadvantaged groups in society in that they are a utel  ul e a le to u justified 
paternalis ,  o  ha i g thei  o  de isio s a d p efe e es o e idde  oste si l  fo  thei  o  
good.102 Unlike some animal ethicists who see no way around this issue as long as animals remain 
dependent members of human-animal society, Donaldson and Kymlicka (henceforth D & K) believe 
humans can enable animals to have a role in authoring the rights and responsibilities of citizenship that 
their model calls for.  
 D & K tend to use the term agency, rather than autonomy, but their meaning is quite similar to 
mine. Agency, for them, is self- illed, o  i itiated a tio  hi h a ies a  e pe tatio  of effi a . 103 It 
involves self-dete i atio , i  the se se of aki g o  ausi g thi gs to happe , hethe  the thi gs  
happen directly through o e s o  eha io  o  i di e tl  th ough the behavior of another. They offer 
the example of a cat meowing for her supper; if it is p odu ed upo  he  e uest, she has e e ised 
age . If I ig o e o  isu de sta d he  e uests… the  he  age  has ee  th a ted. 104 What D & K 
ea   e a li g so eo e s age  is esse tiall  hat I have in mind when I refer to promoting or 
respecting that i di idual s autonomy.  
 While e a li g  has a diffe e t ea i g tha  espe ti g,  the o g ue e of these o epts 
makes when we invoke a relational account of autonomy, that is, one which recognizes the extent to 
hi h o e s auto o  is a p odu t of o e s a ious so ial elatio s, the fo us of Chapter Three of this 
thesis. Catriona Mackenzie and other feminist authors argue against equating autonomy with self-
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sufficient independence, as this implies that dependence on others entails a lack of autonomy.105 They 
point out that o e s apa it  fo  self-determination always depe ds to so e deg ee o  i te pe so al, 
so ial, a d i stitutio al s affoldi g ;106 o e s so ial ilieu dete i es o e s a aila le optio s, hethe  
one is in a position to ake hoi es, a d hethe  o e s status as a de isio -maker is recognized. D & K 
extend these conclusions to animals. They argue that the dependence of domesticated animals on 
humans does not obviate the possibility of them acting as agents. They subjective good can be 
articulated by their human caregivers and can be incorporated into decisions that affect them 
individually or as a group.  
 Fa ilitati g a i als  agency may i ol e e su i g the  ha e a sa  in the construction of 
infrastructure, laws and policies, and social norms that affect them. One example is design and 
engineering of social spaces. ‘e all Tho as s solutio  to the pote tial o fli t et ee  espe ti g he  
dogs  p efe e e to u  f eel  while protecting their safely: she takes them safely to the park but keeps 
them off the highway. D & K describe how Denmark dealt with a similar conflict between restricting 
hu a  hild e s o ilit  a d f eedo  fo  the sake of thei  safel   eati g o e a -f ee spa es,  
thereby restricting cars rather than children.  A similar approach might be taken to promote animal 
agency on the societal rather than individual level. 
 D & K draw an important distinction between macro agency and micro agency, a topic we will 
return to in Chapter Four. Micro agency encompasses choices animals make within relationships whose 
purposes have already been defined by humans. Their example is training animals for sports or other 
specialized activities which are chosen and directed by humans, but allow the animal to engage in an 
increased amount of choice-making. Providing captive animals with environmental enrichment that they 
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can choose how and when to manipulate, as discussed in the Introduction, could also be considered an 
i sta e of e a li g a i als  i o age .  
 Macro agency, on the other hand, involves being able to jointly author  the o ditio s of o e s 
relationship and being able to make the choice to remain in or leave the relationship. D & K point out 
that we often assume that domesticated animals are incapable of macro agency, that is, that by virtue of 
their very domestication, they lack the capacity to determine the fundamental shape of their lives. Most 
people seem to assume that domesticated a i als  a o f a e is…fi ed  thei  e olutio a  histo  
and/or species nature, pre-dete i i g a life of igid depe de e o  hu a s a d hu a  so iet . 107 
However, D & K argue that the human(s) on whom domesticated animals are dependent can enable 
them to exercise some aspects of macro agency by ensuring that they ha e a ea i gful ight of e it… 
rather than forced participation  i  hu a -animal society and by providing options for them to choose 
from among a spectrum of choices for the shape of their lives.108  
 Another component of D & K s discussion that is especially pertinent to this thesis is the 
epistemic issue of knowing what a  a i al s subjective good is or would be: how can we know what she 
prefers or which option she would choose, without being able to discuss this is a human language?109 
Though they acknowledge the diffi ulties i ol ed i  p e e ti g e o s a d the ooptio  of the 
dis ou se,  D & K go on to offer a variety of means we have available.110 They argue that communication 
around this is not a theoretical and practical impossibility, as often assumed. Rather, as children, 
humans are often naturally good at understanding animal communications; it is socialization into 
human supremacy,  the  a gue, that auses us to fo get,  as e a e taught that hat the a i al is 
communicating about her wants is not important. They also note that the discipline of animal behavior, 
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a field that is currently recognized as a specialty in veterinary medicine, offers an additional tool for the 
successful interpretation of animal communication. 
 Each of these accounts has a different emphasis stemming in part from the traditions from 
which they spring. Regardless of its specifics, adopting an account of animal ethics that values autonomy 
or agency, rather than solely welfare, promises to be useful in practice on a number of levels. For animal 
caregivers, adopting such a perspective may, as philosopher Katie McShane points out, better 
counteract the iases a d wishful thinking  that people are prone to: It might be easier to convince 
yourself that an animal in a lab cage is well-cared-for than to convince yourself that the animal would 
choose to be so- aged. 111 The fact that it is psychologically easier to deceive oneself about what is 
good  fo  so eo e tha  a out hat they will (or would) consent to may be one of the reasons that 
social movements against oppression of certain groups of humans have relied on appeals to autonomy. 
“i ila l , ad o a  effo ts ai ed at i p o i g so iet s t eat e t of a i als a  e efit f o  
incorporating autonomy considerations into their arguments. 
 
From Respect for Animal Autonomy to Respect for Veterinary Patient Autonomy 
 One need not accept Tho as, Do o a , o  D & K s spe ifi  defenses of the ethical value of 
animal autonomy or agency to entertain the topic of this thesis. One also need not adopt the term 
autonomy to critically assess my arguments– some may prefer to speak of agency or the right to make 
personal choices, in the words of animal ethicist Frédéric Côté-Boudreau.112 If one accepts even the 
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relatively unambitious premise that the choices and desires of animals ought to matter ethically in some 
way, then – given the centrality of respect for patient autonomy in (human) medical ethics – this ought 
to justify exploring of the prospects for incorporating a similar value in veterinary medical ethics. 
 Such an exploration is all the more justified when we consider that many of those who advocate 
for incorporation of respect for animal autonomy in animal ethics nonetheless seem to assume that 
overriding animal autonomy is unproblematic if done in the name of veterinary care. Providing 
veterinary care is a moral obligation we have to animals in our care, and the assumption seems to be 
that sacrificing autonomy is inevitable in the course of administering veterinary care. For example, 
Donovan writes: 
A dialogi  ethi s does ot asse t that the a i al s positio  should e the o l  atte  
taken into consideration or that the human should automatically comply with the 
a i al s ishes. Ethi al de isio  aki g is i  fa t made dialogical by the introduction 
i to the o e satio  of fa to s the hu a  k o s e o d the a i al s ke , hi h a  
be relevant to the ethical choice. In the case of domestic animals for whom one has 
assumed responsibility, such factors might include, for example, a decision to gi e o e s 
o pa io  a i al a a i atio , e e  though o e k o s the a i al does t e jo  
going to the vet or receiving a shot. One nevertheless decides in this case to override 
the a i al s i ediate ishes e ause o e sees that the a i al s suffe i g is likel  to 
be minimal and temporary and that the long-term result is likely to be beneficial to the 
a i al, sa i g he  f o  o se pai  a d suffe i g. 113  
Though Do o a  lea l  alues the a i al s desi es a d p efe e es, i  the case of veterinary 
interventions with a high likelihood of benefit and low risk of harm, she seems prepared to accept as 
u p o le ati  a pate alisti  solutio : o e idi g the a i al s ishes fo  the a i al s o  e efit. 
Similarly, Thomas seems to consider it unproblematic to override animal autonomy in the veterinary 
context:  
 Cases he e e ight o e ide so eo e s auto o  ould i lude ha  to 
themselves or potential harm to others, and this would only occur under very serious 
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and exceptional circumstances. Examples of this could include treating an animal 
medically, even if it means reducing their autonomy for a period of time…. 114 
 Both of these authors seem to assume that, given the welfare stakes involved and a i als  
limited ability to understand the benefit of medical interventions, decisions about veterinary 
interventions involve a choice between only two alternatives: either espe t the a i al s auto o  or 
provide them with the medical care which is likely to improve their welfare. As I will discuss later, this is 
a construal I have also found in sanctuaries that value promoting animal autonomy. 
 
Summary and Looking Ahead 
 My purpose in this chapter has been to uncover the origin of the assumptions that animals do 
not qualify as autonomous beings or that they are incapable of exercising autonomy, challenge this 
assessment, and to present various contemporary arguments that respect for animal autonomy (or 
something like it) can and should have a role in animal ethics. From the approaches described, I hope 
that a sense has emerged of what I mean by autonomy in this thesis. It refers to making decisions and 
i itiati g a tio s that shape o e s life i  s all a d la ge a s, fo  o e s o  easo s. A  a i al ethi s 
that incorporates respect autonomy does not limit its concern to strictly welfare considerations, such as 
minimizing suffering or providing for the expression of species-typical behaviors. Rather, it seeks 
understand what matters to individual animals and recognizes an obligation to enable animals to make 
large and small choices about their lives.  
 As we will see in the next chapter, conventional veterinary medicine and mainstream medical 
ethics have thus far failed to acknowledge autonomy as a consideration when it comes to veterinary 
patients. Veterinary medical ethics currently says little to nothing about patient autonomy. Despite 
biomedical ethics setting a lower bar for autonomy than some of the accounts reviewed in this chapter, 
the mainstream account of autonomy provided by this field, when exported to the veterinary realm, 
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results in the conclusion that captive animals fail to qualify as competent, or sufficiently capable of 
autonomous medical decision-making. As conceived by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, the major 
proponents of the mainstream account,115 ete i a  patie ts  status as e e - o pete t  elie es 
practitioners of the duty to respect their autonomy, replacing it instead with the responsibility of 
consulting a surrogate who will use welfare standards alone to make decisions for the animal.  
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 As we saw in Chapter One, although philosophers have traditionally denied that animals have 
the capacity for autonomy, the grounds of this assumption have recently begun to be questioned. 
Several animal ethicists now consider animal autonomy or agency a relevant moral consideration, either 
adding to or underlying more traditional, welfare-based concerns. However, even those persuaded that 
a  a i al s e e ise of autonomy is morally valuable often assume that protecting or improving health 
through veterinary care requires and justifies overriding autonomy through paternalistic intervention. 
 In this chapter, I turn to the dominant ethical frameworks in (human) medicine and veterinary 
medicine. First, I will survey veterinary ethics, paying particular attention to the role of respect of 
autonomy.116 Then I will describe what I take to be the ai st ea  a ou t  of espe t fo  auto o  
in human medical ethics and then extrapolate it to the veterinary realm to see what the prospects are 
for incorporating a similar value in veterinary ethics. Because of some key similarities between 
pediatrics and veterinary practice, I will occasionally consult the pediatric medical ethics perspective. 
 
Frameworks in Veterinary Medical Ethics 
 As a discipline, veterinary ethics is substantially less developed than human medical ethics, 
espe iall  ith ega d to the p a titio e s o ligatio s to he  patie ts. To get a se se of the dominant 
views regarding this issue, I ill e a i e the A e i a  Vete i a  Medi al Asso iatio s P i iples of 
Veterinary Medical Ethics and the perspectives of the two preeminent philosophers in the field, Bernard 
Rollin and Jerrold Tannenbaum. As we will see, despite the central role that respect for patient 
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autonomy currently plays in human biomedical ethics, the concept receives scant mention in veterinary 
medical ethics – though respect for client autonomy is sometimes discussed. These accounts differ in 
what they see as the proper relationship between the veterinarian and client and between the 
veterinarian and the patient. Ezekial Emanuel and Linda Emanuel have pointed out that, in human 
medical ethics, different models of the physician-patient relationship also exist, with autonomy being 
conceived differently by each model.117 I will draw on their analysis to help discern when the standard 
veterinary accounts may be appealing implicitly to certain conceptions of autonomy or respect for 
autonomy to undergird their recommendations.  
 The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) describes nine Principles of Veterinary 
Medical Ethics.118 Most principles do not directly discuss the specific obligations of the veterinarian to 
the patient, but those that do efe  to the elfa e  o  health of the a i al, a d the i po ta e of 
compassion. While the concept of welfare is never defined, the surrounding discussions suggest that the 
AVMA conceives of welfare primarily in the negative; that is, welfare is that which is impinged upon by 
disease, suffering, disability, fear, and pain. It can be promoted by the minimization of these factors.  
 Auto o  is ot e tio ed out ight i  a  of the P i iples, ut espe t fo  the lie t s 
autonomy is presumably the value unde l i g the ethi al o ligatio  of the ete i a ia  to i fo  the 
lie t of the e pe ted esults a d osts, a d the elated isks of ea h t eat e t egi e . 119 As we shall 
see, providing adequate information for decision-making is often cited as a crucial aspect of respecting 
patient autonomy in human medicine. However, the injunction as described in the AVMA Principle falls 
short of stringent requirements for obtaining the informed consent of human patients. Despite the 
requirement to provide some essential information to the client, the Principles seem to leave medical 
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decision- aki g solel  up to the ete i a ia , stati g, Atte di g ete i a ia s a e espo si le fo  
hoosi g the t eat e t egi e  fo  thei  patie ts.   
 Given the lack of an explicit role for client or patient values, the veterinary-client and veterinary-
patient relationships the Principles seem to endorse are equivalent to what Emanuel and Emanuel refer 
to as the paternalistic model of physician-patient relationship in human medicine.120 Under this model, 
the o e t o  est edi al de isio  is assu ed to e dete i a le solel   efe e e to sha ed 
o je ti e ite ia,  ithout a  eed fo  o side atio  of the patie t s (or, in veterinary medicine, the 
lie t s o  patie t s) subjective values. To the extent that respect for autonomy plays any role under the 
paternalistic model,121 patie t auto o  is o st ued as the patie t s o  lie t s  assent, now or at a 
later date, to the ph si ia s e o e datio s a d the o je ti e alues  o  hich they are based. In 
human medicine today, such a paternalistic physician-patient relationship is considered appropriate only 
in limited situations, like emergencies, where the need to provide immediate care precludes any 
significant discussion of the patie t s alues.122 
 Bernard Rollin, a well-known scholar in the field of animal and veterinary medical ethics, has 
delved far deeper into the philosophical aspects of veterinary medical ethics. He describes several 
lasses of ete i a ia s  ethi al o ligations: those owed to clients, to peers in the profession, to society 
in general, to veterinarians themselves, and to patients. He notes that obligations to patients are the 
ost o s u e lass, la gel  e ause ou  so iet  has a  i hoate a d shifti g so ial ethi  he  it o es 
to animals.123 As a whole, society as a whole – at least as judged by its current laws – requires little in 
the way of ethical treatment of animals beyond barring deliberate and unnecessary cruelty to animals.  
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 Because the social ethic gives little guidance to veterinary professionals in this arena, Rollin 
a gues, the ete i a ia s pe so al ethi  pla s a  i po ta t ole i  shapi g hat she sees as he  
obligation(s) to her patients. Unfortunately, at least in my own experience of veterinary school (2004-
2008), encouraging students to develop their personal ethic was not always prioritized and, at times, 
even seemed to be frowned upon.124 Like most other scientific fields, veterinary medicine was 
historically influenced by logical positivism, particularly its conceptually confused notion that science 
ust e alue f ee ;125  this may explain why ethical reflection was not encouraged in veterinary 
programs for much of the twentieth century. With the fall of logical positivism, many have realized that 
values cannot be separated from the enterprise of science, as there are invariably some values that are 
accepted, and denying this fact only obscures evaluation of the values in play. Rollin points out that as 
society as a whole has begun to express o e  fo  assu i g that the a i als e use li e de e t a d 
happ  li es ,126 it is becoming more acceptable, and even expected, for veterinarians to explicitly 
address ethical dimensions of practice. To this end, AVMA has recently convened an Animal Welfare 
Committee, and animal ethics is a central concern of professional organizations such as the Humane 
Society Veterinary Medical Association and the Society for Veterinary Medical Ethics. 
 Rollin argues that the fundamental moral question for every practitio e  is To ho  does the 
veterinarian owe primary obligation: animal or owner? Ought the model for the veterinarian be the 
pediat i ia  o  the a  e ha i ? 127 That is, whose interests come first or, perhaps, count at all? Rollin 
recommends the pediatrician model, seei g the ete i a ia s ole as a patie t ad o ate first and 
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foremost. He poi ts out that, hile the ast ajo it  of toda s ete i a ia s ould likel  as i e to the 
pediatrician model, the social ethic toward animals has historically promoted the mechanic model.128, 129  
 While ‘olli  ai tai s that dete i i g hat is i  the est i te est  of a  a i al, i  a glo al 
sense, may be difficult or impossible in many cases,130 he believes animal welfare can be effectively 
p ote ted if e fo us o  espe ti g the a i al s telos, or fundamental nature.131 Telos encompasses an 
a i al s e olutio a il - and genetically-determined functions and activities.132 Rather than construing 
animal welfare merely as the absence of pain and suffering, as the AVMA does, Rollin sees animal 
welfare as ensuring animals can engage in species-typical behavior and live a life that is in line with 
common sense understandings of what is essential about that type of creature – e.g., respecting the 
dog ess  of a dog, the pig ess  of a pig. That so iet  is increasingly concerned with respecting 
a i als  telos in our interactions with them can be seen, he notes, in trends in legislation. He points to, 
for example, the legal mandate to ensure primate psychological well-being in research facilities and the 
movement in zoos to create environments that address the needs of the animals rather than merely 
being pleasing to the human eye.133 
 While telos is a common sense notion, Rollin argues that their expertise enables veterinarians to 
recognize more readily when telos is ei g iolated. I  additio , thei  status as e pe ts  o i ed ith 
the ethical commitments to animal welfare engendered by their professional role serve to give 
veterinarians greater power to speak up for and intervene on behalf of animals. Although the moral and 
legal status of animals in society means that their treatment is often left to the personal ethic of their 
o e s  the ete i a ia s lie ts , ‘olli  a gues that ete i a ia s a  a d should use the 
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Aesculapian authority134 with which they are endowed as healers to discourage clients from pursuing 
interventions or maintaining animals under conditions contrary to their welfare.135 Not only do 
ete i a ia s o e this dut  to thei  patie ts di e tl , he sa s, the  a e e pe ted  so iet  to ha pio  
a i al elfa e a d lead i  elfa e efo … ith ega d to all a i als. 136 
 Defining animal welfare in terms of telos and asserting a strong role for the veterinarian in terms 
of serving as patient advocate leaves open the possibility of a veterinary obligation to respect patient 
autonomy. After all, if an animal of a given species and level of development typically exercises (at least 
some) autonomy or agency, promoting this would presumably be an important part of respecting his or 
her telos. Ho e e , as p ese ted, ‘olli s a ou t does ot explicitly require incorporation of respect for 
patient autonomy as a value. Telos appears to be determinable by reference to species, rather than 
individual, characteristics – and there may be disagreement regarding what constitutes the telos of a 
given species.137  I  ‘olli s e a ples, as e tai i g the i di idual patie t s desires or values is not 
mentioned as part of the process of the veterinarian determining what recommendations to make. 
Rather, ethical decision- aki g a out ete i a  a e a  p o eed  e te al  e aluatio  of health 
related factors and apparent fulfillment or frustration of telos. Finally, Rollin does not discuss ethical 
issues regarding the delivery of veterinary care, which – as we shall see – is often the context in which 
veterinary patient autonomy is most dramatically overridden. 
 ‘olli s dis ussio  does see  to acknowledge, if obliquely, an obligation to respect client 
autonomy. I suspect this is a reflection of the fact of that, in our society, clients are typically the ultimate 
deciders when it comes to which veterinary interventions to pursue, rather than an endorsement of the 
idea that clients are always the best decision makers for veterinary patients. Rollin maintains that, once 
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the veterinarian has determined which intervention(s) would most benefit the patient, she ought to 
work to persuade the client to take this route, ideally  i oki g the lie t s o  alues. This t pe of 
veterinarian- lie t elatio ship is si ila  to the deli e ati e odel  of ph si ia -patient relationship 
discussed by Emanuel and Emanuel. Under this model, the patient (or, in this case, the client) acts 
autonomously when they (1) consider their own values as well as other, health-related values, (2) 
understand the relation of these values to potential medical interventions, and (3) engage in moral 
deliberation with these factors in i d. U de  this odel, ete i a  p a titio e s espe t thei  lie t s 
autonomy when they get to know the person, introduce health-related values she may not have 
considered, and facilitate her moral deliberation.138 Of note, the deliberative model is the one 
recommended by Emanuel and Emanuel for most physicians and patients in human medicine.139 
 The fi al ajo  te t o  ete i a  ethi s is Je old Ta e au s Veterinary Ethics. Tannenbaum 
maintains that when confronting ethical problems in veterinary medicine, all parties actually or 
potentially affected by a given issue should be considered, including the veterinary patient, other 
animals, the client, other clients or members of the public, the veterinarian(s) involved, other 
veterinarians, and other individuals involved in providing veterinary care, such as veterinary 
technicians.140 U like ‘olli , Ta e au  does ot a k a ete i a ia s o ligatio s to he  patie t as 
higher than obligations to other parties. In fact, he explicitly defends the claim that (all) humans are 
supe io  i  o al alue a d status  to all  o hu a  a i als, the e  justif i g the atta h e t of 
greater moral weight to human interests.  
 Among the factors that are relevant to our ethical reasoning about veterinary patients, 
Tannenbau  p ese ts a  a ou t of se e al i te ests that a i als a  ha e. O e is a  i te est i  ot 
suffe i g pai , o  a e tai  ki d of egati e ps hologi al state,  espe iall  if the state is i te se a d 
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long-lasting.  He seems to acknowledge that animals have both physical and emotional subjective 
experiences, which can interact; for example, anxiety and fear can make the experience of pain worse 
and can persist after the pain has disappeared, potentially being more unpleasant than the initiating 
physically painful experience.141 Tannenbaum also acknowledges that animals may have an interest in 
experiencing pleasure, under which he includes the exercise of curiosity and the fulfillment of basic 
biological drives.142 In line with his commitment to attaching greater moral weight to human interests, 
he akes a poi t of oti g that a i al pleasu es ight ot eigh hea il  agai st hu a  eeds. 143  
 Ta e au s a ou t see s to de  that a i als ha e a  i te est i  determining the shape 
of their lives or that we have a duty to promote or respect their autonomy. He explicitly asserts that 
autonomy, which he defines as the apa it  to de ide o  o e s o  that o e ill ake de isio s a d 
long-term plans and to work to put these decisions into effect, 144 is a human capacity shared by few, if 
any, animals. 145  As such, he holds it to be the source of many human rights  that animals lack.146 The 
capacity for autonomy, he asserts, contributes human moral superiority, or greater moral standing. 
Tannenbaum does not elaborate on this putative connection, other than to say it is related to self-
awareness, or being aware that one is an experiencing being, distinct from others. 147  
 Ta e au s ie s o  self-awareness are worth scrutinizing, because parties on both sides of 
the animal autonomy debate consider the capacity of self-awareness to be central. 148, One of 
Ta e au s lai s is that the o al i po ta e of self-awareness stems from the fact that, while any 
sentient being can experience pleasure and pain, only self-aware beings can anticipate future 
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experiences of pleasure and pain and have emotional responses about these forecasted experiences.149 
Another claim that Tannenbaum presumably takes as self-evident, for he offers only minimal support for 
it, is that the vast majority of animals lack self-awareness. He grants that a tiny minority of animal 
species, such as chimpanzees, may be self-aware (and thus entitled to higher moral status than other 
animals), based on their ability to deceive one another and their performance on i o - e og itio  
tests.150 The mirror-recognition test is an experiment devised by Gordon Gallup, Jr. in 1970, which 
begins with giving an animal access to a mirror for a period of time. 151 She is then anesthetized and an 
odorless, non-palpable colored mark is placed a part of her body that she can only see with the mirror. 
When the animal awakens, she is provided with the mirror and any attempts to touch or inspect the 
mark are noted. Like Gallup, Tannenbaum seems to believe that passi g  the i o  test,  sho i g 
evidence that one recognizes that it is oneself in the mirror, indicates self-awareness. 
 These two claims are difficult to reconcile with one another. Even animals with a very 
rudimentary nervous system show the ability to anticipate future experiences and respond to them, at 
least behaviorally.152 For example, a mollusk whose siphon is gently touched will initially only withdraws 
its siphon slightly. However, if the gentle touch is followed repeatedly by an electric shock, the mollusk 
will soon learn to vigorously withdraw its siphon and gills in response to the gentle touch, apparently in 
anticipation of the electric shock. Anyone who lives with a companion animal can likely give examples of 
her excitement in anticipation of a walk, game, or treat, or her emotional distress in anticipation of 
something unpleasant – perhaps a bath or being left alone. Yet, Tannenbaum holds that at best a few 
a i al spe ies ha e li ited  self-awareness – a d he p o a l  does t ea  ollusks!  This suggests 
that he may assign different meanings to the te  self-a a e ess  at diffe e t poi ts i  his discussion.  
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 Recently, efforts have been made to define more carefully and investigate empirically the 
question of self-awareness in animals. Marc Bekoff and Paul “he a  p opose a o ti uu  of self-
og iza e  alo g hi h a ious spe ies a d i di iduals  a  fall, identifying three distinct levels of 
self-cognizance that other authors, like Tannenbaum, may have previously run together under the 
u ella of self-a a e ess.  153 They believe that empirical investigation has and will continue to 
demonstrate that an animal s position on this continuum is determined partly by her evolutionary 
history, social structures, and life-history characteristics.  
 At its most basic, self-cognizance involves determining whether something or someone is the 
same phenotype as oneself. “u h self- efe e i g,  as the  te  it, need not be conscious; Bekoff and 
Sherman point out that the immune system also carries out this type of discrimination without 
consciousness.154 Currently, the claim that birds, animals, and octopuses are conscious is considered 
rather controversial.155 The next higher level under their scheme they term self-awareness,  which they 
define as a cognitive process that allows a possessor to differentiate her own body from that of others 
and from the est of the o ld a d to o eptualize possessio , su h as  food ite  o   
territory.156 Self-awareness, in this sense, is necessary for animals to function in social and ecological 
settings, for example, moving their bodies through a complex environment, interacting with conspecifics 
and predators/prey, and understanding the potentially complex social hierarchy of their group. Thomas 
presents a range of arguments and empirical evidence that many animal species possess a level of self-
awareness somewhere in this neighborhood.157 Thomas likens this level to what she terms phenomenal 
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self-a a e ess, that is, that the e e so ethi g it is like  to e that i di idual, a d that she is a a e of 
her own desires, emotions, and preferences.158 
 Finally, at the far e d of Bekoff a d “he a s self-cognizance continuum is self-
consciousness,  which requires having a theory of mind, i.e., understanding that others have different 
beliefs, perspectives, and emotions than oneself, and being able to think about oneself as an individual 
in relation with others. Studies suggest that human children must develop a theory of mind, rather than 
it being innate, and that this happens around the same time as the ability to take the self as an object of 
reflection and evaluation emerges.159 Bekoff and Sherman theorize that this level of self-cognizance is 
evolutionarily selected for when individuals have repeated interactions, either competitive or 
cooperative, with others, and thus benefit from self-reflection and revising their future thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors in response to othe s  ea tio s to the .160  
 When Tannenbaum presents the mirror-recognition test as assessing self-awareness, he seems 
to have in mind this level of self-cognizance. Presumably, if a being can look in a mirror and realize that 
the spot is on her own face, she understands herself as a separate being among others, one that can be 
an object of her attention. However, despite frequent reference to this test in discussions about self-
awareness/self-consciousness, many have pointed its methodological limitations.  
 Rollin pointed out early on that passing the mirror-recognition may be a sufficient condition for 
attributing self-awareness, but fails to be a necessary one.161 Rollin notes that it is difficult to believe 
that chimpanzees and orangutans, because they pass the mirror recognition test, are self-aware, but 
gorillas – who are more closely related to chimpanzees and humans than are orangutans – are not self-
aware because they fail it. Now that we know that some gorillas (e.g., Koko the signing gorilla who lives 
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in closely with humans162) do pass the test, this dis epa  is e plai ed  go illas  ge e al a e sio  to 
direct eye contact, as this is a threatening communicative gesture.163 Other animals may fail the test, not 
because they cannot recognize themselves but because they are unconcerned about the mark, have a 
od  st u tu e that akes it diffi ult o  i possi le to e o e it, o  si pl  fail to gi e a dete ta le 
eha io al espo se. 164 Like Bekoff and Sherman, Rollin finds it much more plausible to conceive of 
self-awareness as a continuum, along which we would find awareness of phenomenal states like pain 
and itching, perception of dangers and threats, and faculties that permit complex social interactions.165  
 As science has discovered how highly developed certain sensory modalities are in other species, 
critics of the Gallup have pointed out that the mirror-recognition test is inherently biased in favor of 
beings who, like humans, rely on vision for recognizing others.166, Vision, incidentally, seems to be the 
only sensory modality that is well developed in humans relative to other species. Those who pass the 
mirror-recognition test essentially show that they recognize their own image and take it as an objection 
of investigation. Yet, many species rely on smell or other sensory modalities for taking in information 
about the world, and especially for recognizing others. ‘e e tl , a  olfa to - i o  e og itio  test 
has been developed for dogs.167 It showed that, when presented with the urine of another dog, their 
own urine, and an adulterated version of the own urine, dogs will spend the most time sniffing the 
sample of their own urine mixed with a modifying odor.168 As yet, there is no definitive consensus on 
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what this entails for self-awareness, but it seems to support the idea that dogs can recognize themselves 
and take their own scent, at least, as an object of investigation. Given all of these concerns, it seems safe 
to say that the mirror-recognition test is not as diagnostic as Gallup and Tannenbaum assume.  
 Even if an empirical method can be found for differentiating exactly where along the self-
cognizance continuum an individual lies, it is not clear that a highly advanced type of self-awareness is 
necessary for one to be capable of at least a degree of autonomy or to warrant moral consideration. 
Ta e au s defi itio  of auto o  – the apa it  to de ide o  o e s o  that o e ill ake 
decisions and long-term plans and to work to put these decisions into effect  – relies on a high level of 
self-a a e ess i  that de idi g to ake de isio s  i plies taki g o e s de isio -making as an object of 
reflection. However, we can likely point to decisions we simply make, without de idi g to de ide,  that 
are nonetheless based on our reasons and that we consider autonomous. In such cases, our reasons 
may simply amount to our own desires, emotions, and preferences, for which only a moderate level of 
self-awareness is necessary. Tannenbaum seems to be asserting that straightforward decisions made on 
the basis of such reasons do not constitute the exercise of autonomy, but he does not defend this claim.  
 Tannenbaum links autonomy to the making and carrying out of long-term plans, and the 
capacity for long-term planning tends to be correlated with possession of higher levels of self-
awareness, both developmentally within the human species and evolutionarily among animal species. 
However, his focus on long-term planning is problematic.  While (many) humans certainly excel at long-
term planning compared to other species, a  a i als  le el of self-awareness is such that they can 
prepare for future conditions and activities. Many animals cache food whose location they recall many 
months later. Some animals make and transport basic tools, indicating that they are acting in the 
present with a specific future activity in mind. And, again, as humans we sometimes make decisions that 
affect only the immediate present, and still value these as autonomous decisions if we make them based 
on our own reasons. 
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 In contrast to his position on veterinary patient autonomy, Tannenbaum does focus on the 
ete i a ia s dut  to espe t the lie t s auto o , spe ifi all  he  o ligatio  to seek the lie t s 
informed consent. This is conceived as giving the client all the information she needs to make a decision 
and doing so without applying any pressure or influence, overt or subtle.169 In contrast to Rollin, 
Tannenbaum explicitly cautions against veterinarians providing information in ways that are intended to 
steer the client in a certain direction. The veterinarian-client relationship is premised on the 
u de sta di g that the patie t is the lie t s p ope t  a d, Ta e au  a gues, it is this o e ship 
elatio ship a d the lie t s g eate  u de sta di g of he  o  pa ti ula  situatio  that ilitate agai st 
the veterinarian presenting information in anything other than an absolutely unbiased manner. 170  
 Ta e au s a ou t e alls the i fo ati e odel  of ph si ia -patient relationship 
discussed by Emanuel and Emanuel. Under this model, the physician presents all relevant information 
for the patient to decide which medical intervention they want, and then facilitates or executes the 
i te e tio  the patie t sele ts. The ph si ia s alues pla  o ole; she is espo si le st i tl  fo  the 
facts, while the patient is responsible for making a decision based on her own values. Applying this 
model to veterinary medicine, client autonomy equates to the client choosing and controlling medical 
i te e tio s. The ete i a ia  espe ts the lie t s auto o   p ese ti g information in an unbiased 
manner and carrying out her decisions.  
 In human medicine, this model is recommended for certain situations, such as walk-in medical 
centers, where the relationship between the physician and patient is likely to be very short-lived.171 This 
is because, for longer term relationships, patients seem to expect a more caring, less detached 
physician, one who can make individualized recommendations by assimilating their medical knowledge, 
                                                          
169
 Tannenbaum, J. (1989). Veterinary Ethics. (p. 121). 
170
 Tannenbaum, J. (1995). Veterinary ethics: animal welfare, client relations, competition and collegiality (second 
ed.). (pp. 181-183). 
171
 Emanuel and Emanuel 7. 
50 
 
past e pe ie e, a d the patie t s u i ue standpoint.172 The informative model is considered non-ideal 
as a default because it assumes that patients usually have a clear and unchanging understanding of their 
values and desires when, in fact, they may seek out a physician in part because they expect she will 
introduce health-related values into their deliberations about the relative importance of their values.173 
In my experience, information can rarely be communicated with zero bias, as word choice inevitably 
imparts some slant, even with the presentation of statisti al su ess ates this the ap  su eeds ost 
of the ti e  . this the ap  fails % of the ti e  a d ea  su i al ates she ould ha e a othe   
good o ths   she ill likel  e eutha ized ithi   o ths . This akes the attai a ilit  of this 
ideal questionable. 
 Before turning to the mainstream account of respect for (human) patient autonomy, I will briefly 
examine an issue that both Rollin and Tannenbaum consider central to veterinary medical ethics: the 
dual masters  served by the veterinarian. Tannenbaum writes: 
[Vete i a ia s] se e oth a i als a d people. This dual fu tio  a  put ete i a ia s 
in an impossible position when what is good for the patient is not good for the client, or 
when helping the client means harming the patie t. 174 
Ta e au  otes that, e ause the ete i a ia  o ks fo  the lie t, it is the lie t ho etai s the 
ight to de ide hi h se i es ill e p o ided. 175 As e sa  a o e, ‘olli  also otes the ete i a ia s 
fidelity conflict, but recommends resolving it by modeling the veterinarian on the pediatrician, rather 
than the mechanic, a d ei g a  ad o ate fo  the a i al patie t s est i te est.  
 ‘olli s a alog  is useful i  that e a  easil  g asp the diffe e e et ee  a e ha i s 
relationship to a da aged a  a d a pediat i ia s elatio ship to he  sick patient. Pediatrics is also 
similar to veterinary medicine in involving a three-party therapeutic relationship rather than the two-
                                                          
172
 Ibid., 5. 
173
 Ibid., 5-6. 
174
 Tannenbaum, J. (1995). Veterinary ethics: animal welfare, client relations, competition and collegiality (second 
ed.). (p. ix). 
175
 Ibid., (p. 181). 
51 
 
party physician-patient relationship that is standard in medicine. The physician-parent-patient is 
structurally similar to the veterinarian-client-patient relationship in many ways; for example, there is 
often a close relationship between the non-clinician members of the relationship, and both pediatric 
and veterinary patients are typically limited in their understanding of medical issues.  
 Ho e e , ‘olli s a alog  see s to gloss o e  the pote tial o fli ts of dut  that pediat i ia s 
encounter in their course of practice. While familial love often dictates that parents (or guardians) will 
choose a course based solely on what is best for the child, differences in parental and physician values at 
times mean that there will be disagreements about ho  to o st ue the hild s est i te est  and what 
will in fact promote it. And, just as a veterinarian may feel a client is putting her own minor interests 
ahead of the a i al s most vital interests, pediatricians may sometimes encounter parents whose 
values seem to prevent them from selecting interventions that are necessary to protect or heal the child 
– or perhaps even ensure her survival.176 Scenarios in which parents hold religious convictions regarding 
blood transfusion come to mind, or parents who eschew the use of vaccinations or antibiotics. In such 
cases, both physicians and veterinarians may be left questioning which individual they owe a greater 
o ligatio  of fidelit . Ho  do pediat i ia s a igate the halle ge of se i g t o aste s,  o  p ote t 
the interests of the child patient while also espe ti g the ishes of the hild s pa e ts o  gua dia s?  
 While the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics o side s the pediat i ia s 
p i a  dut  to e ep ese ti g the patie t s est i te ests,177 it generally recommends abiding by 
parental wishes unless the child is likely to be subjected to serious harm, suffering, or death, at which 
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point a hospital ethics committee or the court may be asked to become involved.178 While veterinarians 
also frequently defer to the wishes of the client who will not be persuaded, they lack the option of 
seeking outside intervention, even in extreme cases. At most, veterinarians concerned about a particular 
patie t a  e uest a elfa e he k   a i al o t ol age ies, ut a i al o t ol officers are rarely 
empowered to intervene in a meaningful way. When the threat of harm, suffering, or death of their 
patient is too great for veterinarians to bear, their options are typically limited to offering euthanasia at 
no charge (for a severely suffering animal or one with a grave prognosis) or persuading the client to 
surrender the patient to the veterinarian or clinic to assume care and costs associated with treatment. 
 The fa il - e te ed ethi  is a othe  app oa h put fo th fo  deali g ith su h situations in 
pediatrics.179 This approach considers the benefits and burdens of a decision on the child as well as 
other family members, the responsibilities family members have to one another, and the vulnerability of 
the child. The physician attempts to ha o ize  the alues of all fa il  e e s hile also 
encouraging parents or guardians to focus on what is truly in the best interest of the child. A version of 
this app oa h is f e ue tl  utilized  ete i a ia s. Fo  e a ple, o e o o  o fli ti g alue  is 
cost reduction: many private practice veterinarians spend a great deal of time modifying diagnostic and 
treatment plans to keep financial costs at or below the burden the client is willing or able to accept. This 
often entails providing less than ideal care, but e a les the patie t s ost p essi g eeds to e et.  
 
Hu a  Medical Ethics: The Physicia ’s Duties  
 Respect for patient autonomy is among the central values in medical ethics. However, it is not 
the only duty, nor is it necessarily more important than any other. Contemporary accounts of medical 
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ethics identify several other core duties that practitioners have toward their patients. I will briefly 
review these before focusing on respect for autonomy. 
 First, the duty of beneficence requires physicians to do good for their patients by protecting 
their interests and promoting their welfare.180 Positive acts that protect a patient from an illness, resolve 
an ailment, or relieve unpleasant symptoms are examples of a physician fulfilling her duty of 
beneficence. The maxim primum non nocere, o  fi st, do o ha ,  is the o igi  of a othe  dut , that of 
non-maleficence. Non-maleficence requires that physicians consider the possible harm that a potential 
treatment might cause and consider whether modifying the medical intervention, or perhaps even 
providing no treatment at all (e.g., benign neglect), may be a better option. The principle of justice in the 
medical context requires just access to health care, fair allocation of resources, and the equitable 
distribution of risks and burdens when it comes to biomedical research using research subjects.181 
Finally, fidelity is often considered a principle of medical ethics, requiring that the physician consider her 
patie ts  i te ests fi st a o g all othe s.182 This i ludes p io itizi g patie t s i te ests oth he  the  
ight o fli t ith the ph si ia s self-interest and when they conflict with the interests of other 
people.183 The dut  of fidelit  also e ui es that ph si ia s keep thei  patie t s o fide es, carry out 
thei  p o ises to thei  patie ts, a d follo  thei  patie ts  e p essed ishes.184 
 Conflicts between various duties can and do arise, requiring the physician to either find a path 
that adequately fulfills both obligations or balance the competing obligations to determine which is 
more compelling in the specific context. Risky procedures that sta d to d asti all  i p o e a patie t s 
health if successful may pit the duty of non-maleficence against that of beneficence. The duties of 
beneficence and respect for autonomy come into conflict when the patient declines an intervention that 
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the physician believes would greatly improve her welfare or save her life (or, conversely, when a patient 
seeks out an intervention whose risks far outweigh its potential benefits). As we will see in Chapter 
Three, this conflict is at the heart of questions about when paternalism, or over- idi g a patie t s 
decision for her own good, is justified. 
 
Respect for Autonomy in Mainstream Medical Ethics 
 Given the parallels between human and veterinary medicine, it is useful to consider what 
conclusions might be drawn about respect for veterinary patient autonomy if we were to export the 
approach of mainstream (human) medical ethics. However, we must first get clear on what this 
approach to autonomy is. In this section, I will present this account, taking Beau ha p a d Child ess s 
discussion in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (henceforth B & C) to represent the mainstream account of 
autonomy and respect for autonomy in (human) medical ethics.  
  Like a  autho s, B & C egi  thei  a ou t  oti g that the te  auto o  is ot used 
univocally throughout the literature. 185 They equate autonomy with self-rule, specifying that 
autonomous decision- aki g ust e f ee f o  oth controlling interference by others and from 
e tai  li itatio s su h as a  i ade uate u de sta di g that p e e ts ea i gful hoi e. 186 B & C are 
careful not to require too demanding a conception of autonomy, because they believe that the account 
used in medi al ethi s ust ou t the e e da  hoi es of o di a  people as auto o ous and worthy 
of respect.187  
 B & C argue that an action is autonomous if it satisfies three conditions: (1) it must have been 
chosen intentionally, not accidentally, (2) the individual who has chosen it has done so with sufficient 
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u de sta di g, a d  its hoosi g ust ot ha e ee  the esult of o t olli g i flue es. 188 The first 
condition is all-or-none, that is, an action is either intentional or accidental/inadvertent. The other two 
conditions admit of degrees, and must only be fulfilled to a substantial degree, not completely, for an 
individual to qualify as autonomous. 
 The requirement of understanding requires both that the physician provide adequate 
information and, as other writers about decisional capacity stress, that the patient has the capacity to 
comprehend the facts and to appreciate the significance of her medical condition, the decision to be 
made, and how the decision stands to affect her future experience.189 B & C emphasize that it is only 
sufficient understanding that is required, since the level of understanding reached by patients is typically 
less than that of the physician, and full understanding is an ideal rarely if ever reached.190 Adequate 
reasoning capacity is also necessary for understanding how one stands to be affected by an illness, an 
intervention, or a decision. Decisional capacity scholars consider the sub-capacity of reasoning satisfied 
if the patient can weigh risks and benefits and consider possible consequences. As a requirement for 
autonomy, it is often left vague, presumably because – given the empirical evidence for how irrationally 
we often behave – setting the bar too high might result in finding many or most patients are decisionally 
incapable.191  
 B & C s thi d o dition, noncontrol, requires that, for an action to be autonomous, the individual 
u de taki g it ust e f ee of o t ols e e ted eithe   e te al sou es o   i te al states that o  
the person of self-di e ted ess. 192 Not all forms of external influence undermine autonomy, but 
coercion and manipulation do, a topic we will consider in more depth in Chapter Four. Examples of 
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i te al i flue es  gi e   B & C i lude e tal ill ess a d the i atu ity of infants and young 
children.  
 B & C see respecting a patie t s auto o  as a k o ledgi g he  ight to ake hoi es ased o  
her values and desires. This respect entails both taking a certain attitude toward the patient and 
performing certain actions. It entails negative duties, such as refraining from interfering with the 
autonomous decision-making of a patient, and positive duties, such as providing adequate information 
to permit decision making. Physicians may sometimes have a duty to help develop or maintain a 
patie t s apa it  fo  auto o ous hoi e  add essi g fea s o  othe  o ditio s that dest o  o  
dis upt auto o ous a tio . 193  
 The conception of autonomy put forth by B & C acknowledges that autonomy is a matter of 
degree, with greater understanding and freedom from controlling influence leading to greater 
autonomy. Similarly, they also note that, as ith all a ilities, o e s ability to make autonomous decisions 
falls on a continuum, from completely incapable to highly capable. However, B & C advocate setting a 
threshold level of autonomous decision-making ability, above which an individual is considered 
competent at the task of making a medical decision and below which she is considered incompetent.194  
Competent individuals must be able to understand information given to them, consider their options in 
light of their values, intentionally pursue a given outcome, and communicate their wishes. 195 
Competency, B & C recommend, should not be viewed as coming in degrees.196 Rather, above the above 
the threshold, all individuals must be treated as equally competent to make decisions and below it, they 
are considered equally incompetent.197 
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 Competence is also considered by B & C to be a presupposition of obtaining informed 
consent.198 Informed consent is defined in their account as a  i di idual s autonomous authorization of 
a edi al i te e tio  o  of pa ti ipatio  i  esea h…. a pe so  ust do o e tha  e p ess ag ee e t 
or comply with a proposal. He or she must authorize something through an act of informed and 
voluntary co se t. 199 They propose a seven-element definition of informed consent that they divide 
into threshold, information, and consent elements. The threshold elements are competence and 
voluntariness. The information elements are disclosure (of material information), recommendation of a 
plan, and understanding (ensuring the patient understands the information and the recommendation). 
The consent elements are decision and authorization.  
 B & C defend the view that judgments about competency should disti guish persons whose 
decisions should be solicited or accepted from persons whose decisions need not or should not be 
soli ited, o  a epted. 200 They acknowledge that we still owe moral respect to incompetent 
individuals,201 and acknowledge that competency is always relative to a specific decision or range of 
decisions so that a patient may be competent to make decision about things like food preferences and 
initiating contact with friends, but may nonetheless be incompetent to make medical decisions.202 
However, unless the possibility exists of rendering a  i o pete t  patie t competent, the physician 
does not have a duty to respect her autonomy regarding medical decisions. For patients who have never 
qualified as competent, they hold, we need not consider what decision they would make if they were 
o pete t, fo  the e is o asis fo  aki g a judg e t of thei  auto o ous hoi e. 203 Instead, the 
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ph si ia s o ligatio  is to find a surrogate decision maker who then uses the appropriate standard to 
make medical decisions on behalf of the patient.204   
 For surrogate decision- aki g, B & C des i e esse tiall  t o sta da ds  hi h su ogates  
decisions can be guided. One is autonomy-based while the other is welfare-focused, that is, it asks which 
a tio  is i  the patie t s best interests. The autonomy-based standard relies on wishes and judgments 
the patient communicated before their loss of autonomy; the locus of respect in these cases is those 
previous autonomous decisions.205 Ideally, these previously-made decisions would be explicit and clearly 
applicable to the situation the now-incompetent patient is in. However, if an incompetent patient ends 
up in a scenario that she never foresaw or expressed treatment preferences about, B & C allow that a 
surrogate who knew the patie t a d he  alues ell a  su stitute  thei  o  judg e t i  aki g a 
decision about treatment that is likely to be what the patient, when still autonomous, would have 
made.206   
 For never-competent patients, however, their recommendations are quite different. They note: 
We o iousl  a ot follo  a su stituted judg e t sta da d fo  e e -competent patients, because 
o asis e ists of a judg e t of thei  auto o ous hoi e. 207 Thus, in cases where a patient never 
qualified as sufficiently autonomous, the su ogate ust use the est i te est sta da d.   U de  this 
standard, the primary values appealed to are beneficence and nonmaleficence: the surrogate is charged 
ith dete i i g the highest et e efit a o g the a aila le optio s,  he e et e efit is 
determined by considering the risks and probable benefits of all options.208  Welfare and quality of life 
a e the sole easu es i  dete i i g the patie t s est i te est.  
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Applyi g B & C’s Pri ciples of Respect for Auto o y to Veteri ary Medici e 
 While B & C do not discuss animals in their chapter about respect for patient autonomy briefly, 
they do touch briefly on the potential for animals to have autonomous capabilities in their opening 
chapter on moral status.209 Here, B & C note that while many bioethicists claim that nonhuman animals 
la k auto o , this p e ise is o e assu ed tha  de o st ated.  210 They go on to cite examples of 
auto o ous apa ilities i  ild a i als, su h as the a ilit  of a  a i als to fo ge i te tio al pla s 
of action for hunting, sto ki g ese e foods, a d o st u t d elli gs. 211 When discussing moral duties 
o ed to t o pote tial atego ies of esea h su je ts, dete io ati g Alzhei e s patie ts a d la guage-
trained apes, B & C suggest that cognitive capacities including or underlying autonomy exist on a single 
continuum along which both humans and nonhuman animals fall.212 While humans are usually more 
to a d the ad a ed  e d of the spe t u , the  ote, i  ases of disa ilit  o  de e tia, thei  og iti e 
capacities – potentially including that for autonomy – may be surpassed by animals.   
 Given that B & C do not discount the possibility that at least some animals having autonomous 
capacities, it initially seems curious that they fail to consider animals in their discussion of respect for 
autonomy.213 In this section, I will attempt to elucidate a potential justification for this by extrapolating 
their account to animals. I show that, however autonomous a i als  de isio s ight at ti es e under 
B & C s a ou t, virtually no animal ould ualif  as o pete t,  o  suffi ie tl  auto o ous to ake 
medical decisions, thus making it unnecessary – or perhaps impossible by definition – to respect their 
choices in this arena.  
 Fi st, e a  look at B & C s th ee o ditio s fo  auto o ous action: (1) intentionality, (2) 
understanding, and (3) absence of external control. When it comes to decisions, medical or otherwise, 
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animals seem to have the potential to meet the requirement of intentionality. That is, their actions are 
not universally accidental; a chimpanzee will intentionally swallow a flavored medication or spit it out, a 
dog who holds still for placement of an intravenous catheter has made a decision to do so – she may or 
may not be coerced into doing do, but it is no accident. Similarly, in theory and sometimes in practice, 
animals seem to be able to meet the criteria for acting without external controls. They permit or 
undertake at least some medical actions without being coerced. For example, they may happily hop on a 
scale, ingest an offered chewable medication, or permit an injection with a needle of so small a gauge as 
to e o pai ful. The i te al i flue es  B & C o side  as pote tial o t olli g fa to s a  ge e all  
be a greater concern for animals than adult humans, i  that fea  a  e o e likel  to t igge  fight o  
flight  ode i  a  a i al, a d B & C ould likel  o side  this state of i d to e a o t olli g 
influence.  
 It is in the requirement of sufficient understanding where animals most obviously – and perhaps 
universally – fail to eet B & C s ite ia fo  auto o ous a to s i  health a e de isio s. We a  e a le 
to point to certain situations where an animal does seem to have a level of understanding on par with 
that of a typical human patient. For example, it is documented that wild apes ingest specific parts of 
certain plants when they are ill;214 even if their level of understanding is as rudimentary as associating 
this action with expected relief in the near future, this is likely equivalent to many huma s  
understanding of remedies we commonly reach for to relieve headaches or indigestion. In addition, 
veterinary clients often recount stories of pets seeking human assistance with medical problems. For 
example, animals who have become injured while roaming frequently return home, and sick animals 
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a  e o e li g  o  othe ise de o st ati e. Several of my clients have recounted their pet letting 
them know of their bladder problems by walking directly in front of them and passing bloody urine on 
the floor. One interpretation of this behavior is that, perhaps based on past experiences of humans 
providing comfort or relief, the distressed animal understands that her human companion may have the 
ability to render aid, even if she cannot imagine the specifics of what that aid might be. 
 However, for most medical interventions that a veterinarian may recommend for a patient, 
suffi ie t u de sta di g  e ui es the use of o epts a d a st a t ideas that a e out of ea h fo  a  
a i al. A  a i al s u de sta di g of an illness is likely limited to her subjective experience of its 
symptoms, or perhaps an association with an inciting cause such as a traumatic event or ingestion of a 
particular substance. Without linguistic ability and the extent of future-oriented thought that humans 
have, an animal likely cannot understand that a disease is expected to take a certain course. Without 
linguistic ability, sufficient understanding of what is entailed by an intervention, even something as 
simple as a vaccine, seems impossible, to say nothing of comparing potential alternatives. In addition, 
u de sta di g that o e has a  i p o ed lo g-te  p og osis  if a e tai  i te e tio  is hose  
involves a greater degree of rationality and projection into the future that exceeds the capabilities of 
most or all animals.  
 In addition, when it comes to gauging competency and specifically understanding, B & C require 
giving rational reasons or reasons rooted in risk/benefit analysis. 215 There are surely many situations in 
which animals can and do gauge risk and they undoubtedly have reasons for their behavior, the 
rationality of which is often confirmed by ethological observation. However, in situations where medical 
care is being delivered, emotional rather than rational reasons may often prevail – for example, fear of 
the veterinarian (who is a stranger) or being handled in an unusual way – and the risks and potential 
benefits that the animal considers are likely to be very local and focused on their immediate experience. 
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Finally, reflecting on B & C s defi itio  of i fo ed o se t des i ed a o e, e a  ote that, esides 
failing to meet the standards of patient competency that are presupposed by their schema, veterinary 
patients are also unable to satisfy information elements and consent elements of informed consent.216  
 Gi e  the i e ita le lassifi atio  of all ete i a  patie ts as e e  o pete t,  extrapolating 
B & C s a ou t leads to the o lusio  that the ete i a ia s dut  is rely on a surrogate to make 
decisions in the patie t s est i te est, where this is defined as the course most likely to provide a net 
e efit to the patie t s elfa e a d ualit  of life. Use of this est i te est sta da d see s to a o d 
well with the guidelines to which many animal caregivers aspire when making medical decisions for 
those i  thei  a e. What is est fo  the patie t?  is ofte  the fi st – and sometimes the only – question 
asked for companion animals (both in private homes and in shelters) and for animals living in (some) 
zoos or sanctuaries. The goal of veterinary interventions in these contexts is often to relieve pain or 
discomfort and to restore or maintain the patient to a state where they can engage in activities that 
i g the  e jo e t o  pleasu e, as ould e di tated  B & C s best interests standard.  
 In other contexts, the veterinary situation does not resemble straightforward extrapolation, 
mutatis mutandis, of B & C s e ui e e ts fo  deali g ith e e  o pete t  patie ts. A fa il s 
resources (time, emotional, financial, etc.) may significantly constrain the options available to the 
patient. In a more stark contrast to the situation in human medicine, the veterinarian may consider the 
p i iple of fidelit  to appl  p i a il  to the lie t a d p o oti g the lie t s goals. I  the ase of food 
a i al  o  p odu tio  edi i e, it a  e the lie t s fi a ial i te ests o  othe  hu a s  gustato  
interests, athe  tha  the patie t s elfa e i te ests, that take p io it . “i ila l , i  zoos, a  edi al 
interventions are aimed at creation of offspring from a pre-selected dam and sire, with the ultimate goal 
of ai tai i g a ge eti all  di e se apti e populatio ; this goal, athe  tha  the patie t s elfa e 
interests, takes priority. At times, welfare interests come into play more in terms of what options they 
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rule out – what would cause too much pain or suffering to the patient – rather than being used in the 
manner B & C suggest for surrogates, i.e., for choosing the option that could be said to be in the 
patie t s best interest. Whatever the focus of their practice, however, veterinarians today tend to see 
their duties to the patient as limited to beneficence and non-maleficence, without any obvious role for 
respecting autonomy.  
 
Pediatric Patients and Respect for Autonomy 
 B & C do ot gi e u h atte tio  to the a ea of pediat i s a d the ph si ia s dut  to espe t 
the autonomy developing autonomy of child patients. However, just as pediatric medical ethics offers 
ideas for approaching conflicts unique to a three-party therapeutic relationship, pediatrics may provide 
some insight in dealing with patients incapable of making sufficiently autonomous medical decisions. 
Young children, at least, ould e lassified as never i o pete t  to ake auto o ous edi al 
decisions by B & C s a ou t, ith the -now-familiar consequence that a surrogate decision maker, 
usually a parent or guardian, takes on the role of medical decision-maker for them. However, other 
mainstream accounts take as central the fact that children are in the process of developing autonomous 
apa ilities a d de isio al apa it . As su h, pediat i ia s a e e ou aged to i o po ate the hild s 
ishes a d o e s to the e te t easo a le gi e  the t pe of de isio  to e ade a d hild s age a d 
abilities.217 Including children in the decision-making process is also believed to provide them with a 
sense of control which is beneficial for their welfare. 218 
 Depe di g o  the g a it  of the edi al de isio  a d the hild s apa it , pediat i  edi al 
ethics increasingly recognizes various decision-making roles for children.219 For example, some decisions 
are fully left up to the child, such as which arm to have blood drawn from, whereas others may involve 
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either consulting the child for their perspective or giving them the oppo tu it  to atif  a de isio  
made by their parents. In the case of children, respecting autonomy is often discussed not in terms of 
i fo ed o se t ut athe  as o tai i g the hild s assent, where satisfaction of this criterion varies 
with contextual factors, such as the age of the child and the type of decision.220  
 The concept of assent has not, to my knowledge, been explored by veterinary ethicists to date, 
but given the similarities between some veterinary patients and young pediatric patients, I suspect it 
could prove useful were we to accept respect for patient autonomy as a relevant value in veterinary 
medicine. I will explore some possible applications of this concept in Chapter Four. 
 
Summary and Looking Ahead 
 As our discussion up to this point has made clear, acknowledging that at least some animals are 
capable of autonomy and value exercising autonomy does not automatically mean that veterinarians or 
a egi e s ust espe t a  a i al s auto o  he  aki g health a e de isio s. Vete i a  medicine 
has historically concerned itself with obligations of beneficence and non-maleficence; if respect for 
auto o  has ee  o side ed at all, it has ee  the lie t s auto o  that is efe e ed. E po ti g a 
mainstream account of respect for patient autonomy, like that put forth by B & C, only serves to justify 
ignoring respect for patient autonomy is appropriate in veterinary medicine, as veterinary patients lack 
the level of understanding necessary to ualif  as o pete t  to ake edi al de isio s. Under B & 
C s a ou t, ete i a  patie ts  status as e e  auto o ous  i  the eal  of edi al de isio s entail 
that decisions about their care are rightfully made not by them, but by a surrogate who considers strictly 
what best promotes their welfare. 
 In the next chapter, I will look at how patient autonomy is overridden in veterinary medicine as 
well as new trends in the profession that seem to promote patient autonomy despite not being 





articulated or justified in such terms. I will explore certain criticisms of mainstream accounts of 
autonomy and respect for autonomy su h as B & C s. Though originally developed with other contexts in 
mind, these criticisms seem to be relevant to re-considering the role of respect for autonomy in 
veterinary medical ethics. Specifically, disability scholars and critics in feminist and communitarian 
circles have questioned how B & C conceive of autonomy and what it means to respect autonomy. Their 
interpretations call into question the assumption that one cannot or need not respect the autonomy of 
those falli g elo  the o pete  ut off. The accounts also consider how autonomy might be 
respected and promoted at more time-points and junctures than typically considered by the 
mainstream account. As I will argue in the e t hapte , these elatio al  a ou ts of auto o  
provide a way of understanding autonomy which make the principle of respect for patient autonomy 













 As we saw in Chapter Two, there are many reasons for thinking that respect for patient 
autonomy has no place as a value in veterinary medicine. It is not acknowledged by the American 
Veterinary Medical Association or by leading authors in the field of veterinary ethics. Extrapolating the 
account of autonomy taken by mainstream human medical ethics results in animals being categorized as 
e e  o pete t  to ake auto o ous de isio s ega di g edi al a e, so the p i iple of espe t 
for autonomy does not extend to them.  
 It will come as no surprise, then, that patient autonomy is routinely overridden in the everyday 
practice veterinary medicine. I will begin Part I of this chapter by describing some of the ways that this 
occurs, both at the level of which veterinary interventions are selected and how veterinary care is 
deli e ed. I ill the  des i e so e e e t t e ds i  ete i a  edi i e, su h as lo -stress patient 
ha dli g  and positive reinforcement training for veterinary procedures, which – implicitly, at least – 
seem to assign some importance to patient autonomy. These methods seem congruous with animal 
ethics approaches that acknowledge a role for respect for autonomy, such as those I described in 
Chapter One. However, as we will see, the rationale their proponents give for these newer approaches is 
t pi all  i p o i g a i al elfa e  athe  tha  espe ti g patie t auto o .   
  I  the se o d pa t of this hapte , I i t odu e so e iti is s of B & C s app oa h to espe t fo  
patient autonomy, including critiques coming from feminist bioethicists, disability scholars, and animal 
ethicists. I show that the pitfalls of the mainstream approach can be addressed by adopting a relational 
conception of autonomy. The type of account I have in mind does not limit application of the principle of 
respect for autonomy to individuals above a certain autonomy threshold, but rather expands our 
conception of when and where considerations about patient autonomy enter the clinical picture. The 
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account also revises the idea of what we might mea   the te  espe t  as well as what, exactly, is 
being respected.  
 What emerges is a conception of respect for patient autonomy that can be applied coherently 
and meaningfully to veterinary patients, and to human patients who would be denied respect for 
autonomy under mainstream medical ethics because of their status as incompetent or never-
competent. Such an account, I argue, offers a richer account of the motivations underlying the 
veterinary movements toward low-stress patient handling and positive reinforcement training.  
 
PART I 
Patient Autonomy and Veterinary Practice Today 
 As practiced today, veterinary medicine often involves overriding or failing to consider the 
patie ts  o  desi es a d de isio s a d disregarding their refusals of veterinary care – in other words, 
overriding their autonomy. This can take many forms, both in how care is provided and which 
interventions are chosen. Veterinary patients may be forced to swallow medications stuffi g  pills or 
pilli g   ha d o  ith a pill-gun) to cure their illnesses or relieve their symptoms. They may be 
literally dragged into a veterinary clinic they do not wish to enter out of a desire to maintain or improve 
their health and welfare. In order to perform examinations, diagnostic procedures, and treatments, 
animals may be restrained or positioned in ways they are clearly not willing to accept, with physical 
force being used to overpower them. Often, patients express their refusal of a given intervention very 
vehemently: they may struggle fiercely and become so agitated that they urinate, defecate, or express 
their anal glands. Animal bites and scratches, the most frequent injury to humans in veterinary clinics, 
are usually the result of a patient expressing extreme fear or discomfort at what their medical care 
involves and/or their unwillingness to comply with a veterinary procedure.  
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 It is common practice to administer sedatives and anesthetics to veterinary patients, both to 
perform surgeries and to enable the performance of diagnostic procedures or treatments in a patient 
who resists them. Most patients could not be said to assent to sedation or anesthesia, as their 
knowledge of what is occurring is, in most cases, limited to their subjective experience of receiving an 
injection; the concept of a shot inducing a decreased level of consciousness is out of reach for all but 
those who have undergone the procedure numerous times and learned what to expect.  
 Practices like spaying and neutering arguably run counter to the individual a i al s auto o , 
at least narrowly conceived (though social and legal conventions dictate that a sterilized animal may be 
able to enjoy greater access to certain environments than an intact one). These surgeries may hold 
welfare benefits in some cases, for example preventing certain infections and cancers. However, they 
are usually justified by reference to the good of the community overall, by controlling the animal 
population. 
 I  so e i sta es, it is espe t fo  the lie t s autonomy which motivates interventions that 
override animal autonomy. Clients may request euthanasia of a healthy animal or, more commonly, one 
who could be restored to health with relative ease – patients whose behavior clearly expresses that they 
prefer to go on living. Conversely, clients may demand heroic life-extending care of a terminally ill, 
suffe i g pet ased o  the lie t s o  ishes a d o e s, ithout considering desires or preferences 
the patient herself might have. Clients may request cosmetic or convenience surgeries, such as ear 
cropping or declawing, that offer no direct benefit to the patient and whose consequent pain and, in 
some cases, disability are not something the patient would choose for herself. When performing 
procedures that see  to u  ou te  to thei  patie t s elfa e a d ishes, veterinarians acquiescing to 
lie ts  ishes ofte  justify their decision with reference to beneficence and nonmaleficence.  They note 
that the patient relies for her on-going care and survival on the human client soliciting the veterinary 
p o edu e, a d ite e a ples he e de i g a lie t s e uest esulted i  thei  a a do e t of the 
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a i al o  taki g atte s i to thei  o  ha ds  a d atte pti g to pe fo  a medical procedure or end 
the a i al s life through inexpert means. 
 In any case, far from being done out of malicious intent, the purpose of overriding the desires 
a d p efe e es of patie ts is t pi all  to fulfill the ete i a ia s duties of e efi e e a d 
nonmaleficence to the patient. These duties often require that certain interventions be undertaken, yet 
left to their own devices, the patient would decline them. She is unable to appreciate that some 
interventions are in her own best interest, and the unfamiliar experience of veterinary intervention is 
likely a source of fear and anxiety for her, leading her to wish to escape it. Under mainstream accounts 
of auto o , to espe t that a i al s autonomy would mean to avoid interfering with her immediate 
decision to decline veterinary intervention. Since doing so would require caregivers and veterinary 
p a titio e s to egle t thei  dut  to p o ide the i te e tio  dete i ed to e i  the patie t s est 
i te est, o e idi g the patie t s auto o  see s to e e ui ed.  
 Even in settings where a i als  p efe e es a e dee ed e  i po ta t a d he e a egi e s 
st i e to i ease a i als  hoi es a d o t ol – that is, contexts in which enabling animals to exercise 
autonomy is valued – veterinary care is often presumed to require overriding of the i di idual s 
preferences. For example, anesthesia is frequently relied upon for providing veterinary care to captive 
apes and, even in chimpanzee sanctuaries, darting is commonly used as method of inducing anesthesia. 
This involves shooting the patient with a pressurized, medication-filled dart which discharges the drug 
after a large-bore needle penetrates her skin. After their initial experience with this procedure, most 
apes express their strong refusal of the procedure in no uncertain terms, frantically leaping and running 
within their enclosure and developing dart-avoidance strategies, such as remaining in constant motion 
or positioning themselves in locations that make darting difficult. Such is their distress that they often 
scream continuously, urinate, and defecate in panic. I have seen one chimpanzee grab the dart-gun 
through the mesh and destroy it. 
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 In my experience, most sanctuaries either accept darting as an unpleasant but necessary 
component of preventing and treating medical conditions or they adopt a policy of providing minimal 
veterinary intervention. In the latter case, veterinary interventions are only permitted in cases of severe 
illness or trauma, and preventive care is sometimes inadequate to protect group or individual health. 
 
Low-Stress Patient Handling and Positive Reinforcement Training for Veterinary Procedures 
 In recent decades, the veterinary profession has shown increased interest in animal behavior 
and in preventing and treating behavioral/psychological disorders and issues.  Veterinary behavior, like 
surgery or dermatology, is now a specialty in which veterinarians can become board-certified. Examining 
the view of different generation of veterinarians demonstrates a distinct evolution in how behavior 
issues in domestic animals are conceptualized and addressed. Veterinarians who graduated twenty 
years before me tend to believe, for example, i  the i po ta e of esta lishi g do i a e  o e  dogs. 
They often espouse o f o tatio al ethods, like alpha-rolli g,  to a age u a ted eha io s like 
aggression or unruliness. In contrast, the modern curriculum taught by veterinary behavior specialists 
requires first examining the reasons underlying a given behavior, such as unmet needs or fears, and 
addressing these causes. Coercive means, like force or fear, are spurned. Veterinary behavior specialists 
universally despise Cesar Milan, the famous dog trainer whose tele isio  p og a  p o otes sho ing 
ou  dog ho s alpha,  a i g thei  stude ts that he has effe ti el  tu  the lo k a k fo t  ea s  
for their discipline. 
 In this evolution, I detect an unspoken but nonetheless discernible trend toward valuing 
something in the neighborhood of animal autonomy. The movement toward the newer methods of 
modifying behavior is justified as being based in science – and it is: they are more effective, last longer, 
a d i p o e a egi e s  a ilit  to u de sta d the o u i atio s of thei  a i als, so the  a e ette  
equipped to handle future issues. And they are better for animal welfare, eliminating any excuse for 
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physical punishment , electroshock, and intentionally causing fear. But I have the sense that there is an 
unarticulated and thus undertheorized valuing of animal autonomy. Perhaps it would be better 
described as an inclination to limit human domination, which – though out of the scope of this thesis – I 
suspect could be equated with my understanding of respecting animal autonomy.221  
 This trend has been accompanied by the development of methods of delivering care that allow 
animals to cooperate with veterinary procedures or, at least, that do not involve forcing patients to do 
thi gs the  do t a t to do. Courses in veterinary schools and in veterinary conferences are 
increasingly advocating methods of working with animals that permit them to voluntarily choose to 
undertake behaviors needed to receive veterinary care. From these newer perspectives, a patient 
efusi g to pa ti ipate i  a gi e  p o edu es is ot ad  o  is eha i g; athe , he  efusal is a sig  
that we must rethink our own approach to the patient. 
 O e e a ple of this is ete i a ia  “ophia Yi s lo -st ess patie t ha dli g  app oa h. Yi  
notes that veterinary encounters often involve the patient becoming fearful, struggling with handlers, 
and even becoming aggressive. Yin advocates working with patients in ways that minimize fear and 
anxiety. For example, she suggests accustoming companion animals early in life (during the plastic phase 
of their development) to basic handling and ensuring that pupp  a d kitte  isits tea h  the patie t 
that the veterinary clinic is a place where she can expect treats, petting, and play. She advocates using 
deliberate movements to communicate clearly what positions or motions are being asked of the patient 
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and to de o st ate that the ha dle  is p edi ta le a d t ust o th . 222 These methods, she explains, 
e a le patie ts to illi gl  o pl  ith p o edu es. 223 
 Yin seems to justify her approach by appealing primarily to beneficence and nonmaleficence. 
For example, she ites, B  ha dli g a i als [poo l  o  oughl ], ete i a ia s ould e eaki g the 
p o ise to do o ha  o  a dail  asis. ‘est ai i g pets i  a fo eful o  ude a e  a  ake pets 
behaviorally worse to the point where they can no longer receive tho ough ete i a  a e. 224 
Veterinarians who work with the same animals repeatedly have the opportunity to build relationships 
with them which enable care to be provided efficiently and as enjoyably as possible in the long term. 
Other accounts in the literature also justify use of low-stress handling techniques in terms of animal 
welfare, staff safety, and efficiency, without mention of patient autonomy.225 
  At ti es, espe t fo  the patie t s auto o  does seem to e a  i pli it alue u de l i g Yi s 
approa h. Fo  e a ple, she e o e ds that ete i a  p ofessio als ask the sel es Ho  a  e 
make the animal feel comfortable and safe so that she cooperates, rather than making her feel 
th eate ed so that she thi ks she has to p ote t he self?  226 This could be read as placing value on the 
patie t s a ilit  to a t auto o ousl , gi e  the e phasis th oughout he  iti g o  patie ts choosing 
not to struggle and choosing to cooperate. However, it might also appeal simply to creating enjoyable 
states feeli g o fo ta le a d safe  as opposed to a e si e o es feeli g th eate ed , a d the ease 
with which a cooperative, non-fearful patient allows the veterinarian to do her work. In her work, Yin 
never explicitly appeals to patient autonomy as a motivation for using her methods. 
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 Yin also adapts for companion animal veterinarians the practice of positive reinforcement 
training (PRT) for veterinary procedures, a method that has been used for some time in contexts such as 
animal research laboratories, zoos, and sanctuaries. PRT is a training method that typically involves 
incrementally shaping specific behaviors by providing desired rewards when the individual being trained 
performs a behavior desired by the trainer. It may also involve creating associations in the ani al s i d 
with between a certain stimulus and something she enjoys. 
 For example, zoo keepers at Zoo Atlanta have trained numerous gorillas residing there to 
position their chests for echocardiograms, i.e., heart ultrasounds that detect cardiac diseases and 
monitor response to treatment. The first step is teaching the animal the meanings of verbal requests 
su h as hold  holdi g still i  a gi e  positio  a d hest  pushi g he  hest up the age esh . O e 
these cues are understood, a prop that is similar in shape and size to an ultrasound probe is used to 
train the individual to hold their chest up to the mesh in a certain position while light pressure with the 
sham-probe is applied. A gorilla trained for echocardiograms can have a relatively thorough heart 
evaluation done in approximately three minutes without the use of sedative or anesthetics. She may, as 
a result, remain healthier and enjoy a longer life since her heart health can be better managed. My 
observations of the gorillas suggested that they looked forward to training sessions, sometimes 
enthusiastically performing behaviors they had learned even when they were not being requested. 
 As with low-stress patient handing, the rationale given for PRT of veterinary behavior is typically 
improved animal welfare. With animals trained to participate in their own veterinary care, physical 
health can be more easily and comprehensively addressed while relying less on anesthesia with its 
attendant risks. There is less risk of physical harm from darting or manual restraint. Patients do not 
experience the distress that comes with having a procedure performed on them against their will. PRT is 
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also touted as p o idi g a sti ulati g, e i hi g, a d t usti g e i o e t fo  the a i als. 227 For 
animals used in laboratory research, PRT is used for both veterinary procedures and invasive procedures 
done as part of experiments, such as blood collection. In this context, proponents of PRT cite improved 
a i al elfa e as ell e ha ed fle i ilit  a d elia ilit  i  data olle tio  as pote tial e efits.  
 To  k o ledge, i easi g a i als  a ilit  to e e ise auto o  is e pli itl  ited as a easo  
for undertaking PRT only in the context of training non-veterinary behaviors. Terry Maple describes 
training mandrills to play tic-tac-toe with zoo visitors as an example of training increasing autonomy, 
because the animals engaged in training only when they chose to, and learning the new behavior gave 
them more control of their everyday interactions and opportunities to satisfy their preferences.228 Aside 
from this, the closest proponents come to associating PRT with increased patient autonomy in the 
o te t of ete i a  a e is  iti g g eate  hoi e a d o t ol o e  dail  e e ts  as e hancing 
psychological well-being.229 Here, choice and control are considered components of welfare, and 
autonomy is not counted as a distinct good. 
 Again, this lack of analysis in terms of patient autonomy is predictable, given that respect for 
patient autonomy is not considered a relevant value in veterinary medical ethics, and mainstream 
accounts from human medical ethics deny that the principle applies to individuals (such as veterinary 
patients) who fall below the autonomy threshold. More surprising, perhaps, is that sanctuaries which 
take promoting animal autonomy and animal welfare as some of their stated goals often fail to use PRT 
in the veterinary context. 
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 My impression is that one reason that sanctuaries often fail to incorporate PRT for veterinary 
procedures is a general mistrust of animal training among those who run sanctuaries. Historically, fear 
and physical punishment were the typical means of training – and the end toward which animals were 
trained was performance of an act that would entertain humans or otherwise serve human ends. So 
both the means and the ends of training are suspect, in the eyes of those working on behalf of animals. 
This stain on animal training is not easily erased by pointing out that modern means involve reward-
based methods, a d that the e ds a e the a i als  o  est i te ests. 
 But there is another reason, one more relevant to this thesis: like most of the rest of us, 
sanctuary workers and directors ha e ee  steeped i  a o eptio  of auto o  si ila  to B & C s, i  
which respe t fo  auto o  a ou ts to o i te fe e e i  a othe  i di idual s hoi es. I  this light, 
training itself, and perhaps even subjecting animals to veterinary interventions at all, already exhibits a 
lack of respect for autonomy.  
 What I will argue in the remainder of this chapter is that mainstream conceptions of autonomy, 
su h as B & C s, ha e ajo  fla s. Adopti g a  alte ati e a ou t of auto o  a d hat it means to 
respect autonomy, provides us with a richer, more coherent framework for incorporating respect for 
autonomy as a value in veterinary medicine. Specifically, it enables us to understand the methods just 
described in terms of promoting and protecting patient autonomy. And, as we shall see in Chapter Four, 
it helps us parse when practices like training might undermine animal autonomy and when they 
enhance it.  
 
PART II 
Continuums and Thresholds of Cognitive Capacities and their Moral Significance 
 As discussed in Chapter One, B & C acknowledge that autonomy and the ability to make 
sufficiently autonomous decisions a e atte s of deg ee, a i g ith fa to s like the i di idual s level 
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of understanding and whether they are controlled by internal or external influences, such as mental 
illness or coercion.230 Despite the existence of this continuum, B & C seem to take the principle of 
respect for autonomy to extend only to individuals above a certain threshold, or level of ability to make 
sufficiently autonomous decisions. This threshold, they write, identifies those who must be consulted 
regarding medical decisions and whose decisions warrant respect, so must not be interfered with.231 For 
patie ts elo  the th eshold, i.e. i o pete t patie ts,  the ph si ia s o ligatio  e o es ot to 
promote patient autonomy but to find a surrogate decision-maker and ensure she uses the appropriate 
sta da d to ake edi al de isio s o  the patie t s ehalf.  Fo  patie ts ho ha e never been above 
the th eshold the e e - o pete t , B & C a gue that the app op iate sta da d is o e that refers only 
to welfare and quality of life (the best interests standard). Their argument for disregarding patient 
auto o  i  su h ases ests o  the lai  o asis e ists fo  a judg e t of [ e e -competent 
patie ts ] auto o ous hoi e. 232  
 B & C co side  it pate alisti  to i te tio all  o e ide a  i o pete t patie t s p efe e es in 
order to benefit her or mitigate harm to her, even though they would judge her decisions not be not 
substantially autonomous.233 They hold that paternalism is justified in instances where the ph si ia s 
duty of beneficence carries greater weight: 
As a pe so s i te ests i  auto o  i ease a d the e efits [of pate alisti  a tio ] 
for that person decrease, the justification of paternalistic action becomes less plausible; 
o e sel , as the e efits fo  a pe so  i ease a d that pe so s auto o  i te ests 
de ease, the justifi atio  of pate alisti  a tio  e o es o e plausi le. 234 
B  auto o  i te est,  the  see  to ha e i  i d the deg ee to hi h auto o  is o e ridden. That 
is, if auto o  is dis espe ted i  a deep a , the i di idual s auto o  i te est is g eate , he eas, if 
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autonomy is overridden trivially, she has a lesser autonomy interest.235 Presumably, B & C believe that 
an incompetent patient stands to gain substantially from paternalistic intervention in medical decisions, 
either because they cannot make choices or because the choices they do make lack sufficient 
understanding or are not fully voluntary. In addition, the incompetent patient, because of her lower 
autonomous decision-making ability, would not be having her autonomy violated in a deep way.   
 Many authors, such as feminist medical ethicists have criticized the transformation of a multi-
faceted spectrum of decision-making ability into a binary hoi e of espe ti g the patie t s o  ishes 
or desires (autonomy) or ignoring them in the name of benefitting the patient (paternalism).236,237 Susan 
Sherwin points out that this odel see s ade uate o l  fo  a ti ulate, i tellige t patie ts ho a e 
accustomed to making decisions about the course of their lives and who possess the resources 
necessary to allow them a range of options to choose among. 238 Given all the ways in which one might 
fall short of such an ideal, such opponents argue, a dichotomy of noninterference in decisions by 
competent patients or blanket disregard for the autonomy of incompetent patients is inadequate.  
 The reason that B & C – and mainstream medical ethics in general  –  take this approach to 
autonomy may be that, in a range of contexts, the capacity for higher levels of autonomy or rationality is 
a epted as a th eshold hi h diffe e tiates those ho should ha e a full sa  f o  those ho can be 
unproblematically spoken for by others. Donaldson and Kymlicka (henceforth D & K) discuss the role of a 
threshold like this in the case of citizenship:   
I  t aditio al politi al theo , the itize  has ee  o ei ed as a pe so  ith 
capacities for public reason or logos or Kantian autonomy or rational reflection and 
deliberation – complex language- ediated apa ities e ill all … li guisti  age …. 
Linguistic agency has operated not just as an ideal, but as a threshold capacity. Those 
seen as lacking this capacity have been relegated to the margins of political community, 
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situating them as passive wards to whom society owes duties of care rather than as co-
itize s ith e ual ights. 239 
This linguistic agency threshold seems to be part of what B & C require for someone being above the 
competency threshold, as linguistic agency is necessary for adequate understanding of issues involved in 
medical decision-making. Similarly, the shift in physician obligations that B & C defend in cases of 
incompetency parallels the shift in societal obligations that D & K describe as traditionally accepted for 
individuals below the linguistic agency threshold. Although D & K are concerned with citizenship 
generally rather than the specific context of medical care, those at the center of their discussion – 
individuals who lack full linguistic agency, like humans with cognitive disability (CD), children, and 
animals – are more or less co-extensive with  B & C s lass of the e e -competent.   
 More parallels emerge when we examine the rationale that D & K articulate as underlying the 
conventional approach society takes toward people with CD in the context of political decisions:  
If i di iduals a e u a le to atio all  judge fo  the sel es the sou d ess of politi al 
propositions, society should not seek to mimic consent through the use of trustees 
tasked to soli it a d i te p et a  i di idual s su je ti e e pe ie e. ‘athe , e should 
simply acknowledge that ideas of consent are not relevant, and that while we can justify 
easu es fo  the , e a ot justif  ou sel es to  the . I  othe  o ds, t ustees fo  
people with CD should make their best judgment of the objective interests of the person 
being represented, rather than making their best effort to understand how the person 
ith CD o ei es he  i te ests. 240 
B & C use a similar line of argument in defe di g the est i te ests  sta da d as the app op iate o e 
for surrogate decision-makers to use when choosing on behalf of incompetent patients. They reject 
another possible standard, the su stituted judg e t  standard, which would direct the surrogate 
decision-maker to decide as the incompetent person – were they competent – would choose, based on 
that individual s values and preferences. B & C reject use of the substituted judgment standard for 
never-competent patients because, they claim, a surrogate would have no basis for assessing what the 
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i o pete t i di idual s auto o ous hoi e ould e.241 If e su stitute the o ds edi al 
i te e tio  fo  politi al p opositio  a d ho e e e e  o pete t  fo  ith CD  in the 
paragraph quoted above, we end up with a close approximation B & C s a ou t. 
 As we saw in Chapter One, D & K reject traditional political approaches that exclude those 
lacking linguistic agency from the political arena. Given the parallels just described, it is unsurprising that 
their criticism of conventional political theory closely echoes “he i s criticism of conventional medical 
ethi s  th eshold-based dichotomy. D & K write:  
[We] see  aught et ee  t o u satisfa to  odels: a  a ti-paternalistic model 
hi h elies e ti el  o  a  i di idual s self-representation of her subjective experience; 
and a paternalistic model that relies on third-party judgments of objective well-being. 
Neither model provides a plausible picture for enabling participation by those members 
of so iet  ithout li guisti  age .  242 
D & K are concerned primarily with showing that the basis and purpose of citizenship is such that 
linguistic agency should not be used to restrict who should have the rights of full citizenship. They 
extend the arguments used by disability scholars for the full inclusion of people with CD in the political 
arena to argue for meaningful citizenship rights for animals. In what follows below, I will review their 
arguments against using the threshold of linguistic agency to limit political participation and attempt to 
extrapolate this line of argumentation to the question of respecting patient autonomy in the medical 
arena, in particular, in veterinary medicine.   
 The fou datio  of D & K s a gu e t is that o al status a d o al lai s a e fu da e tall  
o e ted to ha i g a su je ti e e pe ie e of o e s o  life a d the o ld; that is, having moral rights 
is a product of being a self, rather than a thing.243 If so eo e is ho e,  that is, if there exists a subject 
who experiences her life f o  the i side,  the  this i  a d of itself ge e ates the t pes of 
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vulnerabilities that moral rights are intended to protect. If individuals have a subjective experience that 
matters to them, then e ought to e og ize the  as ha i g [thei ] o  li es to lead  and as mattering 
morally.244  
 D & K argue against animal rights critics who claim that a higher bar than selfhood or subjectivity 
should be set for mattering morally or for full moral status, and that this bar should be a fu the  
apa it  fou d o l  a o gst hu a s. 245 An approach that centers on trying to identify such a capacity 
is flawed for a number of reasons. Cognitive capacities are inevitably on a continuum, with no natural 
demarcation to be found on which to base a moral distinction. It is difficult to see how one could 
rationally accept a threshold requirement in order to be afforded full moral status without also 
accepting that moral status ought to vary with cognitive capacity all across the continuum – a conclusion 
few if any would be willing to accept. Furthermore, any threshold that one sets will inevitably cut across 
species lines, for there is no cognitive capacity that all humans have but all other animals do not. In fact, 
it is unlikely that we could point to any cognitive capacity that any human has during her entire lifespan 
that no animal has.246 Given the fact that humans vary in their cognitive capacity throughout their lives, 
requiring that one meet a certain threshold of cognitive capacity in order to achieve full moral status 
turns out to be a much less secure moral basis for protecting even humans of o al  og iti e 
function than using D & K s e o e ded standard of subjectivity or self-hood.  
 D & K take care to distinguish their argument from another superficially similar argument for 
g a ti g o al p ote tio s to a i als, the a gu e t f o  a gi al ases,  o  AMC. The AMC position 
is that animals should not be denied moral status on the grounds that they lack certain cognitive 
characteristics because some humans –  among them, some people with CD  – also lack them, yet their 
moral status is preserved; thus, logical consistency requires giving animals the same moral status as 
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these a gi al  ases of hu a s.247 D & K argue that the AMC not only exploitatively instrumentalizes 
the case of humans with cognitive disabilities, it also assumes the very hierarchy they call out as 
unjustified, namely, one with neurotypical human cognitive capacities at its apex . If moral consideration 
is rooted i  the apa it  to su je ti el  e pe ie e o e s life, then the e a e o a gi al ases  fo  the 
AMC to draw upon, because differences in cognitive capacities are conceived nonhierarchically.248 D & K 
argue that animals should be accorded moral protections because they are selves who subjectively 
experience their lives, not because their cognitive capacities meet or exceed those of some humans. 
 On the issue of citizenship rights, D & K join disability scholars who challenge the 
eu ot pi alist ias  the  see as u de l i g a  aspe ts of so iet  a d o alit . This is the idea that 
neurotypical adults and cognitive capacity are the norms against which all others are measured and 
potentially judged to be deficient.249 As we saw above, humans with lower levels of cognitive function 
have historically been excluded from full inclusion as citizens on the grounds that they could not 
understand and reason about political decisions at the level of their neurotypical peers.  However, if we 
take subjectivity and selfhood, rather than neurotypicality, as the core of moral status, then an explicit 
justification must be given for excluding people with CD from privileges and protections, such as 
citizenship rights, that they would otherwise be accorded.   
 If those lacking neurotypical human cognition truly did not have preferences about the norms 
and structure of their world or the course of their lives, then perhaps what is claimed to be 
eu ot pi al ias  is eall  a justified distinction. Yet, we can find out simply by inquiring of such 
individuals that this is not the case. Similarly, proximity to neurotypical adult human cognition might be 
a justified standard if exerting political agency were truly an option only for neurotypical adult humans.  
However, individuals with CD can exert political agency in various ways, albeit a type of agency that is 
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dependent on others for its actualization. Their capacity to exert political agency is a product not only of 
their own rational or discursive abilities, but is determined in large part by the social relationships of 
which they are a part.250 As I will be discussing shortly, we are all dependent, to various extents, on 
others in order to exercise our agency. Thus, denying full citizenship to those with CD is unjustified. 
 While citizenship is conventionally conceived with the neurotypical adult citizens in mind, 
advocates for those with CD have increasingly argued for a more inclusive understanding of citizenship: 
Citize ship is t a sele t lu  fo  li guisti  age ts; it s a o it e t to i lude a d 
empower all members of society, across the whole spectrum of diversity, on their own 
terms. 251  
Citizenship ea s o e ou ts  as a e e  of the g oup. It means participating in the shaping of the 
social norms of society, just as one is expected to abide by its norms. Governments have an obligation to 
support thei  itize s  legal and political agency.252 Importantly, overcoming neurotypicalist bias in the 
political realm requires expanding the locations and practices that define citizenship.253 The goal is to 
develop 
e  a s of e gagi g the su je ti it  of these o-citizens, focusing less on the ability 
to articulate or understand propositions, and more on atte di g to thei  a ied odes 
of doi g, sa i g a d ei g … i gi g itize ship to the pla es a d spa es he e 
e e ship a d pa ti ipatio  a e ea i gful to the i di iduals i ol ed…. [We] eed 
to start from those places and spaces and work from the ground up, rather than 
uncritically assuming that the citizenship functions created by and for neurotypical 
adults a e the o l  alid o es. 254  
Thus, D & K challenge those who argue that, for example, people with CD can only be empowered if 
they are permitted to vote and serve on juries, on the grounds that these are the esse tial fu tio s of 
citizenship. 255 Rather, what needs revision is our very concept of what constitutes an essential function 
of citizenship, as these have been defined by neurotypical people, for neurotypical people.  
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Instead of fetishizing certain practices such as jury duty or voting as the hallmark of 
real  citizenship, we need to consider the new places and spaces of citizenship which 
are meaningful to people with CD, and which enable them to shape our shared social 
life. 256 
Looking at citizenship in this way, D & K contend the concept of citizenship can and should extend to 
domestic animals. They have long been members of human-animal society and, as discussed in Chapter 
One, their perspectives can be incorporated when it comes to establishing social norms and policies. 
 Turning from the political arena to the medical realm, we might also suspect B & C s a ou t to 
contain a neurotypicalist bias. Like the model citizen  of politi al theo , the model patient is conceived 
of as a neurotypical adult, and deviations from this norm lead to assessments of incompetence through 
hi h o e loses o e s e title e t to auto o . Just as in the case of citizenship, if we take subjectivity 
or selfhood as our moral core, we must justify excluding patients who are not neurotypical adults from 
the rights and protections, such as respect for their autonomy, they would otherwise be accorded. If this 
exclusion cannot be justified, then it represents neurotypicalist bias rather than a valid distinction.  
 The purpose of respecting autonomy is to recognize that, as a subject of o e s life, o e has a  
i he e t stake i  di e ti g that life i  a a  that alig s ith o e s alues a d o e s. Thus, respecting 
autonomy may not be relevant if the individual in question does not have (and never did have) her own 
values or concerns that affect her preferences about what happens to her. But many who would fall 
elo  B & C s th eshold etai  a desire to direct their lives and do have concerns and preferences that 
may be diffe e t f o  su ogates  assess e t of thei  elfa e i te ests. Those without neurotypical 
adult cognitive capacities may require additional assistance to receive medical care that is in line with 
their values and concerns. But, again, we are all dependent on others for our ability to develop and 
exercise autonomous capabilities, so this does not constitute a reason to deny such individuals respect 
for autonomy.   





 As a rejoinder, B & C might argue that those below the competency threshold are lacking in the 
og iti e skills a d i depe de t judg e t  eeded to o p ehe d, p o ess, a d easo  a out the 
issue involved in medical decision-making,257 thus their decisions will lack the adequate understanding 
and self-directedness necessary for substantial autonomy. Thus, B & C would argue, their schema does 
not reflect a neurotypicalist bias, but rather a legitimate distinction among patient populations.  
 However, this approach emphasizes one particular set of lo atio s a d p a ti es  that defi e 
exercise of autonomy. The p a ti e  i  this s e a io ould e o side ed gi i g i fo ed o se t a d 
the lo atio  ould e the poi t at hi h a ajo  de isio  a out edi al a e eeds to e ade. 
However, as we will see in the next section, autonomy, like citizenship, can be reconceived in ways that 
make it more comprehensive and applicable to individuals who are not neurotypical adults. Rather than 
restricting what counts as valid exercise of autonomy to conventional practices and locations, which 
were devised for the neurotypical and necessarily exclude those with lower levels  of understanding 
and self-control, we can consider what other practices might constitute meaningful  exercise of agency. 
It is in answering the question of how o e s auto o  a  e espe ted, athe  than whether it should 
e, that o e s og iti e apa ities atte . 
 As D & K point out with respect to the political realm, it is an open question how we should 
expand the practices and locations that constitute citizenship so that those lacking linguistic agency are 
included in shaping social norms. Similarly, I suggest in this thesis that we can examine veterinary 
practice with an eye toward identifying when, where, and how veterinarians and other caregivers can 
attend to patient autonomy. We might ask in what ways patient preferences and values might guide 
medical decisions and the delivery of care. What practices can be incorporated to permit the provision 
of a e ithout outi el  o e idi g of patie ts  de isio s a d efusals? How can veterinary practice 
e ol e to p o ote ou  patie ts  age ? Just as D & K s app oa h se es to e po e  those ho la k 
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linguistic agency to nonetheless shape norms and shared social life, 258 such inquires may enable the 
patients we serve to shape the institution of veterinary medicine. 
 
Towards a Relational Conception of Patient Autonomy 
 So far we have briefly touched on matters of depe de t age ,  in which individuals rely on 
others to exert their agency, and have alluded to ways of revising our conception of autonomy to 
broaden the ways in which it might be meaningfully respected. In this section, I will sketch out various 
a ou ts of elatio al auto o  i  the fe i ist a d communitarian literature in order to situate the 
approach I propose for veterinary medicine. Though most accounts of relational autonomy have focused 
exclusively on human-centered bioethics, once we acknowledge that animals have a subjective 
experience, their own values and preferences, and the capacity to exert agency, much of the work that 
has been done appears to be readily extrapolatable to veterinary medicine. 
 ‘elatio al auto o  is a  u ella te  that a  e used to des i e a a ge of a ou ts, 
including ones with potentially conflicting aspects. Beginning in the 1970s, feminists and others began to 
criticize mainstream conceptions of autonomy as overemphasizing independence and self-sufficiency. 
These were characteristics that the wealthy, white, male philosophers who initially wrote about 
autonomy believed themselves to possess, but which were usually out of reach for women during times 
when gender roles were very divergent and unequal.259 The conventional accounts of autonomy put 
forth by these philosophers, feminists charge, failed to acknowledge the extent to which autonomy 
requires social relationships in order to be developed and exercised.260 Autonomy is necessarily 
relational because many different social relationships are required to bring about the conditions in 
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virtue of which decisions and behavior exhibit autonomy, especially higher degrees of autonomy.261 
Thus, o e defi itio  of elatio al auto o  is the o pete t e e isi g of skills, de i ed a d 
constrained by social circumstances, that facilitate self-di e tio . 262 
 Autonomous capacities require social relationships in order to develop at all. We are all born 
completely dependent and unable to fulfill any of our basic needs, much less reflect on our desires and 
initiate actions to execute them. For an infant to grow into an autonomous adult, she must be nurtured, 
taught, and socialized in ways that allow her to survive, to understand her world, particular situation, 
and options, and to see herself as someone whose values are o th  easo  fo  a tio . 263 Feminists 
have argued that the devaluing of what was traditionall  o side ed o e s o k,  su h as aisi g 
children, led to a failure to recognize this, and to instead conceive of autonomy as an inherent capacity.  
 Even in adulthood, fe i ists a d o u ita ia s ha e poi ted out, e all e ui e o goi g 
interpersonal, so ial, a d i stitutio al s affoldi g  to o ti uall  de elop a d e e ise ou  apa it  fo  
autonomy.264 The options available to us as agents of our lives – sometimes even our recognition that 
there is a decision to be made– are constrained both by our material, educational, and social conditions, 
as well as by the extent to which our society and/or our inner social circle respect our autonomy. Our 
very ability to set a course for ourselves and then pursue that plan – central to most conceptions of 
autonomy – depends in part on physical objects (made by others) and cultural and economic factors 
(products of broad social relationships).265 Interpersonal relationships not only can expand or diminish 
our willingness to exercise autonomy;266 in many cases, our success or failure at exercising autonomy 
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depe ds o  othe s  espo ses to ou  atte pts at doi g so.267 Our social environment determines, in 
large part, whether or not our selected ends are authentic, that is, hethe  the  a e t ul  ou  o ,  as 
opposed to being the product of oppressive socialization or originating as a result of unmet needs or 
undeveloped capacities.268 
 Decoupling the notion of autonomy from the concepts of self-sufficiency and independence is 
considered especially important in the context of health care because people who are sick are often 
critically dependent on others.269  They do not encounter medical professionals from the position of 
equal power, as contractarian models of the autonomous subject that often suggest.270 Patie ts  
continued exercise of autonomy is contingent on their connections with others who care for them.  
 In all these ways, autonomy is causally relational; that is, the conditions necessary for an 
individual to act autonomously are crucially dependent on social relationships. In addition, some claim 
that human autonomy is also constitutively relational, or inherently social. As social beings, they argue, 
we are dependent on others for our very identities, which are shaped in part by our dialogue and other 
interactions with others.271 If autonomy is defined as self-rule, and the self is inherently relational, then 
autonomy itself must be conceptualized relationally.  In addition, the choices we make take place 
against a background of contrasting options that are chosen by others; what makes an individual 
auto o ous is that the  a e uli g the sel es,  athe  tha  taking a path chosen or dictated by others. 
Without the contrast with heteronomy, the argument goes, autonomy would lose its meaning.  
 For the approach I take in this thesis, autonomy is conceived as causally relational, but I do not 
take a position on whether it is constitutively relational. Animal autonomy is at the center of my inquiry, 
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and the philosophical exploration of animal selfhood is still in its infancy, making such assessments 
premature. More important, both conceptually and practically, is acknowledging that autonomy and 
agency are not capacities an individual possesses merely by virtue of cognitive ability, but are always 
dependent on social relationships. This opens the door to recognizing ways in we might help dependent 
others – including animals – to exert agency and exercise autonomy in a variety of realms.  
 It s o th oti g that, though ai st ea  a ou ts like B & C s a e often the target of critics 
advocating a relational approach to autonomy, B & C acknowledge that when a patient makes a 
substantially autonomous decision, it is a relational accomplishment: the relationship with the physician 
influences whether the patient s level of understanding is sufficient. In latter editions of Principles, B & C 
briefly note that p ope l  st u tu ed  a ou ts of espe t fo  auto o  ust ot be excessively 
i di idualisti  a d elatio al a ou ts of auto o  a  e pote tiall  illu i ati g a d defe si le. 272  
 However, some of B & C s iti s ha ge that thei  theory must be also be evaluated on the basis 
of how it has been affected by historical biases and how it affects ongoing discourse.273 They argue that, 
while B & C s account of autonomy may be logically consistent with the incorporation of relational 
concerns, the way B & C p a ti e the dis ou se  perpetuates a flawed moral ideology. That is, what B & 
C in fact count as a moral problem, what they remain silent about, and the assumptions they make 
about the typical  patient reflect and reinforce an underlying, seldom scrutinized moral ideology. The 
moral ideology makes assumption that, such critics charge, fail to a u atel  efle t the li ed o al 
experience,  the fu da e tal interdependence of people, and the role of factors aside from rationality 
in decision-making.274 In concentrating on the competence of individual patients, for example, B & C 
make problems associated with interdependency seem peripheral and minor, or perhaps not even true 
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moral problems, and blind us from approaches to solving them that are social in nature.275 B & C also 
seem to implicitly assume a odel patie t  ho is the ph si ia s i telle tual a d o al e ual, 
whereas an imbalance of power relationships often exists within health care institutions, and social and 
political context adds a significant moral dimensions of the physician-patient relationship.276 Some of 
these critics deny that B & C can ever adequately answer the challenges posed by relational autonomy 
theorists because, in the wo ds of Ca ol  Ells, to atte pt to ide  the fo us to a e d the theo s 
sho t o i gs is to dest o  the theo . 277 
 ‘ega dless of hethe  o  ot the p og osis fo  B & C s theo  is t ul  this g a e, I maintain that 
the extent to which physicians and other caregivers can promote patient autonomy is underestimated 
when the competency threshold is used to limit whose autonomy merits concern. Autonomy, 
understood by relational theorists as the ability to fo , e aluate, a d live in accordance with a 
o eptio  of the good, 278 is valuable to patients on either side of the competency threshold. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will focus on the approaches of two writers on relational autonomy in 
medicine, Alistair Wardrope and Marian Verkerk. The patients with whom they are concerned are 
humans who B & C would likely consider below the competency threshold or, in some cases, patients B 
& C would consider competent but whose ability to exercise autonomy nonetheless seems 
compromised. I will use their insights to begin to ask how taking a relational approach can help expand 
the locations and practices of autonomy in the case of veterinary patients. 
 
Synchronic V. Diachronic Dimensions of Respect for Autonomy 
 In presenting his version of relational autonomy, Alistair Wardrope describes a potential 
underlying cause of B & C s ad o a  of a th eshold to di ide patie ts i to o pete t a d i o pete t 
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populatio s: the o e hel i g fo us o  isis  issues i  edical ethics. Crisis issues are usually 
pu tate de isio s,  that is, de isio s that ust e ade at a dis ete poi t i  ti e a d t pi all  
involve a limited range of options.279 Crisis issues involve pressing questions that must be resolved 
rapidly, and ofte  i ol e esol i g a o fli t a out ho has ulti ate autho it  to de ide o  a gi e  
ou se of a tio . 280 O e e a ple is hethe  to espe t a patie t s de isio  to efuse life-saving care, an 
issue typically framed as a punctate decision in which the physi ia s dut  to espe t the patie t s 
auto o  a  e at odds ith he  dut  of e efi e e. A  a ti le o  this su je t e hoes B & C s 
di e ti e: Fo  i o pete t patie ts the uestio  of ho o i g efusals of t eat e t does ot a ise; it is 
replaced by the issue of ho should ake de isio s fo  i o pete t patie ts. 281 
 It is not difficult to see why this approach would be appealing. In crisis situations, we need to be 
able to make decisions quickly and in a way that will lead us to be satisfied with the results in a majority 
of cases. Algorithms that point clearly to the next step are very helpful in such situations, and by 
necessity they focus on synchronic issues, or relevant considerations at the particular point in time that 
a decision must be made.282 Looking at respect for autonomy through such a lens, it makes sense to 
divide patients into two clear-cut groups, competent and incompetent: an emergency physician who 
finds herself presented with a new patient can rapidly assess the role of respect for autonomy and 
whether a surrogate must be identified.  
 However, as Wardrope points out, edi al ethi s  focus on crisis issues obscures the equally 
important do ai  of house-keepi g issues,  that is, the ways in which the norms that are established 
in a caregiver-patient relationship through the totality of their interactions work to promote or diminish 
patient autonomy. These are diachronic dimensions of respect for autonomy, in that they extend over 
time and may evolve over the course of the relationship. In longer-term physician-patient relationships, 
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the diachronic dimensions of respect for autonomy take on greater importance and may even eclipse 
synchronic dimensions. The norms established between the practitioners and the patient 
o e to o st ai  a d e a le e tai  optio s, su h that the ajo  i flue e of the 
provide  o  the patie t s auto o  is al ead  dete i ed  the ti e the pu tate 
de isio  a ises. Fo  e a ple, [autho  ‘e e a] Kukla poi ts to the p a ti es of self-
surveillance, medical monitoring, and hyper- espo si ilit  that o p ise a te atal 
care, and suggests that this recurrent emphasis on conscientious self-monitoring may 
serve to frame the issue of fetal diagnostic testing in such a fashion that undergoing the 
test a  appea  to he  as the o l  espo si le hoi e. 283 
 Wardrope argues that the focus on punctate decisions and crisis issues in medical ethics serves 
as a so t of dog a,  leadi g to espe t fo  auto o  ei g o ei ed of p i a il  i  s h o i  
terms.284 A dogma, as he understands it, is si ila  to the o al ideolog  dis ussed a o e; it is a 
proposition that is not argued for but rather a product of how the discourse is practiced and the terms in 
which moral problems are typically framed.285 Habitually focusing only on the synchronic dimensions of 
respect for autonomy leads us to ask questions mostly about what should be done, rather than how 
care should be provided.286 It artificially narrows the range of what is considered a moral problem.287 
Wardrope argues for correcting this unjustified bias by paying more attention to how the norms 
established in caregiving relationships can promote patient autonomy. Considering autonomy as a 
so ial p oje t  ea s that respecting autonomy involves anticipating possible choices and what the 
patient will need in order to make them.288  
 Norms are established in all kinds of caregiving relationships, and those between animals and 
human caregivers are no exception. In fact, given that we cannot use symbolic language to explain to 
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animals when something unusual might be needed for providing veterinary care, established norms and 
anticipating future choices may be even more crucial to enabling animals to accept interventions that, 
while likely to restore them to health, are unlikely to be chosen spontaneously. Ma  of Yi s 
recommendations for socializing puppies and kittens could be seen as conscientiously creating such 
norms. A cat who has positive associations with the vet clinic and has been handled gently and 
predictably will be more likely to permit placement of an IV catheter when she is ill and in need of 
treatment, whereas a cat who has had frightening veterinary experiences, or perhaps never been to the 
vet, is likely to fight against almost any kind of intervention. The latter patient is more likely to be 
forcibly restrained or sedated when beneficence dictates that a medical intervention is necessary, or the 
cat may simply not receive any medical care until she is too sick to resist interventions – and perhaps 
too sick to recover. The foresight involved in providing opportunities for apes to engage in PRT for 
veterinary behaviors may also be seen as attending to the diachronic dimension of respecting 
autonomy.  
 
Choosing the Appropriate Locus of Respect 
 Wardrope makes a related point, which is that a focus on punctate decisions leads to 
o side i g the patie t s decision as the lo us of espe t,  he  e talk of espe ti g auto o .289  
That is, we demonstrate respect for autonomy by ensuring a given decision is well informed and then 
facilitating it – or at least ot i te fe i g ith it. Whe  the patie t s decision is our locus of respect, the 
lassifi atio  of patie ts i to lasses of o pete t  a d i o pete t  akes se se, e ause e a e 
about whether a given decision itself is worthy of being respected, and one made by an incompetent 
patient is more likely to be ill-considered or misguided. However, the decision need not be the (sole) 
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locus of respect; we could conceive of the patient herself, the values underlying her decision-making, or 
her own conception of the good as the locus of our respect instead.290  
 Incorporating diachronic dimensions of respect helps shift the locus of respect back to the 
patient as a whole, and leads us to ask how medical caregivers, and perhaps other caregivers, can 
enable her agency and increase her autonomous capabilities. For example, someone who has had a 
dominating partner make all of her decisions for her in the past may need support to develop the self-
esteem and self-confidence to see herself as a decision-maker. Wardrope also discusses female genital 
cosmetic surgery (FGCS) and points out that women seeking it frequently have an incorrect belief that 
the appearance of their external genitalia is not within normal limits and that this negatively affects 
their worth.291 In such cases, conventional medical ethics approaches would likely recommend 
proceeding with the surgery once the informed consent process has been completed. Wardrope 
suggests that considering the woman herself as the locus of respect might suggest a different course, for 
example addressing issues of self-objectification and its effect on autonomous capabilities.292 
 With animals, it may also be helpful to consider what the appropriate locus of respect is in a 
given situation. A dog with a ruptured knee ligament obviously cannot give informed consent or refusal 
to a surgery to correct the injury. However, her human family may be able to evaluate her values and 
concerns, and take these as the locus of respect. A decision to pursue surgery may be said to respect the 
autonomy of young, very active dog who enjoys nothing more than running and has little distress in the 
veterinary clinic, while an older, more sedentary and fearful dog might have her autonomy better 
respected by measures such as maintaining her at a lean weight and providing pain medication and joint 
supplements. In making end-of-life decisions, such as whether to pursue life-extending measures, 
palliative care, or euthanasia, caregivers can respect the a i al patie t s auto o   o side i g hat 
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matters to her, rather than assuming that extension of life is necessarily good, or basing the decision on 
their own emotions or convenience. 
   
A Dialogic Approach to Respect 
  Wardrope proposes an account of respect for autonomy that o eptualizes espe t  i  te s 
other than noninterference. He seeks to reboot the idea of espe t  to odel it not on the ideal of 
espe ti g a atio s so e eig  ou da ies, ut o  that of espe tful o e satio : 
The picture that I hope will emerge is one of respect, not as a matter of non-
interference in individual decisions, but of taking seriously the other as a rational agent, 
a le to e aluate a d gi e easo s that a  a o ati e eight fo  all. 293 
This approach can be used with a patient who has been classified as incompetent because of her 
insufficient level of understanding or inability to anticipate the likely consequences of a given medical 
decision. This patient often still has her own reasons for acting or choosing in one way over another, 
reasons that are important to her. Rather than failing to consult such a patient or disregarding her 
decision, as B & C seem to require, Wa d ope s o eptio  of espe t i  the dialogi  se se suggests a 
way for medical practitioners to respect their autonomy: by viewing what patients communicate about 
their reasons as a  e p essio  of thei  alues  and ensuring that they are incorporated.294 
 In considering the applicability of this approach to animals, an obvious question is whether 
animals are legitimately i luded a o g Wa d ope s atio al age ts,  able to have, give, and evaluate 
reasons. A i als  a ilit  to gi e a d e aluate easo s ill e o side ed i  su se ue t dis ussio s in 
this thesis, but I will take a moment here to examine address the more fundamental worries. Postulating 
reasons for actions has such great value in terms of explanation, prediction, and modification of 
behavior that virtually no one who works or lives with animals can operate without presupposing that 
animals have such reasons. Yet, it is important to note that, in making this statement and in the 
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p e edi g dis ussio  of a i als  easo , I am using the te s easo s  loosel  a d ollo uiall . If 
autonomy is about choosing and acting based on o e s o  easo s, it is i po ta t to la if  hat 
e a tl  e ea   a easo .   
 In Chapter One, we considered Ka t s accounts of rationality and what counts as a reason, but 
dismissed them as too demanding for modern medical ethics; many if not most human patients would 
e i  da ge  of ha i g thei  auto o  o e idde  e ause of failu e to eet Ka t s st i ge t ite ia. 
Toda , to e atio al  is ofte  take  to mean to e app op iatel  espo si e i  o e s attitudes a d 
behavior to sufficiently good reasons;  this definition must then be supplemented by a substantive 
theo  of easo s to dete i e hat o stitutes a good easo  a d hat e ea   app op iatel  
responsive, etc.295  
 In the context of autonomy, we are concerned with normative easo s also alled justif i g 
easo s  athe  tha  explanatory reasons. Explanatory reasons explain why someone acted in a certain 
way – they need not involve conscious consideration. Normative reasons are considerations that 
suppo t, legiti ize, o  justif  a  a tio , hethe  u de take  o  ot. 296  
 One potential definition of a normative reason is a consideration that bears some relation to a 
motivational fact about an agent.297 While there is no consensus about whether this is necessarily true 
of all reasons,298 most would accept a consideration fitting this description as at least a candidate for 
counting as a normative reason for the age t i  uestio . The oti atio al fa t  i  this defi itio  is 
considered by some philosophers to refer to a psychological state, such as a desire; that is, one has a 
reason for acting in a given way if doing so would satisfy a desire that one has, even if one is not actually 
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motivated to act in such a way.299 Othe  philosophe s o side  the oti atio al fa t  to be a fact about 
what the agent is moved to do through her own volition; that is, one has a reason for acting in a given 
way if one is motivated to do so, whether or not this involves a desire.300 One might, for example, be 
moved to act in a certain way because of a belief that this is the right way to act or the smart thing to 
do. In contrast with the tradition, cognitive conceptions held by philosophers like Kant, some feminist 
theo ist ha e oade ed the otio  of a easo  to e o pass e otio s, desires, passions, inclinations, 
or volitions – in short, any mental state involving any motivation or attitude at all. 301 Feminist 
ioethi ists poi t out that e otio s a e ofte  ajo  fa to s i  patie ts  de isio -making; they criticize 
conventional accounts of medical ethics, which over-emphasize rationality and assume a narrow, highly 
og iti e o st ual of easo s,  fo  o e looki g this fa t.302 
 Accepting more permissive standards for counting a consideration as a reason ensures that 
animals easily qualify as having and acting for reasons. However, very permissive accounts may also 
make it difficult to distinguish between justificatory and explanatory reasons, and perhaps also between 
good and bad reasons for acting.303 I do not wish to wade too deeply into the controversy surrounding 
the proper substantive theory of reasons, but include this discussion merely point out that we are 
unlikely to find on a plausible theory that both 1) acknowledges and accepts as justificatory reasons the 
breadth of consideratio s that o pete t  hu a  patie ts ofte  i oke i  aki g edi al de isio s, 
and 2) denies that animals have and act for justificatory reasons.  
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 It is also significant that Wa d ope s a ou t does not require that we definitively distinguish 
justificatory reasons from explanatory reasons. What it requires is taking the time to understand and 
care about what the patient takes as a reason: 
[Whe ] e easo  togethe , ou  utte a es take the fo  of an invitation – from the 
speaker, to the listener(s), to accept what is a reason for the speaker as a reason for 
the  too. The o e satio  atte pts to o st u t a sha ed spa e of easo s ; su h that 
it is possi le that the e is a e  fo  hi h e a  [all] speak. 304 
 For example, a physician can explore why a patient does not want a recommended intervention 
and thus identify concerns (real or imagined) that can be then be addressed. In many cases, it may not 
be the procedure itself that the patient rejects, but an aspect of undergoing it that is frightening or 
othe ise a e si e. While the ph si ia  a  o side  the patie t s pa ti ula  o e  u fou ded o  
pe iphe al, espe ti g the patie t s auto o , u de  Wa d ope s odel, ea s she ust st i e to 
appreciate the patie t s sta dpoi t. Often, the patie t s o e s may turn out to be easily allayed, such 
that the conflict between respecting her autonomy and fulfilling the duty of beneficence is resolved. 
 In this way, Wa d ope s dialogic approach to respect is a means of identifying lo atio s and 
p a ti es  where respect for autonomy can enter the clinical context in a way that is meaningful to 
patients. For example, what an elderly dog objects to about a veterinary exam may be something as 
simple as being forced to stand on a slippery metal table where she cannot get good footing. Perhaps 
the veterinary li i s s e t p ofile,  eplete ith the s ells of pote tial p edato s dogs , is a easo  
some cats hide as soon as the travel carrier is taken out of the closet. What a chimpanzee finds most 
objectionable about undergoing an anesthetic procedure may be that, prior to administering 
medications, her caregivers isolate her in a way that she cannot see or hear her friends. Looking for and 
a epti g a i als  easo s as o t i uti g to the sha ed spa e of easo s  aturally suggest ways of 
respecting veterinary patient autonomy in ways that matter to them. 
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 Animals are not only bearers of reasons, they also seem to be able to evaluate reasons and 
ha ge thei  i ds. Fo  e a ple, a  p i ates ho a e eti ed  to sa ctuaries are distressed at the 
sight of a syringe, which previous experience has taught them is likely to cause them pain or distress. 
Positive reinforcement training, specifically the use of desensitization and counter-conditioning 
techniques, is known to ofte  e effe ti e i  ha gi g a  a i al s e otio al espo se. This t pe of 
training can be conceived of as a dialogic process. At the start, the animal has a good reason (fear and 
past experience) for keeping a far distance from the syringe. The training process might involve 
presenting the syringe in nonthreatening scenarios, initially at a distance and later in closer proximity, 
perhaps in the context of enjoyable experiences, such as play or preferred food item. Though often 
des i ed i  te s of fo i g asso iatio s,  this is e uall  ell e plai ed as a dialogi  p o ess du i g 
which the trainer introduces new reasons for the animal to modify her prior beliefs.  
 Another component of Wa d ope s odel of dialogi  espe t is a commitment to trying to 
understand what the other individual is attempting to communicate, even if we disagree with their 
assessment or understanding of the situation.305 The hope is to arrive at a shared, coherent perspective 
with them, and being open to modifying our own position as a consequence of incorporating their 
reasons. He writes: 
[‘espe t] u iall  i ol es se siti it  to a patie t s alues a d self-conception – an 
atte pt to u de sta d the  a d see the ole the  pla  i  a  age t s life, ut also to 
work within and against them to move beyond aspects of them that may present 
a ie s to auto o . 306 
What Wardrope has in mind is helping patients to recognize when a value they hold may not truly be 
their own, that is, when it is i authe ti .  A  i authe ti  alue o  desi e is one that the patient holds 
because of conditions, such as systematic oppression or deprivation, to which she has been subjected. 
I authe ti  desi es a d alues a  lead to so eo e to fo  adapti e p efe e es  – preferences that 
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would be different if core needs had been met or crucial capacities developed.307 In cases where this 
d a i  is suspe ted, espe ti g auto o  does t ea  goi g alo g ith hate e  the patie t ight 
assert she wants. Rather, taking the patient herself (or perhaps the concept of autonomy itself308) as the 
locus of respect may mean helping the patient to develop the requisite capabilities, prompting her to 
reconsider her preference, or promoting he  o  self-trust and self- o th  p io  to fi alizi g a 
decision.309  
 In the veterinary realm, we also face challenges in caring for the mental and physical health of 
veterinary patients who have adaptive preferences. For example, a retired greyhound may have a 
complete lack of interest in and understanding of play, a fo e  esea h  chimpanzee may fear 
touching the earth and prefer to cling only to wire mesh (the material of laboratory cages), and a 
sanctuary hen who was reared on a factory farm  may prefer to remain in a small nest box rather than 
venture outside. Well-intentioned caregivers may struggle with how best to respect the autonomy of 
such patients. Taking a dialogic approach allows us to introduce new reasons for the animal to consider 
and opportunities to build new skills, while also requiring that the caregiver be open to having her own 
perspective altered as her u de sta di g of the patie t s self-conception grows.310 Desires the caregiver 
initially believes to be inauthentic may turn out persist in the face of reflection, despite their origins. 
Because it is dialogic, the caregiver remains open to exploring other avenues if the patient steadfastly 
retains her past attitude. Once the concept of respecting autonomy is decoupled from the idea of 
noninterference, such interventions need not be conceived as paternalistic. 
 Many examples of positive reinforcement training for veterinary procedures seem to fall 
naturally u de  Ma ia  Ve ke k s u i  of compassionate interference, which Wardrope references in 
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his own work. Verkerk writes about providing care for homeless drug addicts with a history of 
psychiatric problems. Because of their proximity to the competency threshold that is so important to 
standard medical practice, such individuals are at high risk of paternalistic intervention in which their 
autonomy is overridden, such as forced institutionalization. Verkerk is critical of mainstream approaches 
to espe t fo  auto o  e ause the  see  to pa  little atte tio  to ho  the eed fo  oe i e 
interventions can be prevented or, to put it another way, how a situation in which only two strategies 
remain – leave the patient as he is or use coercion – a  e a oided. 311  
 Verkerk believes that non-interference is impossible in a caring relationship, because 
i te a tio s e essa il  ake a d e ake  oth pa ties as pe so s. I stead, respect fo  a  i di idual s 
auto o  ea s e e isi g this po e  to shape othe s isel  a d a efull . 312 It requires taking the 
time to understand how patients receiving care see themselves, their concerns, their struggles, and their 
place in the world.313  Since it is the individual we must respect, not a decision considered in isolation, 
respecting autonomy may mean engaging with the patient to help her to achieve greater autonomy.314 
Returning to our previous example of desensitizing and counter-conditioning a chimpanzee to a syringe, 
the end goal may be to ensure that, when an injection is needed to treat or prevent an illness (a 
beneficent goal and one likely in line with that patie t s values), she may accept it voluntarily, rather 
than leaving darting or other autonomy-overriding practices as the sole option. 
 
Summary and Looking Ahead 
 As we have seen, veterinary medicine traditionally involves the routine and often extreme 
denial of patient autonomy, at the levels of both medical decision-making and delivery of care. Modern 
movements in veterinary medicine that acknowledge the importance of securing the veterinary 
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patie t s olu ta  pa ti ipatio  t pi all  appeal solel  to a i al elfa e, o ei ed of i  te s of 
physical and psychological health, while remaining silent on the issue of patient autonomy. While this is 
understandable given the mainstream bioethical approach, I have shown in this chapter that using a 
relational account of autonomy provides an additional rationale for incorporating techniques like low-
stress patient handling and positive reinforcement training for veterinary behaviors. Such an approach 
helps resolve apparent conflicts between beneficence and respect for patient autonomy by allowing 
these duties to pull in the same direction. It also suggests options for a more coherent approach to 
veterinary care in settings where animal autonomy is already valued, such as ape sanctuaries.  
 As e ha e see , B & C s use of a th eshold of auto o ous de isio -making capacity to 
determine patient o pete e is si ila  i  st u tu e to t aditio al politi al theo s use of li guisti  
agency to assign full citizenship rights: a spectrum of abilities is transformed into dichotomy which 
de ies o e g oup its ight to ha e a sa .  I  oth ases, the st ucture of the discourse tends to obscure 
the fa t that o e s a ilit  to e e t age  a d e e ise auto o  is elatio al, that is, it is depe de t o  
social relationships and other socially-rooted factors. When we take subjectivity, or having a subjective 
e pe ie e of o e s life, as the o e of o al o side atio , athe  tha  usi g eu ot pi al hu a  
cognition as our benchmark, we can begin to broaden our understanding of what it means to respect 
so eo e s auto o . 
 Although, to my knowledge, relational autonomy as a bioethical concept has not previously 
been applied to veterinary medicine, some accounts seem readily extrapolatable to animal patients. 
These include attending to the diachronic dimensions of respect for autonomy and taking the patient 
(rathe  tha  a gi e  de isio  as o e s lo us of espe t. In addition, if we draw our concept of respect 
f o  the odel of espe tful dialogue  athe  tha  espe ti g ou da ies, e a  espe t auto o  
by attending to what the patient herself considers a reaso  a d  compassionatel  i te fe i g  to 
promote the patie t s auto o . As I ha e sho , usi g this elatio al le s, veterinary professionals can 
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identify e  pla es a d spa es  fo  espe ti g patie t auto o , locations and practices that matter 
to the animals themselves. The ete i a  patie t s elatio ships ith her caregivers moves to the 
forefront, as it is through this relationship that we can identify what matters to a patient and can 
develop strategies for protecting her autonomy during the course of veterinary care.  
 In the next chapter I will address some final pressing issues with my account and test its ability 
to withstand criticisms. First will be the issue of interpretation, that is, how can we know what is 
important to veterinary patients and what their desires, preferences, and values are? Next, I will suggest 
some concrete ways in which we might respect patient autonomy at both the level of selecting 
veterinary interventions and in terms of how they are delivered. Finally, I will examine an issue we have 









 In Chapter Three, I introduced a relational account of autonomy that I argue is applicable to 
veterinary patients. It e a les the edi al p a titio e s dut  to espe t auto o  to e te d to patients 
ho ould fall elo  B & C s o pete  th eshold, a d it helps us to ide tif  pla es a d spa es  i  
ete i a  p a ti e he e patie ts  e e ise of auto o  is ea i gful to the . Like othe  elatio al 
accounts, this one acknowledges that a  i di idual s development and exercise of autonomy is 
inextricably dependent on others in their lives and on social and institutional structures, so the fact that 
veterinary patients often depend substantially on their caregivers for exerting their agency does not 
justify devaluing their autonomy. By adopting a o ept of espe t fo  auto o  that onsiders 
diachronic dimensions, consciously attends to the locus of respect, and conceives respect in a dialogic 
sense, rather than as noninterference, we can identify new locations and practices for respecting 
autonomy, ones that align with patie ts  perspective and values. While recent movements in veterinary 
medicine, such as low-stress patient handling and positive reinforcement training for medical 
procedures, are typically promoted on the basis of a narrowly construed idea of welfare, e.g., decreasing 
distress and fear, or on the basis of prudential concerns like improved efficiency, these methods can also 
be employed as a means of respecting animal autonomy. 
 In this chapter, I will begin by examining the challenge of interpretation: since veterinary 
patients cannot articulate their values or concerns, how can we determine what these are? How can we 
ensure that those charged with facilitating their agency do so accurately, rather than projecting their 
own concerns or self-serving biases? After this, I will present some concrete recommendations for how 
veterinary professionals can respect patient autonomy that flow from my account. Finally, I will use the 
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proposed framework of relational autonomy to analyze the practice of training animals for veterinary 
procedures, a practice that some charge undermines animal autonomy.  
 
Interpreting for Animals 
 Under my proposed account, respecti g the ete i a  patie t s auto o  entails incorporating 
her reasons when it comes to medical decision-making and ensuring that her subjective good (her 
desires, values, concerns, etc.) shapes both what she receives in terms of health care and how she 
receives it.  Veterinary patients, since they are unable to articulate their desires linguistically, are 
dependent on human caregivers to be their interpreters. These caregivers are faced with translating the 
a i al s subjective experience and values so that they can enter the veterinary care discussion. Is such 
an endeavor even feasible? What if different caregivers offer different interpretations of what matters 
most to a patient, or what her behavior signifies? And, how can we ensure we are not merely projecting 
onto animals our own wishes, attributing assent or refusal to them when it really stems from our own 
pe spe ti e? As D & K put it, if e a t i te p et [a i als ] su je ti e good, the  the goal of hu a -
e a led [a i al] age  is a  i ohe e t o e. 315 
 This epistemic challenge is one that is often used to justify relying solel  o  o je ti e  
easu es of elfa e. These a e ge e i  ite ia, ta geted at the le el of spe ies o  pe haps the a i al s 
fu tio ,  as defi ed  hu a s, i.e., guide dog o  food a i al. “u h lists a e also a aila le i  
veterinary medicine, for exa ple, the Rule of  lists twenty essential parameters to review on all 
hospitalized patients, to ensure no aspect of their welfare and health status is being neglected.316 Under 
such accounts, as long as health and welfare criteria are met, our ethical duties to the animal are 
satisfied. It is a moot point whether the individual animal has preferences or idiosyncrasies that deviate 
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from the odel patie t  assu ed  the p e-determined criteria. Asking whether her hospital stay 
aligns with her own values is also out of bounds. If e a ot elia l  dete i e a ete i a  patie t s 
desires and values, or if our assessments are likely to be contaminated with self-serving bias, relying 
purely on objective criteria may be preferable to attempting to introduce her subjective perspective into 
the discussion.  
 Before examining what interpretation tools we may have available, it is worth noting that this 
challenge is not unique to animals. People with cognitive disabilities (CD) and children are also often 
depe de t o  othe s to i te p et thei  su je ti e good, a d the isk of ias, self-interest, projection, 
and well-i te tio ed e o   those ha ged ith i te p eti g  fo  the  has also been used as an 
argument for relying on objective criteria rather than attempting to solicit their perspectives.317 Yet, 
advocates for people with CD, including self-ad o ates, ai tai  that t ustees a  a d should help i  
the o st u tio  of i di idual s ipts  of the good life  fo  su h i di iduals to allo  the  to pa ti ipate 
in shaping the conditions in which they live.318 So the existence of epistemic challenges does not mean 
we must abandon the project out of hand. 
 As it turns out, we already have a variety of ways in which to determine, with a sufficient degree 
of o fide e, hat a  a i al s su je ti e good is, that is, hat she alues, desi es, p efe s. And often 
this permits us to project, in situations beyond that a i al s intellectual ken, what course of action she 
would likely prefer, had she a more comprehensive understanding of the situation. These interpretive 
methods include reading body language and vocalizations the way behaviorists319 and ethologists do, 
aski g  the way animal welfare scientists do in preference and motivation tests, and d a i g o  o e s 
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k o ledge of the a i al s esta lished patte s of eha io  a d o u i atio  the a  those i  lose 
personal relationships with animals do.  
 We saw in Chapter Three that a first step is acknowledging that animals often have reasons for 
choosing or acting as they do. A  a i al s easo  is not an articulated statement about logical 
relationships or an appeal to universal and necessary principles, but it does answer the uestio , Wh  
de ide i  this a ?  “i e e ou t inherently motivating desires and volitions as reasons when the 
agent is human, we ought to do the same for other agents who have a subjective experience of their 
lives and preferences about what happens to them. When it comes to giving reasons, animals may not 
be able to articulate their preferences and concerns linguistically, but this method of communication is 
also but one of many that humans employ. Relational autonomy theorists point out that part of (human) 
a egi i g i ol es espo di g to u spoke  eeds o  u e p essed dis o fo t  a d pi ki g up o  
situational cues that extend [o e s] k o ledge of patie t eeds. 320 While such talents may be a natural 
by-product of their socialization for some, caregivers in human medicine can also: 
ulti ate pe eptual skills app op iate to ide tif i g featu es of situatio s that a  
e i h thei  u de sta di g of hat the patie t is u de goi g…. [a d] e pa d 
oppo tu ities to st e gthe  patie ts  se se of thei  own agency, encouraging them to 
elate to su ou di g othe s i  a s that suppo t thei  o  ai s a d e ds. 321 
Part of the job of being a caregiver, then, is ide tif i g a d u de sta di g o e s patie ts  easo s, 
whether articulated or not, and at times even having additional insights about these reasons that her 
standpoint as caregiver affords her. Increasingly, those who carefully study animals are identifying 
considerations which may be less obvious to us because of our own sense modalities or cognitive 
abilities are less developed than those of the species in question;322 once these differences are taken 
i to a ou t, e a  e ette  a le to ide tif  the a i al s easo  fo  a ti g a e tai  a .  
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 The evolving scientific fields of ethology and animal behavior increasingly seek to understand 
hat a  a i al s eha io  sa s a out he  subjective states, including emotional states. While such 
questions were previously considered outside the realm of science,323 they are now considered fully 
valid topics of scientific exploration. The veterinary school curriculum and the line-up at many veterinary 
continuing education conferences now include coursework a out u de sta di g a i als  postu es, 
facial expressions, and behaviors as these relate to underlying emotion states and desires. In addition to 
behaviors whose significance might be easily identifiable by a casual observer, we can now identify more 
subtle expressions of emotion. Lip-licking and yawning when not sleepy, for example, indicate anxiety in 
dogs.324 Tucking all paws under the body and fluffing up the hair coat indicate pain in cats.325 Eye and ear 
position, pupil diameter, body tension, tail position and movement, degree of brow furrowing, and 
other facial expressions are now all considered indicative of underlying emotional and other subjective 
states. Recent research using functional MRI to study the brains of awake, unrestrained dogs shows 
striking similarities in patterns of brain activation, compared with what is found in humans, in response 
to situations designed to elicit certain emotions or pleasure;326 in supporting an analogous similarity in 
subject experiences, this serves to validate ethological findings and open avenues for further research. 
 When it comes to assessing animal desires and volitions, e a  ofte  ask  patients by offering 
optio s a d the  a  a s e  th ough thei  su se ue t a tio s. Indeed, part of the focus of the field of 
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animal welfare science is e pe i e tall  assessi g a i als  p efe e es a d deg ees of oti atio . 
P efe e e tests  are experiments are devised to ask animals to choose between two or more different 
optio s, hile oti atio  tests  assess ho  st o g a oti atio  to satisf  a gi en preference is, by 
determining how hard an animal is willing to work fulfill her preference.327 These are basically controlled 
and systematic methods of gaining the same type of information that animal caregivers continually 
collect in their daily interactions with animals.  
  Fi all , as a  pet pa e ts,  zoo keepe s, a d sa tua  o ke s ill attest, the fa ilia it  
that is developed through providing long term care to individuals allows the development of what D & K 
la el pe so al k o ledge  of a  a i al s su je ti e e pe ie e a d p efe e es: 
Pe so al k o ledge is k o ledge of a  a tual i di idual, he  pe so alit  a d 
temperament, her idiosyncratic behaviors and habits, her likes and needs as revealed 
over time, her individual communication repertoire, and our shared history of 
i te a tio , so ial odes, a d s ste s fo  utual u de sta di g. 328 
The  like  a  a i al a egi e s pe so al k o ledge to the a ilit  of pa e ts to i te p et a  i fa t s 
cries or that of an intimate caregiver to detect ea i g i  a ultipl  disa led pe so s su tle 
movements. In all of these cases, a communication system has developed between individuals that gives 
the caregiver a level of understanding that is different from that of a behavior expert or other individual 
unfamiliar with the individual. Surely most of us who live with animals have such examples: to indicate 
his wish to go for a walk, my dog Henry grabs ahold of my socks as I put them on and tries to pull them 
off and run off with them; this behavior quite startled my visiting mother-in-law who perceived a large 
black dog rushing toward her and atta ki g  he  feet out of the lue as she got d essed. “i ila l , 
ete i a ia s ust ofte  el  o  a lie t s assess e t of hat is o al  fo  the patie t at ho e or at 
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other veterinary visits to determine whether certain behaviors (trembling, urinating inappropriately, 
reaction to handling) is an expression of emotion or a symptom of illness. 
 With these means of identifying the emotions, preferences, volitions, and desires that comprise 
a  a i al s su je ti e good a d a  se e as easo s fo  he  to a t o  hoose i  a e tai  a , e a  
now tackle one of the potential complications of interpretation. Whe  a egi e s  o  i te ests a e at 
stake, there is the risk that they may impose their own perspective on a patient, as their own needs or 
desires cro d out thei  a ilit  to liste  to the patient and speak for her. One example is the pet-parent 
with such a deep attachment to their pet, that they feel the need to stay near the animal or keep her 
ali e at all osts. I  p a ti es, I ha e see  this pla  out, so eti es see i gl  e ause of the pe so s 
social isolation and other times when the pet represents a connection to a human partner or family 
member who has passed away. Another example may be a caregiver, perhaps in a zoo or research 
setting, who has competing interests, such as seeing an experimental treatment succeed or a captive 
endangered animal breed. In both cases, such caregivers may be more prone to self-serving bias or 
projecting their own desires onto the patient. Here, the patie t has e  li ited a s to speak up  if 
her perspective is being misunderstood or misrepresented.  
 These a e a o g the pathologies  that can arise from relationships that are inherently unequal 
in terms of power and communicative ability.329 One potential defense against such pathologies is 
merely being aware of the potential for self-serving bias and projection, and seeking ways to correct for 
it, perhaps by enlisting the input of a trusted confidant. Veterinary professionals can respect their 
patients  autonomy by guarding against such pathologies in their own lives, and by helping clients to 
become aware of them. In some cases, it may be effective just to gi e a e i de  that the patie t s 
pe spe ti e is sepa ate a d diffe e t f o  the lie t s, a d atte s i  its o  ight. At times, the 
clinician might even gently challenge a caregiver whose interpretation of the patie t s su je ti e good 
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seems questionable. K o i g the lie t s e otio al distress is likely intense, she might still be able to 
lead by example, sa i g pe haps: As a ete i a ia , e e  he  I k o  e e taki g the est a e e 
can of a pet here in the hospital, sometimes I still have to stop and ask, is this situation one the animal 
would hoose fo  he self? A d if ot, ho  do e ha ge thi gs to ake it ight? I thi k a e it s ti e 
fo  us to do that i  Fluff s ase.   Providing the caregiver herself with emotional or social support may 
e ed  a a egi e s i a ilit  o  elu ta e to o side  the patie t s o  ishes a d alues. 
 Some degree of objectivity in assessing what matters most to the veterinary patient might also 
be achieved through intersubjective agreement among interpreters. In zoo and sanctuary environments 
where animals receive care from multiple individuals, free discussion among dedicated caregivers and 
outside observers of their different interpretations may lead to a general consensus on what the 
a i al s alues, concerns and preferences are and how best to incorporate them. Another approach, 
common in large human hospitals but currently rare in the veterinary field, is to employ an ethics officer 
or board to help handle challenging ethical cases and hold regula  ethi s ou ds. 330 If the practice 
philosophy incorporates respect for patient agency or autonomy as a distinct value, consideration of the 
unique concerns and perspectives of individual patients may come to permeate the practice culture, 
alongside extant considerations such as pain management, infection control, and client communication. 
 
Respecting Patient Autonomy in Veterinary Practice 
 In this section, I offer some practical guidelines for respecting veterinary patient autonomy that 
spring from the framework I have presented. Some of these have already been briefly described, but 
receive further elaboration here. To be clear, I am not arguing for the primacy of respect for autonomy. 
Rather, I am indicating concreate ways in which the autonomy of veterinary patients can be respected 
throughout their experience of health care.  
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 Undoubtedly, a practitioner who accepts respect for patient autonomy as a value will still find 
he self at ti es f ust ati g a patie t s atte pt to e e t age  e ause other ethical obligations, such as 
beneficence, are greater or more pressing. In some cases, we will need to determine what constitutes 
an acceptable balance, knowing that this may vary with context, such as available social and material 
resources, and will likel  shift du i g a patie t s lifeti e. However, employing a relational account of 
autonomy will often help us identify approaches that bring these values into harmony. It suggests ways 
of shaping the practice of veterinary medicine so that these two values effectively pull in the same 
direction more often. This involves both paying attention to how we can minimize the need to override 
auto o  i  the a e of e efi e e a d o side i g ho  a  e i o po ate the patie t s su je ti e 
good – what she prefers, what matters to her – in veterinary decisions and approaches. Using this 
odel, a ete i a  patie t s auto o  a  e espe ted o  t o disti t le els:  sele tio  of 
veterinary interventions, such as diagnostic and treatment procedures, and 2) methods of delivery of 
veterinary care. 
 At the level of intervention selection, it is clear that we must rely on surrogates when it comes 
to selecting which, if any, treatment or diagnostic procedures should be undertaken for a given patient.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, our patients are unable to understand, and we are unable to explain to 
them, crucial medical concepts like vaccination, the rationale behind diagnostic tests and treatment 
options, statistics related to success or failure of an intervention, and prognosis. Thus, while they accept 
or decline, say, an injection, their lack of understanding means that they are not accepting or rejecting 
the procedure or measure. Beneficence and nonmaleficence require, in most cases, a surrogate who can 
make a decision based on understanding the associated benefits, costs, and risks. This surrogate might 
be the patie t s p i a  caregivers, a veterinary client, a curator/animal care supervisor, or sometimes 
the veterinarian herself, in the case of a stray animal brought into a shelter or emergency clinic. 
However, surrogates can and often should go beyond the best interest standard put forth by B & C. 
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‘espe t fo  the patie t s auto o  ea s su ogates i o po ate the patie t s disti ti e alues a d 
concerns into medical decision-making, seek ways of delivering the selected care that promote rather 
than deny autonomy, and – when possible – attend to developing patients abilities to exercise agency 
continually, rather than only in crisis situations. 
 Obviously, relationship between the patient and her caregiver(s) is especially important, for 
a egi e s a e ofte  the i te p ete s  fo  the a i al, pe itti g he  spe ifi  o e s a d alues to e 
e og ized a d ofte  t a slati g  to he  hat is eeded fo  he  to pa ticipate in her health care. 
Caregiver-animal relationships must go beyond providing food and basic husbandry. Far in advance of 
any actual medical decision-making, caregivers must be observant and attentive enough to understand 
the individuals in their care and identify what each individual values, fears, etc. When the surrogate is 
different from caregiver(s), such as in a sanctuary or zoo, caregivers with intimate knowledge of the 
patient should be directly involved in decision-making, be they crisis or house-keeping ones.  
 When there is a medical decision to be made, the veterinarian explains what is entailed in 
various interventions and their implications for prognosis, recovery time, expected degree of pain or 
discomfort, whether hospitalization or frequent recheck appointments are required, how often blood 
will need to be analyzed, required activity restrictions, expected side effects, etc. In addition to assessing 
traditional welfare trade-offs, surrogates must broaden their assessment to include the patie t s 
particular values and concerns. Where multiple options may offer similar improvements in welfare, as 
far as decreased pain and increased feelings of well-being, the decision of which one to choose may be 
based on autonomy considerations. 
 Once an option is selected that is believed to best accord with duties of beneficence and respect 
fo  patie t auto o , ete i a  p ofessio als, su ogates, a d a egi e s ust still liste  to the 
patient as she responds to what in fact turns out to be involved in the medical intervention. Feminist 
ethic-of- a e theo ists ha e poi ted to the p a ti e of atte ti e ess, a ki d of dis ipli e hose 
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prerequisites include attitudes and aptitudes such as openness, receptivity, empathy, sensitivity, and 
i agi atio . 331 As a decision regarding care is implemented, caregivers can be encouraged to cultivate 
attentiveness and their subsequent feedback can be incorporated, along with objective measures like 
weight, blood counts, and other medical parameters, to determine whether the chosen intervention 
o ti ues to efle t espe t fo  the patie t s auto o .  
 Taking a dialogic approach to respect means subjecting our own commitments to criticism or 
rejection by the patient. During implementation of a selected veterinary intervention, all those involved 
i  that patie t s a e ust o ti ue to e se siti e to hat matters to her. At times, we may come to 
question veterinary interventions we initially deemed necessary based on the duty of beneficence, 
potentially considering a change in intervention choice or means of implementation.   
 This was something I faced with my own dog, Howie. When he was older but in very good 
health, I discovered he had developed a malignant tumor that was still at an early stage. It was removed, 
but unfortunately the resection margins were insufficient for surgery to be considered curative. 
Therefore, I opted for him to receive a course of chemotherapy, which was expected to have minimal 
adverse effect at the dosages used, but likely to provide him with years of a good-quality, cancer-free 
life. After three or four visits to the hospital where he received the treatment, he began to refuse to 
enter building, even with gentle coaxing. Knowing his personality and previous willingness to enter 
veterinary clinics, his new and steadfast refusal to pass through the clinic doors was a clear expression of 
his ishes. I  Ho ie s ase, I e ded up s it hi g to a upu tu e a d he al the ap  that, though ot as 
well studied in research trials, could be given at home and had no noticeable adverse effects – in fact, 
Howie enjoyed the acupuncture treatments and would typically fall into a deep sleep after the first few 
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needles were inserted. In the end, his cancer never returned and he enjoyed several more years of 
good- ualit  life as a se io  itize .  
 When it comes to respecting patient autonomy, just as important as which interventions to 
pursue are the issues of how care is provided and how the patient experiences veterinary interventions. 
I  pediat i  ioethi s, this issue is so eti es f a ed i  te s of o tai i g the asse t  of ou g 
children for their medical treatment. Emerging in the late 1970s, the idea behind assent in pediatrics is 
to acknowledge that children, over time, develop in their level of understanding and decision-making 
abilities such that the capacity of most older teenagers resembles that of adults who can give informed 
consent.332 Thus, respect for autonomy requires that children be able to participate in their medical 
decision-making to the extent that they are willing and able to do so. What ualifies as asse t  
therefore varies with decisional capacity. For young children, whose understanding may be similar to 
that of most veterinary patients, obtaining assent may be li ited to soli iti g a  e p essio  of the 
patie t s illi g ess to a ept the p oposed a e. 333 It might also involve letting the child choose which 
arm to draw blood from or what time to take a medication.334 
 Similar to the concept of assent is that of a uies e e  a ti ulated  the I stitute of 
Medicine Committee on the Necessity of the Use of Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research. While this Committee deemed chimpanzees unlikely to understand the concepts of assent, 
consent, and giving permission, they used the concept of acquiescence to articulate the fact that 
chimpanzees can make decisions about whether or not they are willing to participate in a given 
esea h p o edu e  a d can express their willingness or lack thereof.335 My own experience with 
chimpanzees is that sometimes they seek medical assistance from their caregivers. For example, while a 
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chimpanzee may initially need to be trained to show a wound to a caregiver, she may subsequently 
present her wounds spontaneously; one chimpanzee I know even signs the o d hu t  he  
presenting a wound.336 Given that their level of understanding in such cases is likely similar to that of a 
ou g hild, I elie e that the te  asse t  is so eti es o e a u ate tha  a uies e e.   
 In early writings on assent and child patient autonomy in dentistry, practitioners working with 
hild e  ho efuse to u de go a t eat e t olu ta il  a e e ou aged to sta t  e o side i g the 
urgency of the dental needs and determine if treatment can be delayed or avoided with no lasting ill 
effe ts. 337 This is often a good piece of advice in the case of veterinary patients, as well. Their 
willingness to accept a given procedure may vary greatly with their emotional state and, while we may 
not expect them to become more accepting of interventions due to maturation, a similar change may 
occur through other means, such as training, which is discussed below. 
 In subsequent discussions of asse t, pediat i  ethi ists go fa the , lai i g that there are 
clinical situations in which a persistent refusal to assent (i.e., dissent) may be ethically binding,  su h as 
in research from which the patient will not directly benefit a d he  the proposed intervention is not 
essential to his or her welfare and/or can be deferred without substantial risk. 338 In line with the 
dialogic approach I have discussed, medical professionals are urged to pause to gain a better 
understanding of their situation or to come to terms with fears or other concerns regarding proposed 
care. 339 As the discussion about assent has matured, it has taken on additional relational components,  
such as the importance of truly knowing the child and appreciating both her preferences and the 
spe t u  of [he ] life e pe ie es  when considering how to work toward the ideal of assent.340 
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  Be ause of thei  le el of u de sta di g a d thei  te de  to li e i  the o e t,  hat 
typically matters most to veterinary patients is their immediate experience rather than anything more 
distant in time or space.341 This immediate experience may be comprised of being touched during an 
examination, receiving injections and other medications, undergoing anesthetic induction, and being 
restrained during procedures like catheter placement, venipuncture, and radiography. Most aspects of 
care delivery offer opportunities for veterinary professionals to avoid or minimize the denial of a 
patie t s auto o  by ensuring that she acquiesces rather than dissents.  
 Sometimes, determining acquiescence/assent is easy:  the biting, scratching, struggling, 
growling/hissi g patie t is lea l  sa i g, o,  hile the puppy who wags her tail and joyfully licks a 
treat while failing to notice that she is receiving a vaccination or having her rectal temperature taken is 
assenting to the full extent that her cognitive understanding of the situation allows. However, a patient 
experiencing great pain may resist any intervention, even one that will rapidly alleviate it; in such cases, 
a sufficiently strong pain injection is surely what is called for, whether we justify it on the grounds of 
e efi e e o  futu e asse t,  as the pate alisti  o eptio  of auto o  e sa  i  Chapte  O e 
might suggest. Another more complicated scenario is that of a severely debilitated patient who is unable 
to resist interventions. Here, careful observation is necessary to detect subtle signs of anxiety and 
distress that indicate we must modify our approach to secure acquiescence. 
 Oftentimes, passi e  easu es a e suffi ie t a d supe io  optio s fo  deli e ing care in a way 
the patient will accept. Flavoring, compounding, or otherwise disguising oral medications, for example, 
may prevent pilli g  fo i g the patient to swallow a pill) or darting from being the only options for 
medicating. One of my favorite instruments for working with chimpanzees is an infrared thermometer 
hi h allo s e to assess a patie t s te pe atu e ithout e e  tou hi g he . Other passive measures 
may be structural: building a scale into the floor of the animal housing area (in a sanctuary) or of the 
                                                          
341
 The main exception to this I have seen is in nursing bitches, whose behavior sometimes suggests they are 
preoccupied with returning to their puppies even when they are not physically present. 
117 
 
clinic, so that patients can be weighed opportunistically, without the need for immobilization or 
restraint. Veterinary clinics can be constructed with the future olfactory and auditory experiences of 
patients in mind, such as having separate wards and waiting areas for cats and dogs. Calmer, more 
relaxed patients have better welfare, in terms of decreased psychological and physiological stress, and 
are more able to voluntarily participate in veterinary procedures. 
 Another potential focus is educating caregivers about early signs of disease progression. Prompt 
recognition of such signs makes it possible to intervene early and more minimally and avoid crisis 
situations, which often require extensive handling by veterinary professionals and more potentially 
objectionable diagnostic and treatment interventions. For example, caregivers of patients with 
as pto ati  o  o t olled a dia  o ditio s a  e t ai i g to o ito  patie ts  sleepi g espi ato  
rates, which increase gradually with progression of the condition. Early detection of progression means 
a ette  ha e of a agi g the patie t s o ditio  at ho e, athe  tha  waiting until she is in acute 
distress and the only options are euthanasia or emergency hospitalization. 
 Adopting a relational account of autonomy is also useful in a chimpanzee sanctuary or other 
situation in which a patient is part of a strongly-bonded social group of conspecifics. In such cases, 
consideration of both the patient and others with whom she has close relationships may be needed in 
evaluation options for medical interventions as well as the means of providing them. For example, 
sometimes isolating an individual seems ideal as a way to carefully monitor weight, intake and 
eliminations, and ensure successful medication administration. However, strong social bonds mean that 
such isolation may be experienced by the patient as more objectionable than the illness. Welfare 
considerations alone might lead to a e o e datio  like pai -house with a compatible individual 
du i g edi al t eat e t.  But if we are consciously aiming to respect the animal autonomy, we might 
additionally ask questions like: Which group member(s) would the patient choose to remain with? What 
about the preferences of this social partner? How might the choice of social partner affect the degree to 
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which the patient can voluntarily participate in her own care? Are there reasonable alternatives that 
do t e ui e pe iods of sepa atio  f o  the g oup? Ho e e  skilled the  ight e, eterinary 
professionals need the insight of caregivers to interpret for the animals in their care.  
 
Training for Veterinary Procedures 
 As previously noted, another practical approach is anticipating veterinary interventions that are 
likely to be needed in the future and providing the patient with opportunities to develop skills and 
knowledge that will make voluntary participation to be an option. For example, when working with 
captive chimpanzees, we can likely anticipate that many individuals will at some point in their lives 
suffer a severe wound that will require evaluation and possibly surgery. The standard approach has 
been to wait for the situation to arise and then make a punctate decision about whether the emotional 
distress and medical risk of darting and anesthesia is justified by the need to manage the wound. 
Considering the diachronic dimensions of respecting patient autonomy, we might consider far in 
advance, how to create a situation where the wound might be evaluated without anesthesia and how 
the animal might voluntarily participate in the process of receiving an anesthetic injection if surgical 
t eat e t is eeded. A a egi e  ho akes a  e e da  ga e  out of ha i g a  a i al i  he  a e 
sho  he  a ious od  pa ts is effe ti el  e la gi g that i di idual s pote tial fo  e e isi g he  
autonomy. Similarly, training patients to present a limb for a voluntary anesthetic injection greatly 
expands their potential to exert agency as a veterinary patient and decreases the likelihood that their 
autonomy will need to be overridden through involuntary darting.  
 Such training for voluntary participation in veterinary procedures is an example of what D & K 
efe  to ask the s affoldi g  of ea i gful hoi e. 342 Scaffolding, or structuring, choice involves 
providing opportunities for learning skills and abilities that would lead to greater options or an 
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expanded scope of agency.343 As with the scaffolding used to construct a building, this support is 
gradually removed as the individual acquires the skills being taught, or makes it clear she is not 
i te ested i  lea i g the . It egi s ith asi  so ializatio  i to pa ti ula  o s a d elatio ships 
which help to define the familiar and the trustworthy, and which provide a benchmark from which 
incremental alte ati es e o e ea i gful. 344 For example, in a sanctuary situation, basic 
socialization might involve establishing a relationship with animal residents in which the caregiver 
observes them and learns their preferences for certain conspecifics, foods, toys, and other items or 
activities.  
 Afte  su h a  atte ti e fou datio  is i  pla e, a egi e s a  egi  i t odu i g so e t ai i g 
ga es,  i  hi h s all food t eats a e p o ided he  the a i al offe s a e tai  eha io  i  espo se 
to a verbal or gestural cue. Usually, these are short sessions which the animal can choose (or decline) to 
participate. Once an animal comprehends the idea behind the training game, they are often eager to 
expand their repertoire of cues – there are even accounts of animals using similar methods to teach 
their human caregiver the meaning of a cue.345 Depending on the anticipated veterinary needs, the 
a i al s pe so alit , and her level of interest, caregivers may teach simple cues, such as opening the 
mouth for inspection of the teeth and tongue, or very complex ones, such as presenting a limb and 
remaining still for blood collection from a vein.  
 In some ways, training can be viewed as an extension of the socialization process, as it 
effectively expands the amount and specificity of communication that is possible between animals and 
hu a  a egi e s. Co u i atio  is o sta tl  o u i g, hethe  e ea  to sa  a thi g ith ou  
behavior or not. Training, in requiring careful attention to the structure of our interactions and precisely 
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hat e a e o u i ati g, pe its i easi gl  o ple  t a slatio : p e iousl  ea i gless ues 
come to have clear meanings.  
 In positive reinforcement training (PRT), as was mentioned in Chapter Three, only rewards are 
used to shape eha io s, so the o st that a  happe  fo  a istake  is ot e ei i g the desi ed t eat 
and having the opportunity to try again. At times, the goal of training may simply teach a patient that 
she need not fear or feel threatened by a certain stimulus, for example, short-term separation from 
other members of their social group, the approach of an unfamiliar individual (like a veterinarian), 
unfamiliar objects (like a stethoscope), or objects associated with fear or pain from past experience (nail 
clippers, for some dogs, for example). Techniques include desensitization, in which the stimulus in 
question is presented at a very low intensity but gradually increasing intensity, always below the 
threshold that would trigger fear or anxiety, and counter-conditioning, in which the feared stimulus is 
consistently paired with something pleasant or desired, so it comes to predict something good. 
 Through such training methods, a host of veterinary procedures can be performed on non-
anesthetized patients who voluntarily – even enthusiastically – participate in them, even animals like 
apes and elephants who require protected contact, i.e., mesh or other caging material between the 
patient and humans. I have observed or worked with apes who presented wounds for visual cleaning, 
accepted application of transmucousal medication to their lips and tongue, presented their arm or leg 
fo  a  i je tio , u i ated i to a up, a d e e  i se ted thei  a  i to a slee e  made of cage mesh for 
blood collection and blood pressure measurement. 
 PRT is associated with a more relaxed atmosphere surrounding veterinary interventions and 
lower physiological measures of stress.346 Since it has the potential to improve animal welfare, we might 
ask why not advocate for it strictly on beneficence grounds, why invoke respect for autonomy at all. But 
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at times, these two duties may suggest different courses of action. For example, some zoos currently 
engage in very intensive training regimens,347 aiming, for example, to have every gorilla reliably trained 
fo  e e  edi al eha io . This is p esu a l  p o oted out of a desi e to a i ize the a i als  health 
and welfare. But D & K caution that people with CD speak out against an excessive focus on efforts to 
increase agency, as this can leave less time for simply being oneself and enjoying life.348 Grounding 
training programs in welfare considerations and respect for autonomy might lead us to offer training to 
all, but allowing individuals to choose how much to participate. For individuals with little or no interest 
in PRT, our attention may fall to finding other methods of providing beneficent interventions while 
minimizing the routine overriding of their autonomy. 
 
Does training really enhance autonomy, or undermine it? 
 Despite the pote tial of t ai i g to e ha e ete i a  patie ts  a ilit  to olu ta il  pa ti ipate 
in their care, my experience with the ape sanctuary community is that a significant proportion of 
sanctuary workers who are committed to respecting the autonomy of animal residents oppose training 
of a  ki d. D & K ake a si ila  o se atio , oti g that a  a i al ights a olitio ists [ ho 
advocate minimizing rather than reforming human-animal relationships] jump to the conclusion that all 
… fo s of t ai i g a e u just, a  illegiti ate atte pt to o pel [a i als] to e gage i  u atu al a ts 
that se e hu a  pu poses. 349 E e  zoo o ke s, ho a e t pi all  ot a i al ights a olitio ists,  
raise the question of whether training ight e a o st ai t o  the eatu e s auto o . 350 
 As previously mentioned, this sentiment may stem from a visceral dislike of training due to its 
historical association with methods based on fear and physically violent punishment and with its use in 
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ci uses a d Holl ood o ies to get a i als to pe fo  t i ks.  Although P‘T fo  ete i a  
procedures utilizes exclusively rewards, it stills strikes many as manipulative or even coercive, and 
counter to respecting animal autonomy. After all, the reward for which that patient is working is under 
human control and she has no way to secure it independently of performing the acts that are asked of 
her – so how can her choice be meaningful? Undertaking such training with humans would seem to be 
demeaning, an affront to their dignity, and a denial of their autonomy, one might argue, so why is the 
case any different for animals? Minimizing our interactions with them and allowing them to live their 
own lives with others of their kind might be the best way to respect their autonomy.  
 Such a perspective is grounded in an account of autonomy like that offered by B & C. As we saw 
in Chapter Two, personal autonomy, for B & C, requires self-rule that is free from controlling 
interference by others.351 Indeed, voluntariness, or acting without being under the control of another 
person or condition, is one of the three conditions that must be fulfilled for an action to be autonomous. 
Since, i  follo i g the o a d  of a t ai e , the a i al see s to e u de  the t ai e s ontrol, it 
follows that she is not behaving autonomously when engaging in training or when, in the context of 
veterinary care, she performs a previously trained behavior.  
 Whe  e look o e losel  at B & C s a ou t, ho e e , it is ot lea  that t ai i g must 
necessarily be classified as a form of influence that undermines autonomy. B & C distinguish three 
categories of influence: coercion, persuasion, and manipulation, noting that not all of them qualify as 
controlling.352 Coe io  i ol es the use of a redible and severe threat of harm or force to control 
a othe . 353 Training methods that utilize punishment would certainly qualify as coercive, even if 
u de take  fo  a e efi e t e ds. The sa e a  e said fo  t ai i g that i ol es egati e 
reinforcement,  o  o pelli g a eha io   li ki g its pe fo a e ith the e o al of a sti ulus the 
                                                          
351
 Beauchamp, T.L., & Childress, J.F. (2013). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7
th
 ed.). (p. 137). 
352
 Ibid., (pp. 138-139). 
353
 Ibid., (p. 138). 
123 
 
a i al fi ds a e si e. Fo  e a ple, I ha e o se ed a ete i a ia  sho  the da t gu  to a hi pa zee 
who had previously been trained for hand-injection, in an attempt to get he  to hoose  to a ept the 
hand-i je tio  athe  tha  e da ted. This does see  to eet B & C s defi itio  of oe io . Ho e e , 
the positive reinforcement-based training that I have described would not qualify as coercive under 
their account unless perhaps the patient was compelled by hunger or thirst to participate. 
 Some forms of training might be classified under the type of influence explicitly sanctioned by B 
& C, that of persuasion. Persuasion, as defined by B & C, occurs when one individual successfully 
i flue es a othe s eliefs o  a tio s th ough appeals to easo .354 In Chapter Three, I presented an 
example of using the training methods of desensitizing and counterconditioning to decrease fear of a 
syringe, suggesting that this might qualify as a dialogue between patient and caregiver. In this scenario, 
while we may not be using linguistic statements about logical relationships (i.e., reasons, in the 
traditional sense) to persuade the patient that the syringe is not a cause for alarm, we are gradually 
providing her with new information (e.g., nothing bad happens when the syringe is 50 ft. away, nothing 
bad happens when it is 45 ft. away, etc.) which makes it rational for her to change her assessment.  
 Desensitization and counter-conditioning are both types of classical conditioning.  The positive 
reinforcement training used to shape veterinary behaviors, such as presenting a limb for a hand-
injection or offering a wound for visual inspection, constitutes operant conditioning. With operant 
o ditio i g, the a i al s eha io al espo se p odu es a o se ue e; if e use e lusi el  P‘T, the 
a i al s eha io  i  espo se to a e al o  gestu al ue ill eithe  p odu e a e a d if o e t  o  
othi g at all if i o e t .   
 This t pe of t ai i g see s to fall ost atu all  u de  B & C s atego  of manipulation: 
s a i g people to do hat the a ipulato  a ts  ea s othe  tha  oe io  o  pe suasio . 355 
                                                          
354





Ma ipulatio  a  i ol e the effe t of e a ds, offe s, a d e ou age e t, 356 which are obviously 
involved in PRT. B & C do not bar all types of manipulation in health care as unethical, noting that 
manipulation is at times morally justified. In some cases, manipulation may even be unavoidable, as the 
ph si ia s o d choice, whatever it may be, frames the information she is presenting in ways that 
affect the patie t s i te p etatio .357 Ma ipulatio , o  B & C s a ou t, is p o le ati  he  it i pai s 
autonomous choice. A standard example of manipulation is offering an inducement (e.g., a needed 
medication or extra income) to someone in desperate need in exchange for participating in a research 
trial); the person effectively lacks any meaningful choice about what decision to make.358 Compelling an 
animal to engage in training by making it her only option for obtaining something she desires would be a 
clear example of manipulation that diminishes her ability exercising autonomy. Depriving her of food or 
water to compel her to engage in training would even be considered coercive. But neither manipulation 
nor coercion need apply to all training situations. 
 An illustration of what this could look like may be helpful. Consider a group of animals who live 
in a complex, captive environment, where they have many options for how to spend their time. Favored 
food ite s t eats  e o d thei  sta da d, ut itio all  o plete diet a e ade a aila le o asio all  
in various contexts, including that of training; that is, training is one way among several to secure these 
desired treats. The trainers care about the animal and are motivated by the desire to impart skills that 
expand her ability to exercise agency and that minimize the frequency or likelihood of situations where 
overriding autonomy is the only option for providing needed medical care. Training sessions are offered 
a few times per day, and it is up to the individual animal whether to approach and participate in the 
session, or whether to engage in another activity. An animal may have a training session focused on 
voluntary separation, but she is not separated from the others to compel training. When she loses 
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interest, she can rejoin her groupmates or move on to participating in another activity. E e  o  B & C s 
traditional approach to autonomy, it is not at all clear that this constitutes an objectionable form of 
manipulation.  
 PRT for veterinary procedures seems even less of a threat to animal autonomy when we adopt a 
relational conception of autonomy. Relational accounts recognize that the causal conditions for 
autonomy – socialization, available resources, institutional supports, etc. – are social. Since causal 
o ditio s i  pa t dete i e ea h i di idual s desi es a d o it e ts, no one is completely self-
determining. As Friedman puts it:  
 …auto o  is a atte  of deg ee a d e ui es age ts si pl  to ha o  the apa ities 
for certain sorts of reflection and agency, however these were acquired or are 
i te o e ted ith the age  of othe s…. “elf-determination may, ontologically 
speaking, be merely an intermediate causal process in a causal sequence extending 
backward and forward to infinity. Such causal embeddedness does not undermine its 
character as the kind of causal stage in the process that it is: the part determination by a 
self of he  o  eha io . 359 
In other words, if someone chooses to act in a certain way because doing so aligns with her own values 
and concerns, then the fact that it was someone else or a certain circumstance that introduced her to 
this option does not make her choice less autonomous – all her potential options are the product of 
social circumstances to some degree. As applied to the veterinary case, we might say that, while the 
animal did not initiate the training process, she is acting autonomously as long as she forms a persistent 
desire to participate in training.  
 D & K go further, suggesting that for at least some animals who are part of our society and 
dependent on us for care, it is not only morally permissible but morally required that we offer training 
because it expands the scope of agency, increasing autonomous capability. This is the case when the 
behavior or skill that is taught is one that increases ability to exercise autonomy but is not a behavior 
that would emerge spontaneously. They point out that the disability rights movements advocates for 
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oppo tu ities to e gage i  app op iatel  st u tu ed i te a tio  i.e., i te a tio s hi h halle ge ou  
skills just enough  [that] e pa d the self, a d the s ope fo  age ,  so it sta ds to easo  that this 
prescription holds for animals who are similarly depend on others for exercising their agency.360  
 D & K s disti tio , dis ussed i  Chapte  O e, et ee  i o age  a d a o age  also 
helps to clarify when training enhances autonomy and when it only improves welfare. Using training to 
enhance micro agency but not macro agency, i.e., providing control over the details of o e s life he  
major facets are governed by human interests, ignores a central aspect of animal autonomy. This is the 
problem with using PRT to facilitate procedures such as blood collection or injection in the course of 
most animal research. In this context, PRT surely does improve animal welfare, in that the animal 
subjects experience less emotional distress and perhaps less physical pain if experimental procedures do 
ot e ui e the  to e aught, s ueezed  i  a s ueeze age,361 or forcibly restrained; they will have the 
experience of having their agency thwarted. All things being equal, training in this context aligns with the 
duty of e efi e e. Ho e e , if the a i al s su je ti e good has pla ed o ole i  sele tio  of the 
experimental procedure being performed on her, and it will be performed whether or not she willingly 
participates in it, then training fails to respect for her autonomy. If anything, training makes it easier to 
overlook her denial of autonomy because she does not protest the way she likely would without 
training. With no real options, such training gives e el  the e ee  of age  a d o se t. 362 In 
veterinary medi i e, t ai i g a  se e to e ha e oth a o a d i o age , e ause the patie t s 
values and concerns inform decisions about which veterinary interventions training is used to facilitate. 
A dialogic approach to respect, in which the patient herself is our locus of respect, keeps macro agency 
front and center.  
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 In this final chapter, I have attempted to flesh out what a relational approach to patient 
autonomy might look like in practice. Importantly, respect for patient autonomy would come into play 
not just in determining which veterinary interventions to choose, but also how they are provided. In 
order to determine what options align with a nonlinguistic patie t s alues a d o e s, we must first 
address the challenge of interpreting her subjective good . Fortunately, we have several tools for 
interpretation which are already being utilized in science, veterinary medicine, and animal welfare 
fields: insights from the fields of animal behavior, ethology, and animal welfare science, as well as the 
discernment of caring and observant caregivers. While problems like self-serving biases and projected 
values can arise, we also have socially-constructed remedies such as seeking intersubjective consensus 
and providing a forum within the practice for identifying and addressing ethical issues. 
 I provided some practical guidelines for incorporating respect for autonomy in veterinary 
practice. Mostly, I have considered examples set in companion animal practice and ape sanctuaries – 
both because of my clinical experience and because animal autonomy and agency are already valued, to 
various extents, in these contexts. The o epts of asse t  a d a uies e e  to edi al p o edu es, 
as have been used to protect patient autonomy in pediatrics for several decades, can be usefully 
extrapolated to veterinary medicine. Oftentimes passive measures like flavoring medications and 
conscientiously constructing animal housing and veterinary buildings are the simplest and most 
convenient ways to enable veterinary patients to voluntarily participate in their care. Various positive 
reinforcement training methods, such as sensitization, counter-conditioning, and reward-based operant 
condition, hold the potential to expand animal agency, as well as to undermine it. A relational account 
of autonomy is useful both because it can handle the issues that arise in cases of highly dependent 
agency, and because it suggests ways to deploy the practice of training that ensure it truly promotes 







 With this thesis, I hope to initiate a conversation about why and how we might value and 
protect patient autonomy in veterinary medicine. Chapter One provided a general look at the question 
of whether we ought to attribute autonomy (or something similar, like agency) to animals and, if so, 
whether enabling and protecting autonomy is a relevant value in animal ethics. Chapter Two surveyed 
the discipline of veterinary medical ethics and found that it has largely remained silent on – and at times 
outright rejected – respect for patient autonomy is a relevant value. Furthermore, my attempt to 
extrapolate the principle of respect for patient autonomy from mainstream (human) biomedical ethics 
led to the conclusion that animals, because they inevitably lack adequate understanding of medical 
issues and interventions, would belong to the lass of e e - o pete t  patie ts, hose edi al a e 
is rightly determined by welfare-based standards, with no requirement to respect their autonomy.  
 I  Chapte  Th ee, I des i ed so e a s that ete i a  patie ts  auto o  is outi el  
overridden, both in the selection of veterinary interventions and in their delivery. I also identified some 
recent trends in veterinary medicine that suggest a nascent and unarticulated concern with respect for 
patient autonomy among some in the profession. I then presented criticisms leveled by feminist 
bioethicists and other scholars at the mainstream account of patient autonomy, and their suggestion 
that a relational account of autonomy is both more accurate and more appropriate for use in medicine. 
Adopting such a relational conception enables respect for patient autonomy to be coherently 
incorporated as a value in veterinary medicine, suggests ways of doing so that are meaningful to 
veterinary patients, and permits us to take advantage of relevant conceptual resources deployed in 
similar fields. I e phasized the eed to o ei e espe t  i  dialogi  a d dia h o i  te s. 
 Fi all , i  Chapte  Fou , I des i e a s of i te p eti g  hat o stitutes a  a i al s su je ti e 
good (her values, concerns, preferences, and desires) and elaborate on practical methods for respecting 
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patient autonomy that spring from taking a relational approach. I close by addressing the objection that 
t ai i g patie ts fo  ete i a  p o edu es u de i es a i als  auto o   u dul  a ipulati g 
them, concluding that a relational approach I present has the conceptual resources to distinguish 
instances when training promotes autonomy from instances when it may improve welfare, but adds 
only a veneer of enhancing agency or enabling autonomy.  
 Adding another value to the already complicated ethical landscape of veterinary practice means 
inviting new conflicts between values, e.g., respect for autonomy v. non-maleficence/beneficence. 
Recognizing respect for patient autonomy as an important ethical consideration makes veterinary 
practice more complicated. This, in itself, is not a reason for continuing to disregard it; what constitutes 
properly managing a disease also often becomes more complicated as our understanding of the 
o ditio s o ple it  i eases. But given that our time and powers of critical reflection are finite 
resources that adopting the framework outlined here will consume, it is important to show that taking 
this approach is truly justified. 
 With this in mind, I would like to end by replying to a key objection that may remain in the 
eade s i d, hose a s e i g ill also suggest a eas fo  futu e esea h. Na el , is i oki g 
autonomy really the simplest and most straightforward way to arrive at these substantive 
recommendations? What does introducing autonomy into the veterinary ethics conversation really add, 
that ould t e o tai ed i  a si ple  a ? 
 One way of advancing this objection is to claim that my account, while coherent, violates 
O a s ‘azo , the i ju tio  ot to ultiply entities unnecessarily. If I am creating complexity, it must 
be necessary complexity, it must add something philosophically and/or practically. What does invoking 
autonomy, and requiring it be relationally conceived, add beyond what we could achieve by claiming 
merely that eteri aria s should practice i  a ay that their patie ts o ’t resist a d that does ’t hurt 
them? Or, hat does this a ou t p o ide that ould t o  ould t e a essi le  sti ki g ith the 
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paradigm of animal welfare but stipulating that providing opportunities for choice is part of ensuring 
psychological well-being? 
 This objection can be countered on several fronts. First of all, judging from the dearth of 
publications on the subject, veterinary medical ethics is underexplored and undertheorized as a 
discipline; we have good reason to welcome the infusion of conceptual tools that bioethicists have 
developed for patient populations who are vulnerable in many of the same ways veterinary patients are. 
Relational autonomy theorists in bioethics successfully argue that autonomy is ethically relevant for 
human patients even when they do not qualify as Kantian agents, even when they lack the capacity for 
split-level autonomy, and even when they fail to reach the competency threshold argued for by 
mainstream autonomy theorists. Just as human and veterinary medicine inform one another when it 
comes to specific types of tumors or infections that affect both groups of patients – and ignore one 
a othe s fi di gs to thei  pe il – so too with ethical issues. If we invite discussion on this subject, we 
can expect to learn from both the similarities and the differences between veterinary and human 
medical practice.  
 The conceptual tools on offer from relational autonomy theorists and feminist bioethicists are 
also distinctive because they direct us to broaden the scope of our ethical vision beyond merely our 
interactions with our patients and their caregivers.363 Just like human medicine,364 the institution of 
veterinary medicine not only heals and prevents disease, it also reinforces, produces, and re-produces 
social norms, be they institutions, power structures, or ways of valuing. Depending on the framework(s) 
the profession adopts, certain issues will move to the forefront while others will be rendered invisible 
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and impossible to analyze.365 Given ou  so iet s p ese t state of flu  with regard to the moral status of 
animals and what constitutes ethical treatment of them, and its expectation that veterinarians will 
provide guidance on such issues, it is imperative that we invest in our conceptual resources and tools for 
critical reflection. Veterinary medicine will always shape society and animals  pla e i  it – the question is 
whether or not we will do so deliberately and with careful attention to the full range of decisions we are 
making. 
 Another way of refuting this objection is to locate situations in which including respect for 
patient autonomy as a value in our deliberations will lead us to different conclusions than merely 
adopti g o e of the si ple  ie s, that e ou age us to p o ide a e i  a a  ou  patie ts do t 
resist, or to broaden our conception of animal welfare to emphasize opportunities for choice-making. 
We will find relevant examples at the level of direct patient care as well as the institutional level. 
 I  pa ti ula , adopti g o e of the si ple  ie s ill esult i  a epti g so e p a ti es that 
would run counter to respect for autonomy. For example, the simpler views find it unproblematic to 
create merely choice decisions that are manipulated such that the patient essentially has no option but 
to hoose i  the a  as e desi e. The ie  I ad a e pla es a disti t alue o  the a i al s a ilit  to 
have input into the general shape of her life, as animals do when they are not dependent on humans for 
e e isi g thei  age . E su i g the a aila ilit  of e pe ie es that feel like hoosi g  o  that affe t 
o l  the i o-f a e  of thei  li es a  be sufficient under the simpler views, but not under the one I 
advance. Relational autonomy also invites scrutiny of the origin of desires or values, and makes their 
authenticity a relevant consideration.  
 Some concrete examples may help bring out the value of the view I advance, as well as suggest 
directions for future research. One that springs easily to mind is the issue of euthanasia. I have worked, 
at various times, as an emergency veterinarian, a wildlife rehabilitation assistant, and an animal shelter 
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o ke , so I ha e p o a l  pe fo ed o  pa ti ipated i  o e tha   fai  sha e  of eutha asias. I  the 
case of a very sick or hurting animal whose prospects for improvement are poor given her advanced age 
or the nature of her condition, euthanasia intuitively seems morally acceptable and sometimes required. 
While usuall  sad o  a  e otio al le el, espe iall  gi e   lose p o i it  to the patie t s fa il s 
grief, such cases do not cause me – or most veterinary professionals – moral discomfort. Contrast this 
with the euthanasia of (1) generally happy, healthy dogs and cats in an animal shelter that has reached 
capacity, and (2) animals who are ill but whose conditions are treatable or even curable, but whose 
caregivers request euthanasia because they cannot or will not incur the financial costs of veterinary 
care. Such experiences are filled not only with the emotion of sadness, but often also with anger, 
frustration, and distress. In the veterinary and shelter communities, these types of euthanasias are a 
source of great moral stress and compassion fatigue, and increasingly figure in explanations for why the 
suicide rate among veterinarians is several times the national average.366 
 Can the source of our moral unease be identified by a moral framework that considers only 
animal welfare – even an expanded sense of animal welfare that includes a recommendation to provide 
opportunities for choice or to avoid causing animals the experience of their choices being overridden? As 
animal welfare is currently interpreted by the AVMA, if the manner of a  a i al s death is i  a o d 
ith the patie t s elfa e, that is, if the ete i a ia  uses a te h i ue that is as apid a d pai less a d 
distress-f ee  as possi le, the  ou  duties to the patie t a e supposedl  satisfied.367 Yet, veterinarians 
and shelter workers demonstrate by their emotional and moral responses, and by their efforts to 
minimize the number of such euthanasias, that painless killing is not enough. Considerations beyond 
welfare must be relevant. 
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 Using the paradigm I offer here, we may find the conceptual resources needed to explain the 
source of our moral discomfort with such instances of hu a e eutha asia.  It also di e ts ou  atte tio  
to new ways of at least ameliorating what emerges as an obvious and legitimate moral problem. When 
we euthanize a healthy dog or cat, one who lets us know through her behavior that she values her life 
and would not choose to die right now, we violate her autonomy profoundly. We disregard her 
preference to continue living even if we end her life without hurting her, in a way she seemingly 
acquiesces to by, say, placing her paw into the hand of the person giving her the euthanasia injection.368 
 On its own, acknowledging that violating of patient autonomy is at the moral core of such 
situations will not, on its own, do much practical good. The veterinarian is still confronted with the 
conflict between respect for autonomy, on the one hand, and non-maleficence (if she fears that refusing 
to euthanize the animal will result in the client performing the killing in a manner that causes suffering 
or that shelter overpopulation will cause disease problems and patient suffering).The duty of fidelity 
notwithstanding, she must also factor in ethical obligations to society or other patients, e.g., the newly 
a i ed shelte  a i als  i te est i  ha i g ade uate spa e o  the hu a  o u it s i te est in not 
having disease outbreaks. However, a relational approach to autonomy, with its attention to the 
dependence of autonomy on social, institutional, and interpersonal factors, directs us to potential 
remedies beyond the immediate situation. The reasonable options available in the exam room are often 
limited by policy choices made at other levels, e.g., the hospital, the community, even nationally. 
 Fo  e a ple, he  it o es to ases of e o o i  eutha asia,  is our profession perpetuating 
any policies and incentive structures that contribute to the maintenance of the practice? What steps can 
we take at the hospital level to connect clients who are struggling financially to the resources that would 
make feasible a choice besides economic euthanasia? Should veterinary leadership come out more 
strongly in support of pet insurance, given its proven track record for decreasing the risk of economic 
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euthanasia? Regarding euthanasia of healthy, adoptable animals in shelters, is the AVMA fulfilling its 
moral obligations merely by issuing guidelines on how to euthanize these animals and adopting a policy 
statement, one sentence in length, asse ti g its la k of oppositio  to the eutha asia of u a ted 
a i als … he  o du ted  ualified pe so el, usi g app op iate hu a e ethods ?369  
 At some level, such approaches are already being considered by some in the profession. But I 
suspect we would deepen our ability to analyze the problem if we tap into the conceptual resources and 
practical approaches developed by those in (human) fields where dependent agency and the care of 
vulnerable individuals are central concerns. For example, feminists ethicists like Susan Dodds note that 
the assig e t fo  espo si ilit  fo  depe de t i di iduals is so iall  o st u ted: athe  tha  it ei g 
a given who is responsible for caring for dependent others, this is a decision made by society, whether 
deliberately or through the unconscious replication of unquestioned norms. Dodds argues that the way 
su h espo si ilit  is assig ed a  eate pathoge i  ul e a ilities,  o  sus epti ilit  to suffe i g a d 
loss of autonomy rooted in institutional structures and interpersonal relationships.370  
 The term depe de t othe s  t aditio all  efe s to hild e , o  people ith se e e og iti e o  
physical dysfunction, but there is no reason not to consider animals as dependent others as well, as their 
domestication has made them very dependent on human caregivers for their needs and their ability to 
exercise agency. I o po ati g this pe spe ti e a  help us ide tif  pathoge i  ul e a ilities  to 
which our profession contributes or acquiesces. We may question the social practice of assigning 
financial responsibility for veterinary care exclusively to the pet-o e ,  ho a  ha e ee  the only 
passer-by kind enough to take in a stray off the street. We may ask whether the veterinary community 
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should continue to simply accept that Animal Services departments are funded as their local 
communities see fit, when the resulting lack of institutional support directly causes the continued 
euthanasia of health, adoptable animals. If we deem that change is called for, then considering the 
broad view that relational autonomy accounts bring into view may be our best hope of creating far-
reaching solutions.  
 These examples, and most of those I have presented in this thesis, are focused fairly narrowly on 
companion animal practice and sanctuary medicine. But the veterinary profession obviously tends to 
many other types of animals. Most of our patients are in captivity and, in many – maybe most – cases, 
captivity is a restriction on autonomy. Even if we accept respect for autonomy as an important value in 
animal ethics, the fact of captivity is likely to persist, perhaps indefinitely. A relational approach to 
autonomy points to ways that we can nonetheless enhance the autonomy of animals living in captivity 
and accord it greater respect, and may at times lead us to challenge the perpetuation of captivity. 
 I o po ati g espe t fo  auto o , athe  tha  adopti g o e of the si ple  ie s, e ui es 
that e ot tu  a li d e e to the shape of ou  patie ts  lives; that is, we must look not only at their 
pain, fear, and opportunities for enjoyment, but also at whether they can, in any meaningful way, 
choose the types of lives that they live. While the veterinary profession is but a part of the whole of 
society that determines this, the fact is that the profession currently helps perpetuate institutions and 
practices that deny animals virtually any opportunity to shape their lives. If we accept that the 
autonomy of our patients matters, and that their autonomy depends fundamentally on social factors, 
the  e ust fa e diffi ult a d u o fo ta le uestio s a out ou  p ofessio s ole i  p o oti g 
institutions and practices that require the absolute denial of autonomy to animals. 
 Relational autonomy theorists have similarly challenged conventional medical ethics to own up 
to and change its tendency toward myopia: 
Debate has focused on certain practices within [the institution of medicine]: for 
example, truth-telling, obtaining consent, preserving confidentiality, the limits of 
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paternalism, allocation of resources, dealing with incurable illness, and matters of 
reproduction. The effect is to provide an ethical legitimization of the institution overall, 
ith a epta e of its ge e al st u tu es a d patte s. 371 
One place where my view would challenge veterinary medical ethics in this way is in its promotion and 
perpetuation of intensive animal agriculture, an institution which rests on the systematic denial of 
animal autonomy. As currently practiced, this institution denies animals any degree of macro agency: 
their living conditions, daily schedule, social associations – even their ability to physically move – are 
dictated exclusively by their human owners. Their lives are ended which it suits their human owners. To 
the extent that intensive agriculture concerns itself at all with micro agency, it tends to be limited to an 
attempt to decrease the frequency with which highly coercive methods, like electric prodding or 
physical beatings, are used, via construction of more a i al f ie dl  physical barriers or holding 
areas,372 or use of flight dista e  to get a i als to o e i  the di e tio  thei  ha dle  a ts.  
 Using its current framework of animal welfare, the veterinary profession does not recognize a 
moral problem with intensive animal agriculture. In fact, i  spite of the U ited Natio s  
recommendation that humans try to decrease reliance on animal protein because of environmental 
concerns,373 the AVMA puts resources toward advocating for more animal agriculture and promoting 
g eate  elia e o  a i al-sou e food. 374 I have yet to attend a veterinary continuing education 
conference that provided vegan meal options beyond one piece of fruit and a bag of potato chips.  
 I am not so naïve as to imagine the veterinary profession might begin promoting veganism or 
refusing to participate in the slaughter of animals who prefer to go on living. After all, veterinary 
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medicine has its origins in animal agriculture and, as long as animal agriculture exists, the profession has 
a duties of beneficence and non-maleficence its food a i al  patients, including minimizing their 
suffering during slaughter. However, if respecting and enabling patient autonomy were accorded a role 
in veterinary medical ethics, and its social undergirding made more visible, perhaps we would recognize 
an obligation to: (1) promote a decreased reliance on animal-sourced foods, as decreased demand 
would permit less intensive rearing practices that would likely provide some opportunities for animal 
autonomy, and (2) explore ways of raising farmed animals that enable at least a degree of macro and 
micro agency. As it sta ds, the p ofessio  te ds to dis ou age the p a ti e of ha i g pet  hi ke s o  
backyard flocks, citing disease concerns. However, given that many of these animals enjoy good welfare 
and the opportunity to exercise a significant degree of autonomy, we might consider it a reasonable 
alternative for keeping these chickens  a egi e s  families and communities provisioned with eggs. 
 Animal agriculture is but one example. If we recognize that our profession inevitably shapes, 
both explicitly and implicitly, the social milieu that constrains the very possibility of respecting animal 
autonomy, there are many areas ripe for ethical analysis. Among them: 
 How medical and veterinary research is conducted. This might apply to both designated 
esea h a i als  a othe  g oup of a i als ill little to no say over the macro frame of their 
lives) or companion animals who are enrolled in research trials from which they stand to 
benefit. Perhaps we have an obligation to work to change incentive structures and medical 
record systems to make possible more clinical research on naturally occurring illnesses or 
injuries. While the p a ti e of keepi g la o ato  a i als  fo  e pe i e tatio  pe sists, e 
might look for locations and practices for enabling agency above and beyond the use of PRT to 
produce compliance with research procedures. 
 How zoos implement their PRT programs and to what ends they use them. Currently, many PRT 
programs do seem to operate on the assumption that, if the animal is not resisting and you are 
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not hurting her, all your duties have been met. An ethical framework that incorporates concern 
for autonomy or macro agency may require zoo veterinarians to examine whether they can 
reconcile their provision of reproductive services whose intention is to develop genetically 
diverse, permanently captive population with the fact that, for at least some species, captivity 
seems to impose a fundamental limit on the development and exercise of autonomy. 
These proposals will seem radical to many; I will be pleasantly surprised if they enter the discussion 
within mainstream veterinary medicine within my lifetime. But that is part of the usefulness of this 
approach – it can highlight fundamental ethical problems that our existing paradigms render invisible. 
 Thus, regarding the objection that a si ple  fo ulatio  would get us the same substantive 
recommendations as valuing respect for patient autonomy, relationally conceived, I must conclude that 
it would not. Perhaps, in daily practice, we would reach similar conclusions if we adopted a formulation 
of animal welfare that asks both Is the patient well-cared for? and Would she choose this intervention 
and this life for herself? But, if the a s e  to eithe  of these uestio s is o,  the app oa h I he e 
recommend will demonstrate its value when we begin the work of remedying the situation. 
  As I said in the Introduction, when I began writing this thesis, I was employed as a chimpanzee 
sanctuary veterinarian. After setting up the veterinary program and settling in the first group of ape 
eti ees,  I returned to a position as an emergency veterinarian. These two branches of veterinary 
medicine differ substantially. As a sanctuary veterinarian, I worked with the same group of animals and 
caregivers, often getting to know them very well and having input during the course of their everyday 
lives, while as an ER clinician I usually work with each patient and client only once, and have little input 
i to the a i als  daily lives or the shape of their lives. Yet, I have found the ideal of protecting patient 
autonomy to be a useful in both fields, one that helps me provide better care to my patients, better 
guidance to their caregivers, and better leadership to the practice. My hope is that the ideas presented 
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